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Abstract
This thesis is concerned with sub-state politics and the influence it has on political behaviour and
attitudes. Parting company with much of the existing literature that examines elections in multilevel
systems, I argue that it is incorrect to assume that factors at the statewide level determine electoral
behaviour and attitudes at the sub-state level. Rather, elections at the statewide and sub-state level
should be seen as interdependent. Chapter 1 serves as an introduction to the thesis and sets up the
analytic framework upon which my research is based. I also give a broad discussion of my method
and explain why I choose Scotland andWales as cases in my argument. In Chapter 2, I outline and
describe my primary data sources – the devolved election studies – by detailing their origins and de-
sign. Chapter 3 examines what voters know about sub-state politics. I examine data from 10 election
studies in total and introduce a unique new dataset of press coverage of the NHS to examine policy
attribution. I find that considerable proportions of citizens have little knowledge of sub-state po-
litical issues. Chapter 4 focuses on the role that national identities play in vote choice at sub-state
and statewide elections. I also introduce the concept of party blocs in Scotland andWales. Results
indicate that national identity is a substantial predictor of bloc vote choice. In Chapter 5 I examine
how sub-state identities influence how voters cast their ballots at elections to different levels of gov-
ernment. My results indicate that vote switching is more prevalent among those who identify with
a sub-state identity (instead of a statewide identity). Chapter 6 tests whether split-ticket voting at
iii
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devolved elections is driven by strategic motivations. While voters appear to understand when it is in
their interests to cast a strategic vote in their constituency, there is no evidence suggesting they do in
the list vote. In the final chapter, I conclude by highlighting the findings of this thesis and remarking
on the importance of this work for future analyses of elections in multilevel systems.
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Note on interpretation of tables
For ease of interpretation, regression results in the form of maximum discrete change in probabil-
ity unless otherwise stated in the main body of this thesis. This is the change in predicted probabil-
ity of moving from the minimum (discrete) value of an explanatory variable to the maximum value,
holding all else equal. The way these values are calculated are as followed:
Pr(Y = 1jx;Xk = Max)  Pr(Y = 1jx;Xk = Min) (1)
where x denotes all remaining predictors. WhileXk is allowed to change, all remaining predic-
tors are kept at the same value. I set these predictors to their mean (continuous variables), median
(ordinal variables) or mode (nominal variables).
Full regression tables are presented in the Appendices.
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1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Politics does not occur on a single plane, nor is it constantwithin the bound-
aries of nation-states. Growing up inWales, this has always seemed an obvious statement of
political reality. The majority of my schooling, and my family’s employment, was shaped by policies
implemented not by the UKGovernment in London, but the Welsh Government in Cardiff. At
school, my classmates and I were met with the proposition that yes, we could be British, but we were
also Welsh – a label often loaded with far greater significance for us. Throughout my political sci-
ence education, I have learned that these dynamics are often referred to as ‘sub-state’ factors, owing
to the fact that they are concentrated within a territory below that of the nation-state, in this case
being the UK. The idea then, that political attitudes and behaviours are shaped by these ‘sub-state’
factors again seemed self-evident. When people I grew up with talked about politics, the UK or
‘Britain’ was mostly only referenced in terms of the Olympics or the wars it was fighting overseas. It
led me to conclude that to understand political behaviour and attitudes in the UK electoral scholars
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should study and take account of these factors.
Yet this is not the case in the majority of the literature I have come across throughout my stud-
ies. Instead, sub-state politics are often explained as a function of state-wide factors and analyses of
statewide politics rarely engage with sub-state factors at all (Henderson et al., 2017). In this thesis, I
hope to show that this is mistaken. When scholars do not pay adequate attention to sub-state fac-
tors, they are effectively fighting an analytical battle with one arm tied behind their back. Examining
sub-state political behaviour – and its interaction with statewide politics – reveals a world of new ev-
idence and understanding for political scientists. In the words of Lupia (2006a), “[w]e should focus
on the lower levels.’’ (pp. 220). In an increasingly complex, globalized, and interdependent world,
there are very few policy areas that can now be attributed exclusively to just one central level of the
state (Marks et al., 2008). This has led to a fundamental transformation in nation-state governance
and, crucially, how citizens in these states interact with politics. It is now highly likely that respon-
sibility for policy areas as diverse as healthcare, education, defence, immigration, income tax, and
refuse disposal is divided across multiple levels of government operating within different geograph-
ical boundaries. This arrangement is commonly referred to as ‘multilevel governance’ (Bache and
Flinders, 2005).
Across Europe, the multilevel dynamics of politics have rarely been so visible, making the study of
sub-state politics and elections both timely and necessary. In Italy, the success of the former north-
ern Italian regionalist party Lega Nord has propelled the party into a ruling coalition with the Five
Star Movement, and its leader, Matteo Salvini, to the Deputy Premiership of the country. This has
occurred against a backdrop of calls for greater autonomy, and even for independence, for the re-
gions of Lombardy and Veneto (Cento Bull and Gilbert, 2001; Povoledo, 2017). In Spain, a growing
sense of Catalan identity led to a unilateral referendum on independence held in Catalonia, and the
subsequent forceful reaction by the central Spanish state generated widespread civil unrest in the re-
gion (Minder and Barry, 2017). Across the rest of Spain, right-wing populist party VOX has gained
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popularity through its hard-line pro-centralization message in response to several years of growing
demands for more Catalan autonomy and separation from Spain (Martí, 2013; Elias, 2015; Crameri,
2015).
In the UK, where the majority of this thesis has been written and its subject matter, the multilevel
dynamic of politics has never been more apparent. The 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum
has led to a fundamental reordering of politics not only in Scotland but across the rest of the UK. In
Scotland it has redefined the cleavages that drive political behaviour and created new group identi-
ties around which voters organise themselves (Fieldhouse and Prosser, 2018). It has also led to seis-
mic shifts in the UK Parliament, with the pro-Independence Scottish National Party becoming the
third largest political party in the House of Commons after the 2015 and 2017 statewide elections.
In response to the referendum, then-PrimeMinister David Cameron introduced ‘English Votes for
English Laws’, asserting the UK Parliament’s role as both a UK and ‘English’ institution. This took
place against a backdrop of the growing prominence of English national identity in political debate
(Henderson et al., 2017). InWales, the National Assembly has seen a foundational redrawing of
its competences, moving from a conferred to a reserved model of government and the devolution
of tax powers (Wyn Jones and Scully, 2012; Poole and Ifan, 2019). In Northern Ireland, which has
been without a power-sharing executive since January 2017, shifts in demography and identities, and
Brexit have resulted in growing support for reunification with the Republic of Ireland (Hayward
andMcManus, 2018). These dynamics have rarely been so clearly displayed than the outcome of
the 2016 Referendum on EUmembership, a vote which saw Scotland and Northern Ireland opt
to remain, and England andWales opt to leave. The diverging paths of the UK’s four constituent
countries has become such a salient issue that the current1 UK PrimeMinister Boris Johnson has
appointed himself ‘Minister for the Union’. At no point in the last twenty years has it been so im-
portant for scholars of elections to focus on developing a multilevel understanding of politics.
I use this thesis to address a number of separate, but related research questions analyzing the dy-
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namics of multilevel electoral behaviour. The first examines what voters know (and don’t know)
about politics in a multilevel system, and the implications this has on voting behaviour. The sec-
ond question I address examines the factors that distinguish electoral behaviour in sub-state areas
from other territories within a nation-state. The final two research questions focus on vertical and
horizontal split-ticket voting.
The rest of this chapter will proceed as follows. First, I outline the broad aims and messages I put
forward throughout this thesis. Second, I describe my analytic framework, discussing existing re-
search that focuses on multilevel electoral behaviour. I then discuss the methods, cases, and data that
I use throughout the thesis to address my research questions. Finally, I provide an detailed overview
of each of the chapters that follow, and their contribution to the field.
1.1.1 Aims
The aims of this thesis are driven at least in part by the experience and political events outlined
above. I hope that the research herein stands as a challenge to much of the existing literature on
electoral behaviour that fails to take sub-state politics seriously. This literature has been restricted
by methodological nationalism: the assumption that the state and statewide factors are the prime
‘movers’ of political behaviour at elections to all levels of government. This restriction is ‘baked in’
to methods of data collection and analysis, ensuring that future research maintains and replicates
these biases.
This thesis breaks from this literature and it is my ambition to show that the study of sub-state
politics is vital to the pursuit of knowledge on elections in multilevel systems. I aim to do so by
adopting a multilevel approach: one that does not assume the prominence of attitudes and be-
haviours at one level over another. Such an approach can offer new information and explanations
for electoral behaviour at the sub-state and statewide levels. I also hope that this thesis will lead read-
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ers to go one step beyond and conclude that it is impossible in many cases to understand elections
in multilevel systems without taking such an approach. I aim to do this by addressing a series of
research questions that I argue emphasise the importance of engaging with sub-state politics, and
illustrate the ‘multilevel’ nature of political behaviour. I provide a more detailed overview of these
questions later on in this chapter.
By addressing these research questions, I also hope to advance, and in some cases challenge, ex-
isting theories and models of political behaviour. For example, by examining the role of sub-state
identities in vote choice through a multilevel lens I highlight the substantial influence these identi-
ties have prior to evaluations of competency. I also aim to show that these identities act as powerful
heuristics that voters use to compensate for low levels of knowledge about sub-state politics. In the
next section, I outline the analytic framework upon which this work is built.
1.2 Analytic Framework
1.2.1 The Trend Towards Multilevel Governance
The last forty years have witnessed a trend towards decentralization in nation-states across the world
(Hooghe et al., 2010; Schakel and Romanova, 2018). This decentralization has involved the trans-
fer of responsibility for various policy areas away from the central nation-state to sub-state institu-
tions, leading to “the dispersion of authoritative decision-making across multiple territorial levels”
(Hooghe, 2001, pp. 12). Germany, Spain, Austria, UK, Denmark, France, Canada, Australia, France,
Sweden, Belgium and Norway have all either introduced or increased the number of sub-state bod-
ies and elections to them. These nation-states can be described asmulti-level, due to the multiple
planes of governance created by a transformative shift away from a primarily centralized government
organization to a system of interconnected institutions and actors at supra-state, state and sub-state
6
Figure 1.1: Number of people living in territories with directly elected regional assemblies in 81 countries over ধme
Source: Schakel and Romanova (2018)
levels (Detterbeck, 2012).
This trend is a result of a two, often simultaneous, processes. The first has seen centralized gov-
ernments respond to a bottom-up process from groups calling for more autonomy from the nation-
state (Catalonia, Scotland andWales for example). A simultaneous process of top-down decentral-
ization has also emerged, with an eye to create a more accountable democracy and (or) freer markets
(e.g. in London) (Beramendi, 2009). The scale of decentralization has been described by Schakel
and Romanova (2018) and is illustrated in Figure 1.1. Across Europe, America, and Asia, nearly two
billion citizens were to some extent governed by sub-state bodies in 2010. In turn, as the number of
multi-level systems has increased, the study of these systems has become a growing focus of compar-
ative political research (for example, Rhodes, 1996; Hooghe andMarks, 2003; Hough and Jeffery,
2003; Swenden, 2006; Jeffery and Schakel, 2013; Bolleyer et al., 2014; Schakel and Dandoy, 2014; Mas-
setti and Schakel, 2015).
It is important for us as political scientists to realize the impact that shifts in governance can have
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on citizens’ lives. For a substantial proportion of citizens across the world the politics of the ‘every-
day’ now occur across multiple territorial levels and are not dictated from a singular plane at the level
of the state. The institutions responsible for their family’s education, their ability to access health-
care, the quality of their roads, and the amount of tax they pay are all likely to be determined by
politicians and bureaucracies at different levels of government.
This shift has had a transformative effect on democracy in these nation-states. As Figure 1.1 shows,
more than nine out of every ten citizens who are able to cast a vote in a statewide election in these ar-
eas can now cast a vote in a sub-state election. Spain, Italy, the UK and Belgium have all seen grow-
ing independence or sovereignty movements gain ground, in some cases threatening the territorial
integrity of the nation-states within which they operate (BBC, 2014, 2017).
1.2.2 Elections in Multi-Level Electoral Systems
Despite the trend of decentralization identified by political scientists, the study of sub-state elections
still lags considerably behind that of state-wide elections (Schakel and Romanova, 2018). Both in
terms of theory and method, multilevel dynamics are too often included as an afterthought, or ex-
cluded altogether. To address this, and to lay out my research framework within which my research
takes place, I highlight some of the schools of thought that have developed in the study of multi-
level elections. I begin by addressing methodological nationalism, a critique of electoral research that
assumes the supremacy of the nation-state, developed by Jeffery andWincott (2010b). Second, I
discuss the second-order election (SOE) hypothesis (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). This is the most com-
monly known explanation of voting in multilevel systems and the target of Jeffery andWincott
(2010b)’s critique. Finally, I go on to describe what a ‘multilevel’ understanding of elections might
look like.
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1.2.3 Methodological nationalism
Sub-state governance and elections are an increasingly common occurrence, yet the scholarship on
elections remains focused on elections at the level of the nation-state. Schakel and Romanova (2018)
attribute this tomethodological nationalism, or the assumption that the nation-state is the natu-
ral form of social and political organization. The term was originally developed byWimmer and
Glick Schiller (2002) as a critique of the dominant narratives of international relations and migra-
tion studies, and applied to the study of elections by Jeffery andWincott (2010b) (see also Beck,
2000, 2003; Jeffery and Schakel, 2013). For Beck (2002), methodological nationalism takes the fol-
lowing premises for granted:
“it equates societies with nation-state societies and sees states and their government
as the cornerstones of a social sciences analysis. It assumes that humanity is naturally
divided into a limited number of nations, which on the inside, organise themselves
as nation-states and, on the outside, set boundaries to distinguish themselves from
other nation-states. It goes even further: this outer delimitation, as well as the com-
petition between nation-states, represents the most fundamental category of political
organisation [and] the social science stance is rooted in the concept of nation-state. It
is nation-state outlook on society, politics, law, justice and history, which governs the
sociological imagination” (pp. 51-2).
These assumptions have become (or rather always have been) the norm in social sciences, and
in particular the study of elections. It is not necessarily a set of conscious biases but is nonetheless
entrenched within theories of politics and the ways in which data is collected. In this vein, Jeffery
andWincott (2010a) compare methodological nationalism to Billig (1995)’s conception of Western
nationalism in general: “at once forgotten or taken for granted, but also omnipresent and regularly
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reinforced at a subliminal level” (pp. 172). They argue that this methodological nationalism has
blinkered the social sciences to what is happening within the state at sub-state and regional levels.
These regional and sub-state communities “may themselves and from the ‘bottom up’, actively seek
to, and succeed in” influencing and changing multi-level relationships, with voters, parties and inter-
est groups pursuing territorial goals that are not consistent with the boundaries of the nation-state
(Jeffery, 2006, pp.214). Yet a theoretical and methodological fixation with the nation-state has meant
that it has been difficult for social scientists to explore these dynamics. These assumptions have cre-
ated a historical tendency for the social sciences to overstate the dominance of the central state, even
prior to wide-scale decentralization. As I expand upon in Chapter 2, data collection habits that date
back over 70 years have made multilevel analysis of voting within nation-states impracticable.
1.2.4 The Second-Order Election Hypothesis
Jeffery andWincott (2010b)’s critique can be viewed as a direct challenge to the dominant frame of
analyses of sub-state elections which assumes the supremacy of state-wide elections. Here, electoral
behaviour at the sub-state or supranational levels is assumed to be primarily a function of statewide
issues and attitudes. Perhaps the best example of this approach is the second-order election (SOE)
theory, an approach to electoral behaviour in multilevel systems that has sought to explain differen-
tial patterns of voting between levels of government (Jeffery and Schakel, 2013). Coined by Reif and
Schmitt (1980) in their study of elections to the European Parliament, the SOE theory proposes that
voting patterns in non-statewide elections are heavily influenced by issues and events at the statewide
level, and most importantly, satisfaction with statewide government performance. The evidence
often cited in support of this model consists of four contentions (Rohrschneider and Clark, 2007);
1. Relative to statewide elections, voters have a tendency to ‘defect’ from the governing statewide
party in favour of opposition parties.
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2. Smaller parties will tend to benefit from this defection.
3. The rate of defection from larger ruling parties to small opposition parties is greater during
the middle of a parliamentary cycle, when performance evaluations of governing parties tend
to be at their lowest.
4. Turnout at non-statewide elections is lower relative to statewide elections.
The mechanisms for these behaviours draw from on a range of existing theories of electoral be-
haviour and have been examined more thoroughly in subsequent analyses. The model relies heav-
ily on the work of Tufte (1975) and his conception of elections acting as referendums, namely, that
when voters are faced with an election that they do not perceive to be important, they use their vote
choice to send a message to the governing statewide party (Tufte, 1975; Reif and Schmitt, 1980;
Oppenhuis et al., 1996; Schmitt and Teperoglou, 2017). Depending on the point at which non-
statewide election falls in the political business cycle, the governing party will normally perform
worse than its performance at statewide elections, with opposition and smaller parties doing better
(Soldatos, 1994). The theory approaches differential turnout through a rational choice framework
(see Blais, 2000). If we consider the choice to vote as a result of a cost-benefit analysis voters under-
take, we can expect higher participation in elections at which voters believe the benefits of voting
will outweigh the cost (Downs, 1957). The balance between the costs and benefits of voting is de-
pendent on the probability of a vote having an impact on the result of an electoral contest, as well
as the perceived costs of having a candidate not of your choosing win (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968).
Mattila (2003) and Pacek et al. (2009) argue that the decision to vote is one that carries a low-cost
and low-expected benefits. As a result, it only requires small changes in the cost or benefit to induce
a significant change in ballot behaviour (Aldrich, 1993). According to the SOE theory, voters do not
perceive European Parliament elections to be as important or relevant as statewide elections, mean-
ing that the perceived benefit achieved by voting would be less than the cost of voting.
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The SOE theory also states that the behaviour of elites at these elections are a function of statewide
considerations. For example, Andeweg (1995) has argued that political parties face incentives to
maintain focus on their statewide policy program, even during elections to non-nation state bodies.
This is because they are aware that their performance in government will be judged on their ability
to implement their manifesto commitments at the statewide level. This has a knock-on effect on the
behaviour of individual citizens: As parties fail to debate the European Union (EU) in its own right
and as a separate level of government, the electorate are unlikely to hear information necessary to
determining their vote choices, and therefore fall back on statewide events and judgments (Gabel,
2000).
At European Parliament elections, the SOE theory has been a useful analytical tool through
which to explain voting behaviour (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Norris and Reif; Marsh, 1998; Majone,
1998; Schmitt and Thomassen, 1999; Rohrschneider, 2002; Rohrschneider and Clark, 2007; Hix
andMarsh, 2007). Its success has led to it being applied beyond its original context, moving from
supranational to sub-state elections. On the basis of observations of aggregate-level voting data, sub-
state elections appear to fit the pattern described by the SOE theory. Like elections to the European
Parliament, sub-state elections tend to have a lower turnout than statewide elections2, and receive
significantly less attention in the media. Small and ethno-regionalist political parties also tend to
receive higher vote shares relative to statewide elections (see Perez-Nievas and Bonet, 2008). Yet
analysis of aggregate data has also challenged the ability of the SOE hypothesis to explain voting pat-
terns in sub-state elections. Hough and Jeffery (2003) show that while the SOE certainly has some
explanatory power in Germany and selected contests in Spain, the hypothesis falls short in other
sub-state areas. In territories historically considered politically and culturally distinct from the rest
of the nation-state – such as the Basque Country, Catalonia, Scotland, andWales – the SOEmodel
has not offered an adequate explanatory device for voting behaviour. They conclude that “regional
elections in the historic nationalities at least are clearly not ‘second order’ elections, but rather oper-
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ate according to a distinctive region-specific dynamic” (Hough and Jeffery, 2003). Similarly, Dandoy
and Schakel (2013) argue that voting behaviour at regional elections moves along a regionalization-
nationalization continuum, with more ‘second order’ behaviour occurring in states with higher
levels of centralization.
Furthermore, the SOE theory has empirical and theoretical weaknesses that warrant attention.
First, the equivalence of European Parliament elections and sub-state elections is questionable. Eu-
ropean Parliament elections do not generate a directly elected executive as many sub-state elections
do (Perez-Nievas and Bonet, 2008). The European Commission, which serves as the executive of
the European Union, is appointed by the European Council and then receives a vote of approval by
the European Parliament. The resulting outcome is one that is far less accountable to the citizenry
of the European Union than the outcomes of sub-state elections. In addition, it is probable that
an electorate’s knowledge of a regional political arena is greater than the European political arena,
a contention that I address in Chapter 3. There are many reasons why this may be the case, such as
political parties being more willing to enter into discourse of regional politics and policies relating to
issues closer to home (Perez-Nievas and Bonet, 2008).
The second, as has already been mentioned, is the assumption of the primacy of statewide elec-
tions over ‘less important elections’ (Schmitt and Teperoglou, 2017). In particular, the assumption
that the effect of elections at the statewide level have a substantial and largely ‘one-way’ impact on
elections and behaviours at other levels. The possibility that elections and behaviours at other lev-
els might have a substantial impact on statewide elections is rarely considered or investigated. In
this way scholars create a vicious circle: existing theory highlights the importance of statewide elec-
tions, encouraging scholars to apply these perspectives to other elections at different levels of gov-
ernment, which further stress the importance of statewide factors. As Jeffery andWincott (2010b)
argue “[the SOE hypothesis] imports the assumption that other electoral competitions are subordi-
nate to statewide politics, [and] pre-empts alternate possibilities”(pp. 179).
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The SOE theory has also faced empirical challenges; in particular, its over-reliance on aggregate
data to draw inferences about individual-level behaviour. (Schakel and Romanova, 2018). At its
basic level, the SOEmodel is about the motivations and behaviours of individual voters. Aggregate-
level analysis simply cannot ascertain why voters behave differently and why turnout is lower at
different elections; it can only identify net variations in voting patterns (King, 2013a). Therefore,
an individual-level analysis using survey data is required to actually understand the motivations of
political behaviour in multilevel systems. When individual-level analysis has been carried out, the
SOE theory has often lacked explanatory power. Trystan et al. (2003) argue that a ‘multi-level vot-
ing’ approach – whereby it is accepted that some parties will systematically perform better electoral
contests at certain levels than others – offered a more powerful explanatory model in explaining the
inaugural 1999 elections to the National Assembly for Wales. Similarly, Wyn Jones and Scully (2006)
have found that voters in devolved elections are often driven by uniquely Welsh/Scottish issues.
More recent work by Scully (2013) has suggested that Scottish issues hold more weight at Scottish
elections thanWelsh issues do at Welsh elections, consistent with Dandoy and Schakel (2013)3. Al-
though these studies face their own limitations (see Chapter 5) they pose a significant challenge to
how sub-state election analysis should be approached.
1.3 A multilevel understanding of elections
This thesis argues that the study of sub-state elections, and indeed of elections in general, requires a
different approach. If scholars continue to see sub-state politics as a function of statewide politics,
they are closing themselves off to a world of information that can contribute to our understanding
of political behaviour at every level. An evolving body of work has developed in recent years that ad-
vocates for a multilevel understanding of elections and electoral behaviour (Schakel and Romanova,
2018). In this next section I discuss electoral research that can help us understand the dynamics of
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elections in multi-level systems.
1.3.1 Elections in multi-level systems: a two-way street
An essential first step in understanding the dynamics of electoral politics in multilevel systems is to
acknowledge the interchange that exists between different levels within a nation-state, and in partic-
ular the interchange of behaviours that occurs between elections. Unlike the SOE, which sees elec-
toral behaviour at sub-state elections as a function of statewide issues and attitudes, I argue that we
should instead view elections in multi-level systems as a two-way street. This means that scholars of
elections should account not only for how statewide factors might influence sub-state politics, but
how sub-state factors can have a substantial impact on statewide, and indeed international, political
events. To do this, we can draw upon a wide range of evidence from political science. For example,
inherent within the theory of electoral cycles is the idea that past elections, and the relative timing
of them, have an impact on the electoral outcomes of any other given election. Schmitt and van der
Eijk (2008) identify different relationships, or ‘interdependencies’, between elections in multilevel
systems:
1. ‘interdependencies between previous [and future elections]’ and;
2. ‘interdependencies between elections at different levels of government.’
In other words, the focus of each election is necessarily defined by the preceding one; the win-
ning party or parties set the policy agenda until the next election at which they must defend these
policies against an opposition. By the same logic, each election sets the parameters within which the
following election takes place. If it is true that election results at different levels are interdependent
of one another, then the motivations and behaviours of voters and politicians are necessarily inter-
dependent also, given that they determine electoral results. Therefore, when examining an election
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in a multi-level system of governance, it is necessary to consider how factors at other levels may in-
fluence the outcome. In this sense elections at a particular level in multi-level systems should not be
viewed as isolated events affected only by factors measured at the level of the nation-state. After all,
when government terms of office run to full term (or near full term) it is very likely that any election
that precedes another will be one that occurs at a different level, excluding the small number of areas
where elections at multiple levels are held concurrently (Belgium and Spain, for example). Its likely
to be the case then that one of the largest and temporally relevant influences of voter and elite be-
haviour will be a recent election that occurred at a different level of government. Once again, we can
turn to the literature of electoral cycles for support. This body of work describes a trend observed
across a variety of states whereby the fortunes of political parties are influenced in part by where the
poll falls in the political business cycle (Tufte, 1975; Soldatos, 1994). By this reading, it is the tempo-
ral distance between elections, rather than whether they are first or second-order elections, which
plays the largest role in determining how one election impacts upon another: i.e an election held 12
months prior to another election is likely to play a larger role than than an election held 24 months
prior (Schakel and Dandoy, 2014)
Contemporary political events across Europe illustrate how sub-state issues and elections have
had substantial impact on statewide politics. In the UK, general election campaigns in Scotland and
Wales – and indeed areas beyond their borders – are often framed by the previous sub-state election.
The 2011 devolved election victory of the SNP, and subsequent Scottish Independence Referendum
of 2014, dominated Conservative campaign messaging across the rest of Great Britain at the 2015
statewide general election (see Figure 1.2 for illustrative example) (see Cowley and Kavanagh, 2018).
In Spain, the recent electoral success of right-wing populist party VOX can be viewed as a reac-
tionary response to, among other things, the Catalan independence movement. Santiago Abascal,
the party’s leader, has vowed to uphold “the unity of Spain and centralization of the state” (Hedg-
coe, 2018), whilst Fernandez-Albertos (2019) has argued that “the Catalan issue is what has most
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Figure 1.2: Conservaধve campaign poster, 2015 General Elecধon Source: M&C Saatchi, London
motivated their support so far”. There are also recent examples of how sub-state factors have af-
fected not only statewide political events, but international agreements between multiple nation-
states. The Canada-Europe Trade Agreement was twice seriously delayed by sub-state interests; first
by dairy farmers in Quebec (Johnson et al., 2013), and then by the sub-state Walloon Parliament in
Belgium (BBC, 2016). These examples present compelling evidence for a detailed and rigorous exam-
ination of two-way interdependencies that exist between elections at different levels of government.
Such evidence of interactions between tiers of government also calls into question the idea that
the relationship between statewide and sub-state politics is a one-way relationship. Elections at
different levels of government can be used to ‘frame’ future elections. This is particularly impor-
tant when assessing media coverage of multilevel politics. Prior elections are likely to be used in the
media as ‘referendums’ (Simon, 1989) or ‘barometers’ (Anderson andWard, 1996) that offer a real
test of public opinion. Mattila (2003) has argued that ‘politicians, journalists and potential voters
show increased interest in voting because [European Parliament] elections serve as markers of party
strength in the upcoming [state-wide] elections.’ (pp. 456). It is also important to consider that
such influence does not necessarily follow the normal logic of causation, where earlier events are
causes and later ones are consequences. Oppenhuis et al. (1996) show that the effect of a statewide
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election on a European Parliament election that precedes it, is different in character from one that
follows it. Political actors are likely to anticipate future political events like elections and modify
their behaviour as a result. I would suggest, then, that the way in which the media cover and frame
politics in multilevel systems can therefore have a substantial impact on the political behaviour of
citizens.
Another way that elections can be seen as interdependent is through the formation of voting
habits. Habit is often cited as a proposed factor that can explain voting behaviour and turnout in
particular: people are more likely to vote in the current election if they voted in previous elections
(Gerber et al., 2003). Yet it is possible that other aspects of political behaviour can manifest them-
selves as habits. For example, Shachar (2003) has presented evidence that party choice can also be
viewed as a habit. In multilevel systems, this habit can by disrupted if voters cast their ballots for
different parties at different levels of government.
The literature identifies two ways in which multilevel systems facilitate this differential voting.
The first is that voters choose the party they vote for based on level-specific factors (Trystan et al.,
2003; Hough and Jeffery, 2003; Wyn Jones and Scully, 2006; Schakel and Dandoy, 2014; Schmitt
and Teperoglou, 2017). This theory of electoral behaviour has been referred to as ‘multi-level vot-
ing’, and challenges the SOE understanding of electoral behaviour as a reaction to statewide factors
(Trystan et al., 2003).
Second, multilevel institutions can also disrupt the voting habits of citizens by creating incen-
tives to cast votes for different parties at different elections. This is particularly relevant in multilevel
systems where different electoral systems are used at different levels of government. Electoral sys-
tems are frequently cited as having a considerable impact on the behaviours of voters and political
parties (Duverger, 1954; Sartori, 1976; Cox, 1997; Farrell, 2001). How a system translates votes into
representation shapes how parties coordinate organization and campaign efforts and how voters
measure the costs and benefits of voting. When voters do face incentives to vote differently at dif-
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ferent levels of government, this can change their future electoral behaviour. Shachar (2003) argues
that the act of voting for a party different to the one a voter normally votes for, increases the proba-
bility of that voter defecting to another party at subsequent elections. This can create a ‘spill-over’ of
knowledge and behaviours from one election to the next, and between levels. Voters will procure an
understanding of which parties are competitors and potential challengers; ways of maximizing the
influence of their vote; and the political issues that are prevalent in their arena. Future voting will be
built upon this knowledge, with knowledge frommore recent elections having a larger influencing
role. This notion of path dependency – that electoral choices are made utilizing past knowledge and
decisions – has been examined in electoral research to a limited extent (see Campbell, 1966; Reif and
Schmitt, 1980), but has not yet been analysed to the same extent in multi-level systems.
1.3.2 Summary
Elections at one level cannot be viewed in isolation, and instead should be viewed as points on an
electoral continuum. Voters use knowledge frommultiple levels of politics when formulating their
electoral choices, and are often unaware of doing so, as elites and parties coordinate between lev-
els and voters seek quick sources of information. This means that the behaviours and attitudes of
voters are not constant, and are shaped by the level of government most salient at the time and the
outcomes of previous elections at any level. Elections in multilevel systems must be viewed in this
context. Recent political events in Spain, the UK and Belgium have highlighted that scholars can no
longer view sub-state factors as a function of statewide issues. Instead, our analysis of elections in
general need to account for both of these factors.
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1.4 Method, Case, and Data
In this section I discuss my method and case selection for this thesis, and introduce the data used in
the analysis of this dissertation.
1.4.1 Method
The primary source of analysis in this thesis is individual-level survey data. This offers a number
of benefits when analyzing the behaviour of large populations. First, survey research allows the
researcher to identify characteristics and trends within their sample and generalize these onto the
real-world population (Johnston, 2008). Second, the large-scale adoption of internet-based sur-
veys has dramatically reduced the cost of collecting responses, allowing for the collection of larger
sample sizes which invariably capture a greater degree of variation within the sample. As many of
the most common quantitative analysis techniques such as regression are dependent on variation
between observations, this allows for more in-depth analysis of differences between groups in a sam-
ple. Third, the anonymity provided by surveys also provides benefits to individual-level research.
Research on behaviour is dependent upon subjects providing truthful responses to the best of their
ability. When conducted anonymously, respondents face less social pressure to change their answers
to be more socially desirable (Tourangeau et al., 2000b).
Finally, as I am interested in the individual motivations and drivers of electoral behaviour in mul-
tilevel systems, surveys offer the only feasible way to uncover these individual dynamics among large
groups of the population. Aggregate-level data cannot tell us information about individual-level be-
haviour or motivation due to the problem of ecological inference (King, 2013b). Small-N qualitative
research such as focus groups or in-depth interviews also face problems. While they are able to pro-
vide much more in-depth insights into the behaviour of certain individuals, we cannot extrapolate
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and generalize onto the real population. Survey research offers an ideal middle ground between the
two.
1.4.2 Case and Data Selection
Throughout this thesis, I focus on two sub-state areas within the UK: Scotland andWales. Political
decentralization is relatively new to the UK, with devolution only occurring after referendums in
1997. Yet the UK has also been home to long-term territorial heterogeneity when it comes to elec-
toral behaviour, particularly in Scotland andWales (see, for example, Blondel, 1963; Hearl et al.,
1996; Mitchell, 2009). In this way, the UK offers a unique case where political scientists are able to
analyse how voters behave when presented with an entirely new political arena, and a new electoral
system to go with it. Yet Scotland andWales also offer an interesting contrast to one another. Since
joining the UK in 1707, Scotland has retained a degree of institutional autonomy, with separate legal
and educational systems (Mitchell, 2009). In contrast, Wales has been assimilated into the institu-
tions of England to a far greater degree (Balsom et al., 1983). Yet it has maintained a distinct culture,
with different religious traditions, and a substantial population of first-language Welsh-speakers.
These cultural dynamics have often been cited as mechanisms that amplify the influence of sub-state
factors in political behaviour (Hough and Jeffery, 2003; Jeffery and Hough, 2003).
Scotland andWales also make for useful cases due to the availability of high-quality survey data:
dedicated election surveys have been carried out at every devolved election since 1999. These studies
provide political scientists with detailed individual-level data on political attitudes and behaviours,
with level-specific questions. The devolved election studies are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.
Outside of the devolved election studies, the British Election Study also offers a useful source of data
for voters in Scotland andWales. The 2014-2017 British Election Study includes booster samples
of respondents in Scotland andWales providing enough observations to carry out detailed analysis
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(Fieldhouse et al., 2018).
The main methodological innovation of this thesis is to combine these data, merging the BES
with the devolved election studies. By doing so, I create a newmulitlevel panel that – for the first
time in the UK – is able to follow the same voters over time, over multiple election at different lev-
els of government. These data also includes questions specific to both levels of government, which
means that the data is less vulnerable to vote recall bias. Previously, if scholars were interested in
how a respondent voted at a previous election to a different level of government, they were reliant
on respondents being able to accurately and honestly volunteer that information. Yet it is well estab-
lished in the political science literature that vote recall and vote self-prediction are unreliable (Weir,
1975; Himmelweit et al., 1978; Tourangeau et al., 2000b; Rogers and Aida, 2014). This unreliability
is heightened by respondents’ current party preferences, at times of party preference volatility, or
when asked proximate to a different election (van Elsas et al., 2013). As Chapter 5 will show, party
preferences are not stable between elections to different levels. However, by linking the BES with
devolved election studies, previous vote (in addition to numerous other variables of interest) is
recorded in the immediate aftermath of the vote, reducing the likelihood of recall bias. It also al-
lows for the combination of attitudes from different levels, meaning that the interaction between
attitudes and behaviours between levels can be better understood.
1.5 Overview
This thesis brings together four substantive chapters that analyze different aspects of political be-
haviour in Scotland andWales. Separate research questions are addressed in each chapter, yet are
unified in their effort to provide answers to questions about individual-level behaviour in multilevel
electoral systems. In this section, I provide an overview of each chapter, and address the contribu-
tions each make to the wider literature of electoral behaviour.
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The first substantive chapter of this thesis is a comprehensive investigation of what citizens in
Scotland andWales know about politics. This represents the first attempt to do so. Political knowl-
edge is assumed to be of central importance to the health of democracy: the better informed citizens
are about politics, the better placed they are to express their preferences and attitudes at the ballot
box and to hold incumbents to account (Fiorina, 1981). Not only has this assumption underpinned
normative theories of democracy for decades (Downs, 1957; Dahl, 1971, 1989, 1998; Held, 1996), but
it is also assumed to play a central role in many of our empirical models of voting behaviour (e.g.,
Inglehart, 1990; Zaller and Feldman, 1992; Freedman et al., 2004). Knowing what voters do or don’t
know is an important foundation upon which other work can be built. It is of particular interest
and importance in a relatively young multilevel system like those of Scotland andWales. Here, citi-
zen awareness of political facts relating to the sub-state level cannot be taken as a given.
The chapter is split into three substantive sections. The first focuses on descriptive analysis of
political knowledge in Scotland andWales. Landman (2003) argues that systematic research should
always begin with good description. As such, I provide a detailed descriptive analysis of all survey
questions included in the Scottish andWelsh devolved election studies that test respondent knowl-
edge from 1999-2016. I also investigate whether there are systematic differences in political knowl-
edge levels between Scotland andWales, something which may have significant implications for
comparisons of voting behaviour between the two sub-state areas. Here I establish two trends. The
first is that a substantial proportion of Scottish andWelsh citizens are unable to correctly answer
questions about politics at the devolved level. The second is the existence of a knowledge gap be-
tween Scotland andWales: Scottish citizens knowmore about devolved politics thanWelsh citizens.
The second section examines the supply of political information in Scotland andWales, a poten-
tial source of the knowledge gap. To do so, I use an entirely unique dataset of over 190,000 news-
paper articles between 2000 and 2017. I run a content analysis on the data to identify which level of
government the print media talk about when they discuss a prominent devolved policy area: the Na-
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tional Health Service (NHS). This analysis – of approximately 96,000,000 words – identifies clear
trends in press coverage that may go some way to explain different levels of knowledge in Scotland
andWales. Again, this is a unique contribution to the field, being the largest and most comprehen-
sive analysis of political media coverage carried out in Scotland andWales. In the third and final
section I return to individual-level survey data to examine what differentiates those citizens who
knowmore or less about politics with a series of regression analyses. Here, I make a contribution to
the existing literature on political knowledge and elections in multilevel systems by linking national
identity and level-specific media consumption to what citizens do or do not know. This is the first
time that sub-state specific factors have been shown to have an impact on levels of political knowl-
edge.
Chapter 4 addresses Scotland andWales’ territorial heterogeneity, relative to England. Work by
electoral scholars has long recognized that Scotland andWales are distinct political areas, even in the
decades prior to devolution (Blondel, 1963; Butler and Stokes, 1969; Hearl et al., 1996; Trystan et al.,
2003; Johns et al., 2010; Scully, 2016). This distinctiveness has been defined by the strength of the
Labour Party, the weakness of the Conservative Party, and the significant presence of left-of-centre
ethno-regionalist parties (the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru).
Existing explanations of voting behaviour have not adequately addressed the mechanisms for
this distinctiveness. I argue that an explanation for this can be uncovered by examining the factors
further back in the funnel of causality, specifically national identity. I start with a conception of po-
litical party competition in Scotland andWales occurring between ‘blocs’ of parties: a left-of-centre
bloc and a right-of-centre bloc. I then examine which factors can predict which bloc of parties a vot-
ers chooses to vote for at three elections: the 2015 UK general election, the 2016 devolved elections,
and the 2017 UK general election.
To do this, I combine individual-level survey data from the 2014-2017 British Election Study
(Fieldhouse et al., 2018) and the 2016 devolved election studies (Henderson et al., 2016; Scully et al.,
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2016). This creates the opportunity to follow the same individuals across these three elections. Com-
bining election surveys is a new approach that has not previously been used in the UK, and is also
relatively unique in the study of multilevel electoral behaviour more generally. My results show that
national identity is a powerful explanatory tool for distinguishing between the two blocs of voters.
The implications of this are twofold. First, it confirms the role of sub-state identities in influenc-
ing and determining vote choice at statewide elections. It therefore establishes the need for electoral
scholars to account for multilevel factors in analyses of voting behaviour, even when examining an
isolated electoral event at a different level of government.
Second, the results have more specific implications for the study of political behaviour in the
UK. As a nation-state, the UK is currently undergoing a period of seismic constitutional flux and
uncertainty, accompanied by increasing social, political, and geographic polarization. If we are to
understand long-term political change in the UK, it is vital to understand where diverging political
attitudes are generated, and how they are solidified into political behaviours.
In Chapter 5, I focus on differential voting between levels of government. In other words, why
do some voters vote for different parties at elections to different levels of government? My starting
point here is the Multilevel Voting (MLV) hypothesis which postulates that voters in multilevel sys-
tems use different logics to make vote choices at elections to different levels of government (Trystan
et al., 2003). Jeffery and Hough (2003) argue that this is because of the presence of ‘historic national-
ities’ or the the existence of strong sub-state identities.
Yet Jeffery and Hough (2003)’s hypothesis has never been tested at the individual-level; it is in-
stead a hypothesis derived from observing aggregate-level vote returns. This is an ecological fallacy:
individual-level behaviours (i.e. vote choice) cannot be inferred from aggregate-level patterns. It also
fails to acknowledge that national identity within sub-state territories is heterogeneous. Some voters
will identify with a sub-state identity, others will identify with a statewide identity, and some will
identify with both or neither. A priori, we would expect to see considerable variation between indi-
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viduals in their propensity to vote for different parties at different levels of government, conditional
on the national identities with which they identify.
This chapter puts this ‘historic nationalities’ hypothesis to the test at the individual-level: that
voters with strong levels of attachment to a sub-state identity will be more likely to switch the party
they vote for at different levels of government. For this analysis, I use Wales alone as a case, owing to
the availability of data. Again, I combine observations from the BES andWES to create a panel of
respondents across three elections at different levels. I find that national identity does indeed play a
role in differential voting inWales, but only among certain groups of voters. This is the first analysis
which has shown national identity to influence differential voting at the individual-level, and pro-
vides an important explanatory mechanism for proponents of MLV. It also sets the foundations of
future comparative analysis, providing testable hypotheses that can be adapted across cases.
Chapter 6 addresses the phenomena of voters casting ‘split-tickets’ at Scottish andWelsh devolved
elections. At these elections, voters use the additional member system (AMS), which provides voters
with two separate ballot papers, one with a list of parties, and one with a list candidates. The candi-
date ballot elects members via a plurality vote from constituencies, whilst the party list ballot elects
members on a compensatory basis using the D’Hondt formula from larger geographic areas referred
to as regions. This means that voters are able to vote for two different parties at the same election, or
‘split’ their ticket.
This behaviour has been well-documented and explored in numerous democracies that use mixed
electoral systems across the world (see Karp et al., 2002; Plescia, 2016; Jesse, 1988; Helmke, 2009) but
there has been very little focus on ticket-splitting in the UK, with the exception of two studies which
focus on a single election: Curtice (2006c) and Carman and Johns (2010). In this chapter, I use sur-
vey data frommultiple devolved elections to examine the motivations that drive split-ticket voting.
Specifically, I am interested in whether strategic motivations drive split-ticket voting at devolved
elections.
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The analysis has several implications for the study of electoral behaviour in Scotland andWales,
and in a wider multilevel context. In Scotland andWales, the findings call into question citizens
understanding of the electoral system and their ability to maximize their preferences at elections.
More widely, the findings raise questions about the role of institutions in influencing vote choice in
multilevel elections. The analysis shows that, under certain circumstances, the Scottish andWelsh
electoral systems can encourage voters to vote for two different parties at devolved elections.
Returning to the central message of this thesis, it is important to draw from the literature is that
no election in Scotland, Wales, or anywhere else occurs in a vacuum. Elections at one level cannot be
viewed in isolation, and instead should be viewed as points on an electoral continuum. Voters use
knowledge frommultiple levels of governance when formulating their electoral choices and are often
unaware of doing so as elites and parties coordinate between levels and voters seek quick sources of
information. To answer the questions of how and why voting behaviour differs between levels the
answer must be firmly based in an understanding of these facts.
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The Devolved Election Studies
2.1 Introduction
Before presenting my substantive chapters, I think it is first appropriate to provide an overview of
the data I use throughout. The primary sources of survey data used in this thesis are the Scottish and
Welsh Election Studies – referenced throughout this thesis as SES andWES respectively – which I
collectively refer to as the devolved election studies. In total, ten election studies and four referen-
dum studies of voting age adults have been carried out in Scotland andWales between 1997-2016
(including the 1997 devolution referendums).
Whilst this tally could arguably be extended even further to include the 1979 Scottish andWelsh
Referendum studies, for the purpose of this thesis, I am only interested in the political behaviours
and attitudes of citizens in the ‘Age of Devolution’: from 1997 to the present day. Regular election
surveys have not been carried out in Northern Ireland, and as such are not included in this analysis.
In this chapter, I provide a descriptive overview of origin of the studies, their methodologies and
themes, and conclude by offering thoughts on the future of the devolved election studies.
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2.2 Origins
Prior to the devolved election studies, the British Election Study (BES) had served as the longest
running – and for a considerable time, the only – source of survey data available for the study of po-
litical behaviour in Great Britain.4 Founded by David Butler and Donald Stokes in 1963, the study
borrowed heavily from the ‘Michigan model’ of election studies, which Donald Stokes himself had
co-authored (see Campbell et al., 1960). Drawing on the socio-psychological focus of theAmeri-
can Voter, the initial British Election Studies were designed with a focus on Britain-wide class voting,
reflecting the dominance of theory that identified socio-political cleavages as the dominant driver
of political behaviour in Britain in the 1950s and 1960s (Butler and Stokes, 1969; Crewe et al., 1977;
Curtice, 2006a). Other social cleavages such as territorial dimensions were not considered in the sur-
vey design, although these omissions were later acknowledged by Butler and Stokes in their seminal
work Political Change in Britain (Butler and Stokes, 1969).
Among UK electoral surveys, the BES is unrivalled in terms of the insights into political be-
haviour and attitudes in Britain yielded from its data. Yet design features that can be traced back
to its origin have restricted the analytic reach of investigations since, namely through the production
and reproduction of survey samples ill-equipped to facilitate analysis of sub-state dynamics. This is
despite substantial territorial heterogeneity across the UK noted as early as Blondel (1963). As Figure
2.1 illustrates, it was not until 2010 that the BES Scotland sub-sample rose to 1,000 respondents. The
Scottish samples faced further limitations in that sampling did not extend above the main popula-
tion belt until 1992. As Jowell et al. (1993) describe in the explanatory notes of the 1983-1987 BES,
“electors in [...] the Scottish Highlands were excluded from the sampling frame [...] because the
small and scattered population could not be interviewed cost effectively.” (pp. 14). This had been
the case at every previous BES (Butler and Stokes, 1969).
In the face of these obstacles, a number of academics based in Scotland andWales began to run
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Figure 2.1: BES sample sizes in Scotland and Wales, 1964-2017
Scotland- andWales-only surveys. In 1979 teams of political scientists in Scotland andWales car-
ried out election studies in the aftermath of the first referendums on devolution in 1979 (Miller and
Brand, 1981; Madgwick and Balsom, 1980). Scholars in Scotland also ran a post-election survey on a
Scotland-only sample in the aftermath of the 1992 UK general election (Brand andMitchell, 1994).
Although these efforts were ‘one-off’ studies, they provided the blueprint for the first devolved elec-
tion studies that followed.
The devolved election studies officially began in 1997 in the lead-up to the Scottish andWelsh
referendums. The project was initially a collaboration between the Centre for Research into Elec-
tions and Social Trends (CREST – nowNational Centre for Social Research or NatCen), Anthony
Heath at the University of Oxford, and a number of political scientists in Scotland, namely David
McCrone, Lindsay Paterson and John Curtice. Welsh involvement in the study arrived relatively
late in the game. Unlike Scotland, which had a number of academics with decades of experience of
survey design and application, Wales was largely lacking similar expertise. As has been the case in
the establishment of many election studies round the world (see E. Miller, 2006, for a discussion of
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the origins of the American National Election Studies), the team was put together largely through
happenstance. It was a chance phone call fromHeath to RichardWyn Jones at University of Wales,
Aberystwyth – at the time working on Critical Theory in International Security Studies – that led to
the establishment of the Welsh wing of the Referendum Study.
2.3 Survey Design
The various authors and contributors to the inaugural devolved election studies (listed in Table 2.1)
faced a unique obstacle that the vast majority of statewide election studies had never faced: no de-
volved elections had yet taken place in Scotland or Wales. The institutions of interest - the Scottish
Parliament and National Assembly for Wales - did not yet exist, and neither did a list of their respon-
sibilities and functions. At the inaugural elections in 1999, voters had very little knowledge of what
these institutions might look like, what they were able to do, how the electoral system worked and,
– in an election where there were no incumbents – were generally unaware of the candidates beyond
their party cues (see Chapter 3).
The investigators were largely in the same position. This meant that the early authors had to an-
ticipate the issues and drivers of voting at the first devolved elections, without ever having seen one
take place. As such they relied heavily upon the British Election Studies - studies that the majority
of the original investigators had led since 1983. Not only did this path dependency exert influence
on the academic output from these studies, it also influenced later studies as the desire for compara-
bility across studies meant that the focus of the early studies fed into subsequent ones. Notably, the
1999Welsh Election Study abstract stated that the survey was “designed in the tradition of British
General Election Studies and in close conjunction with the 1999 ‘Scottish Social Attitudes/Scottish
Parliamentary Election Study’ ” (Heath et al., 2000)
Much of the initial process of deciding the themes and topics that would be included in the initial
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referendum studies took place at Nuffield College, Oxford. The teams were keen to make the stud-
ies in Scotland andWales comparable throughout and the majority of the questions were therefore
asked in both countries. The design was also heavily influenced by previous questions asked in Scot-
land andWales. The Scottish survey was shaped significantly by earlier work initially in the Scottish
Cross-section of the 1974 British Election Study and carried on byWilliamMiller and Jack Brand
on the 1979 Scottish Election Study (Miller and Brand, 1981). These in turn helped shape the 1992
Scottish Election Study carried out by James Mitchell and Jack Brand which was administered as an
‘add-on’ to the 1992 British Election Study (Jowell et al., 1993). In Scotland, much effort has been
made to maintain the substantial time-series of identical questions since at least 2007, enabling the
SES to assess change over time for a number of voters in Scotland across potentially one of the most
turbulent time in its political history. More recently, waves of the Scottish Election Study have been
conducted in sync with major UK political events for a number of reasons: firstly to keep the quasi-
panel and question time-series going, and secondly to address areas of public opinion or politics in
Scotland that the British Election Study does not capture adequately.
In order to create something of a time-series for survey data collected inWales, questions were re-
cycled from the 1979Welsh Referendum Study and from the only serious attempt to study electoral
behaviour inWales: Balsom et al. (1983). Creating a nascent time-series proved valuable as scholars
were faced with the challenge of working out what had changed since the monumental 1979 Devo-
lution Referendum defeat in Wales, where nearly 4 out of 5 voters rejected devolution, to the 1997
referendum at which a slim majority of voters voted in favour of the establishment of a National
Assembly for Wales (Wyn Jones and Scully, 2012).
The full list of studies conducted with the aim of exploring electoral behaviour in Scotland and
Wales is illustrated in Table 2.1. Since their inception, the number of scholars involved with elec-
tion studies has expanded considerably, each bringing their own ideas and contributions. This table
reflects a pattern observed in much of the academic work on these two nations, with Scotland’s elec-
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tion study team having varied to a much greater extent than that inWales, where RichardWyn Jones
was involved in every study from 1997-2011, and Roger Awan-Scully involved in every study from
2007-2016.
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Table 2.1
Country Year Name Principal Investigators Company Survey Type
Scotland 1997 Scottish and
Welsh Referen-
dum Studies
1. Roger Jowell (Social and Community Plan-
ning Research), 2. Anthony Heath (University
of Oxford), 3. John Curtice (University of
Strathclyde), 4. RichardWyn Jones (University
of Wales, Aberystwyth)
Social and
Community
Planning
Research
F2F, Self-
completion
Scotland 1997 Scottish Refer-
endum Survey,
1997
1. David Denver (Lancaster University), 2.
James Mitchell (University of Strathclyde),
3.Charles Pattie (University of Sheffield), 4.
Hugh Bochel (University of Lincolnshire)
University of
Strathclyde
& Lancaster
University
Postal
Survey
Scotland 1999 Scottish So-
cial Attitudes
Survey, 1999
1. DavidMcCrone (University of Edinburgh), 2.
Lindsay Paterson (University of Edinburgh), 4.
John Curtice (University of Strathclyde), 5. Ben
Seyd (University College London), 6. Alison
Park (National Centre for Social Research)
National
Centre
for Social
Research
F2F
Scotland 2003 2003 Scottish
Social Attitudes
Survey
National Centre for Social Research National
Centre
for Social
Research
F2F
& Self-
completion
question-
naire
Scotland 2007 Scottish Election
Study, 2007
1. Rob Johns (University of Strathclyde), 2.
James Mitchell (University of Strathclyde),
3. David Denver (Lancaster University), 4.
Charles Pattie (University of Sheffield)
YouGov plc Internet
Panel
Scotland 2011 Scottish Election
Study, 2011
1. Chris Carman (University of Strathclyde), 2.
James Mitchell (University of Edinburgh), 3.
Rob Johns (University of Essex)
YouGov plc Internet
Panel
Continued on next page
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Scotland 2014 Scottish Refer-
endum Study
2014
1. Ailsa Henderson (University of Edinburgh),
2. Christopher Carman (University of Glas-
gow), 3. James Mitchell (University of Strath-
clyde, 4. Rob Johns (University of Essex)
YouGov plc Internet
Panel
Scotland 2016 Scottish Election
Study, 2016
1. Ailsa Henderson (University of Edinburgh),
2. Alan Convery (University of Edinburgh), 3.
Chris Carman (University of Glasgow), 5. Rob
Johns (University of Essex)
YouGov plc Internet
Panel
Wales 1997 Scottish and
Welsh Referen-
dum Studies,
1997
1. Roger Jowell (Social and Community Plan-
ning Research), 2. Anthony Heath (University
of Oxford), 3. John Curtice (University of
Strathclyde), 4. RichardWyn Jones (University
of Wales, Aberystwyth)
Social and
Community
Planning
Research
F2F, Self-
completion
Wales 1999 Welsh Assembly
Election Study,
1999
1. RichardWyn Jones (University of Wales,
Aberystwyth), 2.Anthony Heath (University
of Oxford), 3. Ben Seyd (University College
London), 4. John Curtice (University of Strath-
clyde)
National
Centre
for Social
Research
F2F,
RDD,
clustered
phone
& F2F
samples
Wales 2003 Welsh Life and
Times Study
(Welsh Assem-
bly Election
Study), 2003
1. RichardWyn Jones, (University of Wales,
Aberystwyth), 2. Anthony Heath (University
of Oxford)
National
Centre
for Social
Research
F2F,
Phone
if inter-
viewed in
Welsh
Continued on next page
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Wales 2007 Welsh Life and
Times Study
(Welsh Assem-
bly Election
Study), 2007
1. RichardWyn Jones (University of Wales,
Aberystwyth), 2. Roger Scully (University of
Wales, 3. Miranda Phillips (National Centre for
Social Research)
National
Centre
for Social
Research
F2F
& Self-
completion
question-
naire
Wales 2011 Welsh Refer-
endum Study,
2011
1.Roger Scully (Cardiff University), 2. Richard
Wyn Jones (Cardiff University)
YouGov plc Internet
Panel
Wales 2011 Welsh Election
Study, 2011
1. Roger Scully (Aberystwyth University), 2.
RichardWyn Jones (Cardiff University)
YouGov plc Internet
Panel
Wales 2016 Welsh Election
Study, 2016
1. Roger Scully (Cardiff University), 2. David
Cutts (University of Bath), 3. Luke Sloan
(Cardiff University), 4. Peter Burnap (Cardiff
University), 5. MatthewWilliams (Cardiff
University), 6. RichardWyn Jones (Cardiff
University)
YouGov plc Internet
Panel
Table 2.1: The Devolved Elecধon Studies. NB: F2F = Face-to-Face.
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Table 2.2 illustrates clearly that the devolved election studies have increased their complexity and
reach substantially since the initial referendum studies were conducted. Whilst sample size in both
Scotland andWales started from a base of 676 in 1997, the 2016 election studies had sample sizes of
over 4,000 in both countries. The studies have also seen a sharp increase in the number of questions
respondents are asked, allowing for a much more detailed analysis not only of vote choice, but of a
number of political and social attitudes and behaviours.
The initial studies followed aMichigan-style framework, namely a single cross-section survey,
with data collected via face-to-face interviews from a random sample of the population. This format
was used by the election studies of 1999 and 2003 in Scotland and between 1999-2007 inWales. The
2007 Scottish Election Study was the first to introduce multiple cross-sections – providing the de-
volved electoral studies with a better tool through which to study causality. This study also included
an additional ‘post-post’ wave to identify the unique ballot problems that occurred during the 2007
SP elections (see Hepburn, 2010). 2007 was the first time the devolved election studies were carried
out online by YouGov, a move that allowed for larger samples to be surveyed and a greater num-
ber of variables to be explored. The 2011 Welsh Referendum Study followed suit, meaning that all
devolved election studies since 2011 have been carried out by YouGov using their respondent panel.
Table 2.2
Name Design Sample Size Response Rate # of Variables
Scottish andWelsh
Referendum Stud-
ies, 1997
One-time cross-
section (Post-
election)
676 59% 358
Scottish Refer-
endum Survey,
1997
One-time cross-
section (Post-
election)
2,335 52% 80
Scottish andWelsh
Referendum Stud-
ies, 1997
One-time cross-
section (Post-
election)
686 60% 358
Continued on next page
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Scottish Social
Attitudes Survey,
1999
One-time cross-
section (Post-
election)
1,482 59% 440
Welsh Assembly
Election Study, 1999
One-time cross-
section (Post-
election)
1,256 43% 536
2003 Scottish Social
Attitudes Survey
One-time cross-
section (Post-
election)
1,508 57% 513
Welsh Life and
Times Study (Welsh
Assembly Election
Study), 2003
One-time cross-
section (Post-
election)
988 63% 369
Scottish Election
Study, 2007
Three cross-sections
(pre-, post- and
post2-election).
Small panel in-
cluding 2007
respondents
1,872 72%* 536
Welsh Life and
Times Study (Welsh
Assembly Election
Study), 2007
One-time cross-
section (Post-
election)
884 54% 353
Scottish Election
Study, 2011
Two cross-sections
(pre- & post-
election)
2,046 N/A 465
Welsh Referendum
Study, 2011
Two cross-sections
(Pre- and post-
election)
2,569 N/A 595
Welsh Election
Study, 2011
Two cross-sections
(Pre- and post-
election)
1,943 N/A 637
Scottish Referen-
dum Study 2014
Three cross-sections
(pre- & post-
referendum, 1 year
post-referendum)
4,849 N/A 859
Continued on next page
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Scottish Election
Study, 2016
Three cross-
sections (pre-, post-
elections+additional
post-GE17), Panel
including 2014 &
2011 respondents
4,074 N/A 791
Welsh Election
Study, 2016
Two cross-sections
(Pre- and post-
election), Rolling
campaign cross-
section, Expert sur-
vey, 12 month social
media monitoring ,
Panel including 2011
respondents
4,163 N/A 1,596
Table 2.2: The Devolved Elecধon Studies Summary Staধsধcs. NB: YouGov use an online panel of pre-registered
respondents for surveys and as such response rate is not applicable to these studies.
The 2016Welsh Election Study also saw the introduction of a ‘rolling campaign wave’ – also
called a rolling cross-section or rolling ‘thunder’ wave – something first employed by the 1984 Amer-
ican National Election Study and a defining characteristic of the Canadian Election Study (Brady
and Johnston, 1987; Bartels, 1987, 1988; Johnston and Brady, 2002). The campaign wave takes mul-
tiple ‘snapshots’ of a small subset of the larger sample at more regular time points throughout the
campaign. In the case of the 2016WES a random sample of roughly 100 respondents from the larger
panel were interviewed every day for the final 30 days of the campaign. This attempts to respond to
some concerns regarding causal inference that have troubledMichigan-style election studies (see, for
example, Curtice, 2002) as it enables researchers to link responses to external information sources
or events occurring throughout the campaign period such as debates, scandals, or particular news
stories (Johnston and Brady, 2002).
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Figure 2.2: Individuals in the UK using the Internet (% of populaধon). Source: World Bank.
2.4 The Consequences of Changing Survey Design
In addition to describing how the design of the devolved election studies has evolved over time, it
is necessary to discuss how these changes impact upon the inferences that can be drawn from these
data. Two changes stand out in this regard: the move from smallerN probability sampling tech-
niques to largerN non-probability sampling, and the mode switch frommostly face-to-face inter-
viewing to online polls. Non-probability sampling has become increasingly prevalent in the social
sciences in the past two-decades, going hand-in-hand with the switch in survey mode to online. As
such, I discuss these two changes in tandem.
The switch from probability to non-probability samples can be thought of as a something of a
trade-off. Probability samples, such as those used by the SES from 1997-2003 and by theWES from
1997-2007, have for many decades been the method used by survey researchers to make reliable and
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accurate inferences to broader populations (Baker et al., 2013). One reason for this is that surveys car-
ried out via probability samples are considered to have high external validity (Morton andWilliams,
2010). Practically, they are the closest most research can get to a truly random sample, where every
individual in a target population has an equal probability of being selected.
Yet for all the benefits probability sampling brings, in practice it is costly and time-intensive. Face-
to-face – the most common place mode of interview for most major surveys5 – interviewing relies on
teams of interviewers often travelling across considerable physical distances to interview respondents
that may not be available. While random digit dial (RDD) surveys reduced this cost somewhat,
the decline of landline telephone use6 and the rise of caller ID with increased mobile phone use has
meant that this mode is increasingly subject to non-response bias (Brehm, 1993; Curtin et al., 2005;
Ansolabehere and Schaffner, 2014).
This has occurred simultaneously with a rapid increase in the number of individuals with regular
access to the internet (see Figure 2.2). Online surveys, most commonly conducted among a panel of
respondents who have been recruited by survey companies, are considerably less costly than other
survey modes due to the automation of collection, cleaning and coding of data (Brick, 2011). Once
the sample is collected, post hoc weights are applied to reproduce known parameters of the target
population. This reduction in cost offers a number of advantages beyond financial saving. Much
larger samples can be collected allowing for more robust analyses of sub-sections of society, or larger
booster samples of hard-to-reach groups can also be collected more readily. Table 2.2 illustrates this
clearly: both the sample size and the number of variables increased considerably in election studies
carried out online.
Despite the added cost efficiency provided by online opt-in panels, they do not have the same
benefits as probability-sampling. Opt-in panels are rarely representative of the target population,
especially when researchers are interested in more than just a handful of variables. Samples derived
from these panels have frequently been found to be more politically engaged, better educated, and
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wealthier than the median citizen (Baker et al., 2010). Furthermore, there is compelling evidence
that post hoc weighting rarely compensates fully for sample composition biases (Dever et al., 2008;
Tourangeau et al., 2013). As a consequence, researchers cannot have the same confidence in their
inferences that come with probability samples. As Baker et al. (2010) noted in the AAPORTask
Force on Online Panels, researchers “should avoid non-probability opt-in panels when a key research
objective is to accurately estimate population values . . . [and] claims of ‘representativeness’ should
be avoided when using these sample sources.” As most political science research in particular aims to
infer findings from sample to a larger target population (e.g. the electorate) this weakened external
validity is a considerable concern.
As the use of online surveys and sampling has developed, more recent research has begun to sug-
gest that inferences from online opt-in samples can still add considerable value. In a comparison of
survey modes Ansolabehere and Schaffner (2014) found that a ‘carefully executed opt-in Internet
panel’ produces estimates that are as accurate as RDD surveys and had a total survey error similar to
that of a postal survey which used a random sample of residential addresses. Similarly the AAPOR
Task Force on Non-Probability Sampling concluded that non-probability samples can be appro-
priate for statistical inference when underpinned by sound theoretical and modelling assumptions
(Baker et al., 2013).
2.5 Themes
Like all election surveys, the devolved election studies have consistently included questions on topics
that are understood to be particularly salient to voters. These topics can be grouped into three broad
categories: national identity, voting motivations, and legitimacy.7 In the remainder of this section I
provide an outline of the central themes of the studies.
42
2.5.1 National Identity
The devolved election studies have advanced the study of national identity in the UKmore than
any other one topic, both in the analysis derived from the studies and the effect they have had on
other surveys. Since 1999 each survey has included at least three – and often many more – questions
about a respondents’ national identity. The inclusion of these variables has consequently shaped
the focus of research of political behaviour and attitudes in Scotland andWales. Much of the work
produced has illustrated the importance of national identity in political attitudes and behaviours,
uncovering relationships that had rarely been touched upon pre-devolution. Previous studies using
‘British’ data essentially meant a focus on England, where the vast majority of constituencies, voters,
and candidates are based. This meant that the study of national identities were largely confined to
qualitative studies or one-off surveys (e.g. Budge and Urwin, 1966; Balsom et al., 1983; Bennie et al.,
1997b).
Early scholarship on the devolved election studies showed national identity to be an important
variable that could be used to explain a host of political behaviours. Curtice (1999) found national
identity to provide an explanation of the apparent differing levels of enthusiasm and support for
devolution in both Scotland andWales. In Scotland, support for the Scottish Parliament was high-
est among those who identified as more Scottish than British, with a parallel relationship observed
inWales for Welsh identifiers. British identifiers in Wales were found to be more sceptical of devo-
lution compared to British identifiers in Scotland which was a partial explanation for the differing
results.
Curtice (1999) also found little support for the notion that people in Scotland were more Scottish
than people inWales were Welsh, it was just that the different nationalities in each country behaved
in different ways (see also Wyn Jones, 2001)]. National identity also seemed to play a role in how
optimistic people were about the impact that devolution would make on their lives. In Scotland, re-
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spondents of all national identities perceived the impact to be the same (i.e. those who identified as
either more British or more Scottish thought that devolution would have similar impact). InWales,
attitudes were this was again highly stratified by national identity: people who identified as more
Welsh believed devolution would have a much greater impact than those who identified as more
British (Curtice, 1999; Wyn Jones and Lewis, 1999; Bromley, 2003).
Support for political parties in Wales and Scotland has also been historically stratified along lines
of national identity. InWales Wyn Jones et al. (2002) identified that Plaid Cymru support was dis-
proportionately drawn from those who identify as Welsh not British; whereas the Conservatives
and Liberal Democrats’ support was overwhelmingly drawn from voters who identified as more
British. Labour was the only party to draw mostly proportional support from across national iden-
tity groups; perhaps helping to explain their unusually consistent success in elections inWales. The
same authors frame Conservative party support as inextricably linked to notions of ‘Englishness’, a
claim similar to that made byMitchell (1990b) in Scotland. These patterns have existed for decades,
leading Butler and Stokes to pronounceWales as “the most anti-Conservative area in all of Britain”
(Butler and Stokes, 1969, pp. 171).
Analysis in Scotland has been more reluctant to use national identity as an explanatory variable
in explaining party support or vote choice. For example, Paterson (2006)’s Sourcॽ of Support for the
SNP neglects to look at the association between SNP support and national identity. Despite this
reluctance, national identity has continued to play an important role in explaining political attitudes
and behaviours in Scotland, particularly constitutional references. For example, those who feel more
Scottish are more likely to favour more powers for the Scottish Parliament or independence, and
those who identify as more British are considerably more likely to favour the status quo (Johns et al.,
2010; Henderson et al., 2015). These findings have taken on particular importance in the wake of the
2014 Scottish Independence Referendum, where vote choice was heavily split along lines of national
identity (Sharp et al., 2014).
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Figure 2.3: 2015 UK General Elecধon vote choice in Scotland by naধonal idenধty. Scoষsh not Briধsh N = 839,
Briধsh not Scoষsh N = 338. Source: SES 2016
The recent electoral dominance of the SNP has also been shown to be correlated with national
identity (Johns andMitchell, 2016), with Figure 2.3 illustrating the strength of this relationship using
2016 SES data. Johns andMitchell (2016) also argued, however, that the key to the SNP’s electoral
success was their ability to gather votes from groups that also felt a sense of British identity.
2.5.2 Voting motivations
Beyond the influence of national identity the devolved election studies have brought a new under-
standing of the mechanics of vote choice in Scotland andWales. Early scholarship on political be-
haviour in Scotland andWales had focused on sociological approaches to explaining vote choice;
whereby a voter’s social background largely determines the party they vote for (e.g. Budge and Ur-
win, 1966; Balsom et al., 1983; Bennie et al., 1997b). In particular, these studies focused on factors
unique to Scotland andWales, such as religion and sectarianism in Scotland, and theWelsh language
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in Wales.
As the sociological model began to be challenged more broadly by literature on economic vot-
ing (e.g. Fiorina, 1981; Sanders et al., 1987; Lewis-Beck, 1990; Clarke et al., 2004) it also came under
scrutiny in Scotland andWales. In their analysis of the 2007 Scottish Parliament election Johns et al.
(2009b) argued that vote choice at this election could be better explained by so-called valence or
competency measures. This was further supported by a more detailed analysis in Voting for a Scot-
tish Government where the authors use the 2007 SES to show that Scottish voters saw the SNP as
the most competent at dealing with Scottish issues (see also Johns, 2011b; Johns et al., 2013a; Carman
et al., 2014). InWales, Scully andWyn Jones (2012) also illustrated that the 2011 Welsh election could
be better explained using valence evaluations of party and leader competence (see also Scully, 2013;
Scully and Larner, 2017).
2.5.3 Legitimacy
At the initial devolved elections, an understandable focus of political scientists was to understand
the perceived legitimacy of new devolved institutions. How would voters receive the establishment
of new legislatures and executives? This was a particular concern inWales where the result was very
close on a low turnout (Wyn Jones and Lewis, 1999). The result led Taylor et al. (1999) to comment
that:
“...‘Welsh’ Wales may have backed devolution, ‘British’ Wales still appeared to want
to retain its links withWestminster. Far from giving the new assembly the legitimacy
that would have derived from a clear popular vote, the referendum simply exposed a
fault line at the heart of Welsh society” (pp. xxviii).
Subsequent evidence pointed to a rapid change in attitudes post-1999. Scully et al. (2004) exam-
ined whether low voter turnout at the inaugural 1999Welsh election was a sign that the Welsh elec-
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torate did not view the institution as legitimate. While they did find evidence of a lack of interest,
they found little support for abolishing it. In the two decades since the inaugural elections inWales
there has been ‘steadily declining opposition to devolution’ (Wyn Jones and Scully, 2012, pp. 165).
Indeed, Wyn Jones and Scully (2012) argued that the result of the 2011 Welsh Referendum – which
asked voters in Wales whether the Assembly should be granted law-making powers – confirmed that
devolution( and the institutions associated with it) were now the accepted form of government in
Wales. In particular, they noted that groups and areas originally opposed to devolution in 1979 and
1997 were now broadly supportive of it (Wyn Jones and Scully, 2003, 2012).
In Scotland, legitimacy was seen as less of an immediate concern since the 1997 referendum pro-
duced a large vote in favour on a higher turnout than inWales. Yet low voter turnout at the 2003
Scottish election – less than 50% – still gave rise to concern among those who wished devolution to
be a permanent feature of the Scottish political landscape. While a similar drop in turnout at the
2001 UKGeneral Election implies that voter disillusionment with devolution is unlikely to be the
cause (Bromley and Curtice, 2003), the SES did produce considerable evidence of voters being dis-
appointed with devolution and the Scottish Parliament (Bromley and Curtice, 2003; Bromley, 2003;
Park andMcCrone, 2006). This disappointment – which could equally be labelled as poor expecta-
tion management – during the first two terms of the Scottish parliament may have played a role in
the unexpected rise and success of the SNP.
Political scientists have also examined how citizens think about the divergence in levels of govern-
ment responsibility between Scotland andWales. In the wake of the 2003 devolved elections, Cur-
tice (2006b) argued that a “system of asymmetric devolution appears to be the only constitutional
structure capable of enjoying public support throughout Great Britain” (pp.109). More recently,
work by (Henderson et al., 2013) used data from the devolved election studies, in addition to other
sources, to identify what they labelled a ‘devolution paradox’ whereby citizens want their sub-state
governments to do more, but do not want policy to diverge from other territories within the state.
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2.6 Summary: The Future of the Devolved Election Studies
As devolved studies increase in number, so do the possible research question that emerge from
them. In particular, an ever-increasing time-series opens new possibilities to examine changes in
attitudes over time and the importance of political context in influencing political behaviour. With
this in mind, I conclude this chapter by briefly outlining some of the issues that future studies face.
First, future studies should maintain a substantial and meaningful time-series with previous elec-
tion surveys by carrying forward existing question wording and format as far as possible. Phillip
Converse, one the founders of the American National Election Study, is often attributed as having
said that election studies should never change question wording, even when better alternatives be-
come available. Here, the time-series is the most valuable aspect of the studies: it allows us to track
attitudinal and behavioural changes in the population over time. This uniformity is unfortunately
missing from the devolved election studies, as the vast majority of questions asked in 1997/9 have
either had their wording and format changed substantially or have been dropped altogether. Recent
improvements have been made however: Scotland has maintained a valuable time-series since 2007
andWales since 2011. Every effort to be made to ensure this continues.
The studies should also allow for comparisons between surveys carried out in Scotland andWales.
Doing so will also allow future analysis to better understand divergence or convergence in the po-
litical attitudes and behaviours between the two countries. Comparable data from two sub-state
polities with very similar cultural and political traditions is a surprisingly rare commodity in politi-
cal science, and is a unique selling point of the devolved election studies. This is not to say that the
devolved election studies should ignore the context in which voters cast their ballots (this is perhaps
the biggest weakness of Michigan-style election studies). Instead, future surveys should aim to create
a balance between these two, often opposing, needs. Throughout this thesis I demonstrate that the
ability to compare Scotland andWales directly can help us to answer a wide range of questions.
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Finally, if the study of elections in the UK is to truly adopt a multilevel approach, the devolved
election studies should be linked to the British Election Study. In Chapters 4 and 5 I demonstrate
how this is currently possible, although it is important to emphasise that this is not a result of proac-
tive planning on the part of the BES and devolved election teams. If both sets of studies are to con-
tinue being carried out by the same polling company – most recently by YouGov – then it should be
possible to create a multilevel panel using respondents who were interviewed in both studies. This
will allow political scientists to explore questions that had previously been shut off to them, such as
voter switching between levels of government (see Chapter 5), the concept of multilevel partisan-
ship, or the differences in what individual voters do or do not know about different levels of politics.
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3
Voter knowledge in Scotland andWales
3.1 Introduction
Since their foundation in 1999, the devolved governmental institutions of Scot-
land andWales have been a fundamental part of political life in the UK. The influ-
ence of both institutions has steadily increased over the last two decades. The Scottish parliament
has acquired new powers over income tax and social security (see Poole and Ifan, 2019) - arguably
making it one of the most powerful sub-state legislatures in the world (Hooghe et al., 2016). Mean-
while the National Assembly for Wales has also acquired new powers, albeit from a lower base of
responsibilities, acquiring both law-making powers and control over a number of taxes fromWest-
minster (see Wyn Jones and Scully, 2012; Poole and Ifan, 2019). As law-making and tax-raising bodies
the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales8 now wield considerable power over the
day-to-day lives of citizens. But what do citizens of Scotland andWales know about these institu-
tions?
This chapter provides the first comprehensive review of citizens’ political knowledge. It is divided
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into three main sections. First, I provide a detailed descriptive analysis of survey questions that asked
respondents in Scotland andWales about political facts over the period between 1999 and the most
recent election studies in 2016. Second, I examine the supply of political information in Scotland
andWales using a unique dataset of over 190,000 newspaper articles. Finally, I examine what dif-
ferentiates citizens who knowmore or less about politics with a series of regressions performed on
survey data from the 2016 Scottish andWelsh Election Studies (the SES andWES).
The motivation underpinning this exploration are simple; namely, the assumption that political
knowledge matters. The better informed citizens are about politics, the better placed they are to
express their preferences and attitudes. This is the assumption that has underpinned normative
theories of democracy for decades (Downs, 1957; Dahl, 1971, 1989, 1998; Held, 1996). An informed
citizenry, it is argued, is better placed to hold incumbents to account for their behaviours whilst in
office, thereby better protecting its interests (Fiorina, 1981).
Assumptions of political knowledge also play a central role in many of the the empirical mod-
els that political scientists use to understand political behaviour. Indeed, the ability of voters to
make evaluations of competence constitute a central tenet of many of the dominant theories of
vote choice in Scotland andWales over the past decade (Johns et al., 2010; Johns, 2011b; Johns et al.,
2013a; Scully andWyn Jones, 2012; Scully, 2013; Scully and Larner, 2017). Political knowledge is also
frequently used as a variable in analyses of political behaviour, which presents further grounds for
exploration. Numerous studies have employed political knowledge as an explanatory variable (e.g.,
Inglehart, 1990), an intervening variable (e.g., Zaller and Feldman, 1992) or a dependent variable
(e.g., Freedman et al., 2004). A better understanding of what voters do or don’t know is an impor-
tant foundation upon which other work on political behaviour can be built.
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3.2 Why Political Knowledge Matters
“A popular government, without popular information or the means of acquiring it, is
but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy, or perhaps both.” (James Madison, 1822. Letter
to W. T. Barry)
Political knowledge has long been understood as playing a central role in the functioning of rep-
resentative democracy. Heavily influenced by the writers of the US constitution, theorists of democ-
racy have long argued that government can only be held to account for its actions when citizens
know what it is doing (Downs, 1957; Riker and Ordeshook, 1968; Dahl, 1971, 1989, 1998; Held, 1996).
A focus on political knowledge can also be traced back to the earliest works of quantitative political
science. In Voting, Berelson et al. (1954) argue that “The democratic citizen is expected to be well-
informed about political affairs. He is supposed to know what the issues are, what their history is,
what the relevant facts are, what alternatives are proposed, what the party stands for, what the con-
sequences are” (pp.308, see also Lazarsfeld et al., 1944; Campbell et al., 1960). With this information,
citizens are expected to judge incumbents and challengers by their records and reward or punish
them at elections accordingly (Dahl, 1989; Fiorina, 1981). This bottom-up accountability mechanism
is what provides incumbents with the incentive to be ‘responsive’ to citizens’ wishes, and legislate
accordingly (Soroka andWlezien, 2010). After all, if citizens’ vote choice is not influenced at least
to some degree by government performance, incumbents have little incentive to pursue policy goals
that reflect citizens’ interests. As Verba writes, “democratic responsiveness depends on citizen par-
ticipation” (Verba, 1996, pp.2). Yet ever since Converse (1964)’s influential essay The nature of belief
systems in mass publics, political scientists have cast doubt on this foundational assumption that
citizens know enough about politics to make decisions effectively.
In Scotland andWales, the establishment of the devolved institutions was championed as a pro-
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cess that would increase the accountability of political actors and policies to the citizens of Scotland
andWales. UK PrimeMinister Tony Blair prefaced theWhite Paper that constituted the blueprint
for Scottish devolution ‘Scotland’s Parliament’ with the assertion that “a Scottish Parliament and
aWelsh Assembly [will give] the people of Scotland andWales more control over their own affairs
within the UK” (The Scottish Office, 1997, pp.v). In the same document, the inaugural First Minis-
ter of Scotland Donald Dewar9 wrote that “The Scottish Parliament will strengthen democratic con-
trol and make government more accountable to the people of Scotland.” (The Scottish Office, 1997,
pp.vii). In the pre-referendum white paperA Voice for Walॽ similar ambitions are presented:“[t]he
Government is committed to establishing a new, more inclusive and participative democracy in
Britain. Its proposals for a Welsh Assembly reflect these aims”(TheWales Office, 1997, pp. 3).
To date, researchers have not sought to assess whether citizens in Scotland andWales have access
to the necessary information to allow this accountability mechanism to function effectively. In mul-
tilevel systems generally, existing evidence suggests we should not assume this to be the case. Soroka
andWlezien (2010) argue that non-unitary or decentralized political systems can provide unclear or
confused government policy signals: the more levels of government making policy in various policy
areas, the less clear it is to citizens what their ‘government’ is actually doing (Powell andWhitten,
1993; Downs, 1999; Rodden, 2004). This signal is further confused in multilevel systems like the
UK where substantial proportions of the devolved governments’ budgets are transferred from cen-
tral government. Here, multiple levels of government are involved in multiple policy areas but the
actions of central government are not directly visible despite its out-sized role in determining the
allocation of funds (Cutler, 2004; Johns, 2011b). What voters do - or don’t - know is likely to have an
important impact on whether representatives are held to account in Scotland andWales.
Political knowledge also has several benefits that extend beyond the mechanism of democratic
accountability, namely that it can be thought of as a good in and of itself. Political information is an
important resource for citizens and, as Carpini and Keeter (1996) argue, it is “a facilitator of other
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forms of political and thus, indirectly, socio-economic power” (pp. 1). Yet political information is
also more readily available to those citizens who are already socially, economically and politically ad-
vantaged. Consequently, it is easier for these citizens to realize their interests through a democratic
political system. It is imperative, therefore, to identify systematic barriers to accessing political in-
formation where they exist. As Habermas (1984) has argued, the health of a democracy can be mea-
sured by the extent to which citizens are able to enter into public debate with equivalent amounts of
information. Where citizens – or particular groups of citizens – do not have sufficient information,
democracy can start to falter. Entman (1989) shows that what citizens know about politics shapes the
parameters of political discourse more broadly. Where citizens are less informed, political campaigns
will be more likely to use sensationalism and demagoguery to appeal to voters (Carpini and Keeter,
1996).
Carpini and Keeter (1993) argue that political knowledge is a crucial part of citizenship on the
whole. How citizens engage with politics extends far beyond infrequent opportunities to cast votes.
When citizens seek recourse for problems they face, political knowledge is an important factor in
deciding how these problems are solved. Similarly, if citizens or groups of citizens have low levels of
political knowledge, it is considerably more difficult for them to express their individual or collective
interests at the ballot box.
That leads us to the question: what do citizens in Scotland andWales know about politics? The
limited amount of existing work carried out in this field has produced mixed results. Johns (2011b)
analysis of voters at the 2007 Scottish Parliamentary election found that while ‘many voters’ were
able to correctly assign policy responsibilities they were unlikely to use this knowledge in their
decision-making calculus at election time. InWales, in the sole existing study on this issue Dafydd
and Badanjak (2018) focused on attributions of responsibility among 2016Welsh Election Study re-
spondents finding that “few [voters] have the knowledge or the inclination to hold those in power
to account.” (pp. 1). Analysis carried out elsewhere has also produced mixed results. Cutler (2004)
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has suggested that many citizens are unable to say which levels of government are responsible for dif-
ferent policy areas or decisions (see also Cutler, 2008a). This is in part due to the behaviour of elites
in multilevel systems. Work by Rico and Liñeira (2018) has shown that mulitlevel structures of gov-
ernance produce incentives for elites to ‘pass the buck’ by shifting blame across levels of government.
Conversely, Rudolph (2003) found that citizens were able to more or less accurately apportion re-
sponsibility to different levels of government.
3.3 Measuring Political Knowledge in Scotland andWales
All systematic research begins with good description (Landman, 2003, pp. 5). In this section I focus
on what citizens in Scotland andWales do know about politics. To do so, I draw upon the work of
Neuman et al. (1992) and Carpini and Keeter (1996) and provide a detailed description of how re-
spondents in Scotland andWales perform when asked about certain facts relating to politics. Using
data from Scottish andWelsh Election Studies from five elections, I provide analysis based primarily
on the percentage of respondents who are able to correctly answer factual questions.
Before we can say with any level of certainty what citizens do or don’t know a number of issues
warrant attention. The first is epistemological: how do political scientists decide what information
is useful for voters to know? Are political scientists well equipped to make such decisions? These
questions have troubled scholars of electoral studies for decades. Schattschneider (1975) warned that
political scientists were in danger of setting standards that were totally unrealistic: “We become cyn-
ical about democracy because the public does not act the way the simplistic definition of democracy
says that is should act [...] The trouble is that we have defined democracy in such a way that we are
in danger of putting ourselves out of business” (pp. 134-36). In an essay titledHow Elitism Under-
minॽ The Study Of Voter Competence, Lupia (2006a) argues that claims of “what informed voters
ought to think about” when making political choices should be treated as highly suspect. This is be-
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cause political scientists allow their own ideological biases to influence what they say voters ‘should’
know. As political scientists, it is often part of our job to seek out political information. Political
information is also, hopefully, an area in which we have a particular interest. We therefore have in-
centives to place greater importance on the information that both interests us, and that we often rely
upon for employment.
It is also unrealistic to expect voters to have consistent levels of knowledge on a multitude of ar-
eas within the field of politics. Information generally is costly to acquire, and there are often costs
associated with processing and remembering that information. When we do make decisions, it
is not possible for us to consult all of the potentially relevant information to that decision. In-
stead, we make decisions based on the smaller subsets of information that we are able to recall more
quickly (DeBell, 2013). Inevitably, this tends to be information that we have recently acquired or
used (Berent and Krosnick, 1995; Lupia, 2006b, 2016). Even if it were possible therefore, acquir-
ing all possible facts that relate to certain political choices voters face is inefficient. Instead, it makes
sense for citizens to focus on information that is immediately relevant to their lives. In fact there is
some evidence that groups of voters with knowledge of individual areas of interest play an impor-
tant role in modern democracies. These groups - what Converse (1964) called ‘issue publics’ - play a
dual role in holding elected officials to account on these specific issues and act as a heuristic for the
wider electorate.
The task of measuring what citizens may or may not know using surveys is far from straightfor-
ward. Doing so involves a three-step process, with each step facing its own unique challenges. The
first step for the researcher is to decide what information they will ask citizens about. For exam-
ple, do they want to know whether respondents know which party won the most recent election,
whether the economy has grown or shrunk in the past 5 years, or howmany local councillors are
elected in their electoral ward? Deciding which facts about politics are ‘useful’ for respondents to
know is something that has confounded the discipline in the past. Lupia (2006a) argues that in
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order to decide what facts to ask respondents about, political scientists should ask themselves two
questions: “What benefit does society receive when a randomly selected individual can recite this
fact?” and “Is this knowledge key for individuals to carry out their tasks?”.
Questions of validity also arise with regards to measuring political knowledge using mass surveys.
The percentage of respondents who can correctly answer a political knowledge question in a survey
is not necessarily the same as the percentage of the general population who are aware of that infor-
mation. In particular, survey non-response and question format are likely to affect the validity of
results: an accurate picture of what citizens do or do not know is heavily dependent on the ability
of survey researchers to obtain representative samples. As discussed in Chapter 2, both Scottish and
Welsh Election Studies switched from a probability sampling framework to online opt-in panels.
Inferring what the wider population Scottish andWelsh citizens know from these samples is not
straightforward.
The ‘true’ distributions of measures such as gender and age can be obtained from the census,
and variables like vote choice can be compared against actual vote returns. Thus, samples can be
weighted according to these known distributions to make data more representative.10 However, the
level of political knowledge within the wider population is unknown.11 As such, one cannot be sure
that the distributions of knowledge seen in online samples are an accurate reflection of the target
population. For example, both the SES andWES have samples that likely over-represent politically
active members of the public. Table 3.1 shows the turnout estimates for the 2016 devolved elections
from the 2016 SES andWES, along with official declarations of turnout provided by the UK’s Elec-
toral Commission. In both cases, the survey samples over-estimate turnout by approximately 30
percentage points. Ample evidence exists that links political knowledge and civic and political par-
ticipation (e.g. Carpini and Keeter, 1993; Blais, 2000; Clarke et al., 2011). Therefore, a sample that
overestimates participation to such a degree potentially overestimates levels of knowledge also. This
is an important consideration when examining the findings of this chapter.
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Official Survey Difference
Scotland 55.6 84.0 28.4
Wales 45.3 79.2 33.9
Table 3.1: Turnout esধmates for 2016 devolved elecধon in Scotland and Wales. Source: Electoral Commission (offi-
cial) & SES and WES (unweighted survey sample esধmate).
Once the researcher has identified the information they wish to ask respondents about, they
move to the second step: designing a question which can gauge a respondents knowledge on this
subject with a satisfactory degree of accuracy. Evidence drawn from surveys containing knowledge
questions can be misleading due to the process respondents go through when answering questions.
When respondents agree to take part in a survey, they are unaware of the topics they will be asked
about. This means that their responses to questions may not be reflective of their attitudes but are
rather responses constructed on-the-spot in reaction to the question being asked (Zaller and Feld-
man, 1992; Tourangeau et al., 2000b). In fact, Converse (1964) presented evidence that a substantial
proportion of respondents may answer these questions at random.
Survey question format is also likely to influence the percentage of respondents providing the
correct response. For example, questions that provide a closed number of options for respondents to
select from are likely to produce different results from open-ended questions. The questions asked
in each SES andWES cover a number of different topics and areas, some more useful than others.
Very few of the questions were repeated in multiple years, limiting analysis of changes in the levels of
knowledge among citizens.12 Despite this discontinuity, the questions asked can generally be divided
into three categories:
1. Responsibility: Which levels of government are responsible for different policy areas?
2. Actors: Who are the individuals and institutions with power to influence these policy areas,
and what policy positions do they hold?
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3. Electoral System: Do citizens know how their vote works?
These three categories largely represent what Carpini and Keeter (1996) call ‘the rules of the
game’: information that is at least beneficial, if not necessary, for democracy to work effectively.
The remaining analysis is broken down into these categories.
3.3.1 Attributions of Responsibility
Questions of responsibility ask respondents to identify which level of government are accountable
for different policy areas. For example, a number of questions in the SES andWES ask whether the
devolved institutions are responsible for defence, income tax, the NHS, policing, and education.
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 list all questions of attribution of responsibility in the SES andWES between 1999-
2016. Although the initial devolved election studies asked a number of the same questions, more
recent surveys have asked separate questions in Scotland andWales. The question format has also di-
verged rendering direct comparison impossible - even where questions ostensibly ask about the same
policy area. For example, the 2016 SES offers respondents three options when asking ‘Which level
of government is responsible for X?’: UK Government, Scottish Government, and Don’t Know.
In the 2016WES however, respondents are provided with a longer list of options: European Union,
UKGovernment, Welsh Government, Local Authorities, Don’t Know. Limiting the number of
options is likely to overestimate the percentage of SES respondents providing the right answer, as
respondents who guess the answer have much higher odds of being correct. Conversely, additional
response options in the WES could underestimate respondents’ knowledge by creating confusion.
The first election studies in 1999 uncover considerable confusion. In Scotland, although two-
thirds of respondents were aware that the Scottish Parliament would control its budget less than
half of respondents were aware of the Scottish Parliament’s tax powers. InWales, fewer than 30%
of respondents were able to correctly attribute responsibility in 1999. There does appear to have
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Year Question % Correct
1999 Scottish Parliament will control its budget* 74
2016 Foreign Affairs reserved 73
2016 Defence reserved 73
2003 UKGov’t makes all defence decisions 72
2016 Local government devolved 71
2016 Immigration reserved 71
2016 Education devolved 68
2016 NHS devolved 63
2016 Pensions reserved 58
2007 Spending on the NHS in Scotland has gone down since 2003* 53
2007 Scottish Executive to decide whether to renew Trident* 53
2003 Liberal Democrats were part of Scottish government 1999-2003* 53
2003 Scottish Parliament can change Scottish Income Tax* 47
2016 Welfare Benefits reserved 46
1999 Scottish Parliament not able to change tax* 45
2016 Agriculture devolved 44
2003 List MSPs not responsible for problem in area* 15
Table 3.2: % of SES respondents able to correctly answer quesধons about responsibility. % correct for quesধons
denoted by * are derived by adding ‘definitely true’ and ‘probably true’ (or ‘definitely false’ and ‘probably false’). All
data are weighted. Source: SES 1999-2016
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Year Question % Correct
2007 The UKGovernment makes all decisions about defence* 74
2016 Which level of government is responsible for Defence and Foreign Affairs? 70
2007 TheWelsh Assembly decides school budget* 69
2003 UKGovernment makes defence decisions* 66
2007 TheWelsh Assembly cannot change income tax level in Wales* 56
2003 TheWelsh Assembly can decide howmuch of its budget is spent on schools* 55
2003 Welsh Assembly can’t change income tax* 54
2016 Which level of government is responsible for Schools? 50
2016 Which level of government is responsible for level of income tax? 50
2016 Which level of government is responsible for NHS? 49
2016 Which level of government is responsible for police? 33
1999 Assembly makes defence decisions* 29
1999 Assembly not able to change tax 26
1999 TheWelsh Assembly decides school budget* 26
Table 3.3: % of WES respondents able to correctly answer quesধons about responsibility. % correct for quesধons
denoted by * are derived by adding ‘definitely true’ and ‘probably true’ (or ‘definitely false’ and ‘probably false’). All
data are weighted. Source: WES 1999-2016
been some improvement since 1999, with certain policy areas more clear to respondents than others.
In particular, defence and foreign affairs appear to be an area of policy that the majority of respon-
dents knew to be a UKGovernment responsibility. Respondents seem less sure, however, of who
is responsible for devolved policy areas. Considerably fewer respondents knew that the NHS, for
example, is a devolved policy area in Scotland andWales than knew that defence and foreign affairs
were not.
In both cases, the results provide some cause for optimism, and some cause for concern. In Scot-
land andWales, respondents’ ability to correctly attribute responsibility to different levels of gov-
ernment seems to have improved substantially from a low base in 1999. In the most recent SES, a
majority of respondents were able to correctly identify the level of government responsible for for-
eign affairs, defence, local government, immigration, education, the NHS, and pensions. Slightly
less than half knew which level of government was responsible for welfare benefits and agriculture,
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but responsibility for these policy areas was arguably uniquely unclear at the time of the 2016 SES.13
InWales, a substantial plurality of respondents was able to identify the level of government respon-
sible for schools, income tax, the NHS, and defence and foreign affairs.
Yet in both cases there remains a substantial proportion of respondents left unable to identify
which level of government is responsible for certain policy areas. This has far-reaching implications
for the study of voting behaviour in Scotland andWales. For example, the dominant explanation of
voting behaviour at devolved elections has been the valence model (Clarke et al., 2004; Johns et al.,
2010, 2009b; Scully andWyn Jones, 2012; Scully, 2013); which states that vote choice is heavily influ-
enced by which party voters’ think is best placed to deal with the most important issue. InWales,
a majority of voters in the most recent WES and BES have stated that the most important issue for
them is the NHS. Yet less than half of respondents are aware of which government – and therefore
which governing party – is responsible for NHS policy. This poses a clear theoretical challenge for
the valence theory of voting at devolved elections.
3.3.2 Actors
Quite apart from policy attribution, if voters are to hold incumbents to account for their perfor-
mance in government, they need to be aware of who those incumbents are. Political candidates
and parties are also among some of the most powerful heuristics used by voters to determine vote
choice (King, 2002; Clarke et al., 2004; Poguntke andWebb, 2005; Costa Lobo and Curtice, 2014;
Prosser et al., 2018). The SES andWES have included a number of questions asking respondents to
identify certain political actors. Table 3.4 once again gives the percentage of SES respondents who
answered each question correctly and in each case a majority of respondents gave the correct answer.
Unsurprisingly, the question that most respondents could answer correctly was whether the SNP
had promised to hold an independence referendum should they win the election. At the other end
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Year Question % Correct
2007 The SNP has promised to hold a referendum on independence if it wins* 82
2007 Labour hadMinisters in the 2003-2007 executive 77
2007 Conservatives hadMinisters in the 2003-2007 executive 70
2007 Liberal Democrats hadMinisters in the 2003-2007 executive 69
2007 The Liberal Democrats are committed to introduce local income tax* 63
2007 Conservatives hadMinisters in the 2003-2007 executive 62
2003 Liberal Democrats were part of Scottish government 1999-2003* 53
Table 3.4: SES respondents’ knowledge of poliধcal actors. % correct for quesধons denoted by * are derived by adding
‘definitely true’ and ‘probably true’ (or ‘definitely false’ and ‘probably false’). All data are weighted. Source: SES 1999-
2016
of the table, just over half of respondents in 2003 knew that Labour had formed a coalition govern-
ment with the Liberal Democrats in the aftermath of the 1999 devolved election.
InWales, respondents were asked primarily about individual actors. The results are shown in Ta-
ble 3.5. All respondents were asked whether they could identify their constituencyMember of Par-
liament (MP) and Assembly Member (AM) from a list of six names.14 The names were all fictitious,
except for the respondent’s actual MP and AM.More respondents were able to name their MP than
their AM, but in both cases a majority of respondents were able to correctly identify their represen-
tatives. This was not the case for other representatives however. Only 2% of respondents were able
to identify two of Wales’ four Members of the European Parliament and two of the four regional
AMs. AsWelshMEPs represent the whole of Wales and spend a considerable amount of time on
the European continent, it is unsurprising that respondents had little knowledge of them. Similarly,
regional AMs are not elected as individual candidates but from a party list, represent large regions
consisting of multiple constituencies, and take up roles that make them less visible to constituents
(Poole, 2018). 15
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Year Question % Correct
2016 Which of the following people is the MP in your UK parliamentary constituency? 70
2016 Match Jeremy Hunt to correct job 58
2016 Match John Bercow to correct job 57
2016 Which of the following people is the AM in your NAW constituency? 53
2016 Match Tim Farron to correct job 43
2016 Match Kirsty Williams to correct job 41
2003 Ron Davies First Minister before Rhodri Morgan* 21
2016 MatchMark Drakeford to correct job 18
2016 Match Jean Claude-Juncker to correct job 15
2016 Match Rosemary Butler to correct job 11
2016 Match Donald Tusk to correct job 10
2016 MatchMartin Schulz to correct job 6
2016 Name recognition of Regional AMs (both correct) 2
2016 Name recognition of MEPs (both correct) 2
Table 3.5: WES respondents’ knowledge of poliধcal actors % correct for quesধons denoted by * are derived by
adding ‘definitely true’ and ‘probably true’ (or ‘definitely false’ and ‘probably false’). All data are weighted. Source:
WES 1999-2016
3.3.3 Electoral System
Surprisingly, political scientists have rarely analyzed citizens’ understanding of a vital aspect of
democracy: the electoral system. But if voters are unsure of how to use the electoral system to voice
their political preferences, their knowledge of political actors and government responsibility might
be of little use. This question is perhaps even more salient when a new or different form of electoral
system is introduced to the electorate. This was the case in Scotland andWales at the first devolved
elections in 1999, when voters were introduced to the Additional Member System (AMS), more
commonly knownMixed-Member Proportional (MMP) (Dunleavy andMargetts, 1999). In con-
trast to UK general elections where voters received one vote for a constituency, under AMS voters
have two votes; one for a constituency and one for a regional list. The constituency contest is de-
cided by the same plurality system used at UK general elections, but the regional seats are propor-
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tionally assigned using the D’Hondt formula. This system is generally considered to be one of the
most difficult electoral systems for voters to understand (Farrell and Gallagher, 1999; Gschwend,
2006; Carman and Johns, 2010).
Despite limited analysis, there is considerable evidence of voter confusion in relation to the elec-
toral system. The first devolved elections in 1999 saw multiple reports of voter confusion (BBC,
1999; Seenan, 1999), with future Welsh First Minister Rhodri Morgan remarking “I think it is fair
to say that a lot of people were confused by it.” (Morgan, 1999). The Guardian quoted a Glasgow
polling worker as saying: “It’s been a nightmare, I’ve spent half the morning trying to explain to
people how it’s supposed to work. Even after I explained, half of them didn’t understand. It’s just
too confusing” (Seenan, 1999). Survey analysis by Curtice et al. (2000) confirmed this, finding that
while voters did not report difficulty in filling out ballot papers, nearly half of voters said that they
couldn’t understand how seats would be allocated. Whilst it might be expected that there is some
confusion at the very first use of a new electoral system this confusion has continued. 16
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 provide details of all knowledge questions on the electoral system asked in the
SES andWES. The SES also provides the opportunity to look at changes in knowledge of the elec-
toral system over time in Scotland. By asking some of the same questions in each SES, it is possi-
ble to create a time-series between 1999 and 2016. Figure 3.1 shows how the proportion of SES re-
spondents providing correct answers to questions on the electoral system have changed over time.
It is important to note that as this is not panel data, we cannot draw inferences from it regarding
whether an individual’s knowledge of the electoral system has changed. The pattern that emerges
is surprising. For every question, the proportion of respondents able to provide the correct answer
actually decreased dramatically between the inaugural election in 1999 and the second devolved elec-
tion in 2003 before recovering. An explanation for the drop in knowledge at the second election may
be to do with focus. In the run-up to the 1999 SP election, great effort was made to provide infor-
mation on the electoral system that was to be used. 17 This effort has not been made in subsequent
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Year Question % Correct
1999 Can vote for same party twice* 78
2016 You cant vote for the same party in both constituency and regional lists* 73
2007 You cant vote for the same party in both constituency and regional lists* 69
2003 Can vote for same party on 1st and 2nd vote 67
1999 List seat ensure fair share of seats* 63
2011 It would be much easier under AV for small parties to win seats* 60
2007 [In LEs] You can only rank candidates from one party* 60
2007 [In LEs] You vote by ranking candidates rather than choosing just one* 57
2011 AV is more proportional than our current system* 55
2011 If you’re going to vote for a small party, you’re better off choosing it in the list* 50
2016 If you’re going to vote for a small party, you’re better off choosing it in the list* 48
2007 Better choosing a small party in the regional than the constituency vote* 46
2007 [In LEs] Each ward will be represented by 3 or 4 councillors* 46
2003 List seats make fair share of seats* 43
2016 The number of seats won by a party is decided by the number of constituency votes 42
2007 [In LEs] Only your first two preferences count in the calculations of who gets elected* 38
1999 Candidates standing for constituencies cant stand for list* 31
2007 Number of seats won by a party is determined by number of constituency votes* 30
2011 The number of seats won by a party is decided by the number of constituency votes 30
1999 Seats decided by 1st vote* 30
1999 Two votes show 1st and 2nd Preference* 26
2016 Where a party is very strong, not much point voting for it on the list* 24
2003 Party seats are decided by the number of 1st votes 24
2003 Given 2 votes to show 1st and 2nd preference 23
2003 Candidates standing for constituencies cant stand for list* 21
1999 Party with less than 5% of second votes unlikely to win list seats* 19
2011 Where a party is very strong, not much point voting for it on the list* 18
2007 Where a party is very strong, not much point voting for it on the list* 18
2003 Party with less than 5% of second votes unlikely to win list seats* 15
Table 3.6: Scoষsh voters’ knowledge of electoral system used for Scoষsh Parliamentary and local elecধons. % cor-
rect for quesধons denoted by * are derived by adding ‘definitely true’ and ‘probably true’ (or ‘definitely false’ and
‘probably false’). Source: SES 1999-2016. All data are weighted.
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Year Question % Correct
2003 In NAW elections you are allowed to vote for the same party on 1st and 2nd votes* 50
2007 In NAW elections you are allowed to vote for the same party on 1st and 2nd votes* 49
2003 There are 60 members of the Welsh Assembly* 36
2003 List seat ensure fair share* 35
2003 Two votes show 1st and 2nd preference* 25
2003 Party with less than 5% of 2nd vote unlikely to win list* 24
1999 List seat ensure fair share* 22
1999 Can vote for same party twice 22
2003 Seats are decided by 1st votes 19
2007 TheWelsh National Assembly has about 100 elected members* 19
2003 If you stand in the constituency you cant stand on the list* 13
1999 Party with less than 5% of 2nd vote unlikely to win list* 12
1999 If you stand in the constituency you cant stand on the list* 8
1999 2 votes show 1st and 2nd preference* 8
1999 Seats are decided by 1st votes 8
Table 3.7: Welsh voters’ knowledge of electoral system used in Naধonal Assembly for Wales elecধons. % correct for
quesধons denoted by * are derived by adding ‘definitely true’ and ‘probably true’ (or ‘definitely false’ and ‘probably
false’). Source: WES 1999-2016. All data are weighted.
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Figure 3.1: How has knowledge of the electoral system changed in the Scoষsh electorate? Source: SES, 1999-2016.
All data are weighted.
elections, perhaps explaining the dip and then steady recovery, as voters become more acquainted
with the electoral system.
3.3.4 Comparing Scotland andWales
The most recent iterations of the SES andWES have not asked the same questions or used compara-
ble question format in the knowledge questions posed to respondents. This means that from 2007
onward it is not possible to compare levels of knowledge in Scotland andWales using these data
sources. The election studies of 1999 and 2003 did ask the same questions however.18 While these
studies were carried out nearly two decades ago during devolution’s infancy, a comparison of this
data can at least give us an idea of the baselines of political knowledge on devolved issues. In par-
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Figure 3.2: The knowledge gap between Scotland and Wales 1999. Labels given as Δ = % correct in Wales - % cor-
rect in Scotland Source: SES and WES, 1999
Figure 3.3: The knowledge gap between Scotland and Wales 2003. Labels given as Δ = % correct in Wales - % cor-
rect in Scotland Source: SES and WES, 2003
ticular, it may assist in identifying any substantial knowledge ‘gap’, where knowledge of devolved
issues is considerably higher in Scotland than inWales or vice versa. Figure 3.2 shows the difference
in the percentage of respondents who provided the correct answer in Scotland andWales from the
1999 SES andWES. In every question bar one, fewer respondents in Wales were able to provide the
correct answer to questions regarding the electoral system and the responsibilities of the devolved in-
stitutions. Indeed, in 1999 not one question yielded more than 30% correct answers from theWelsh
sample.
Figure 3.3 shows that the size of the knowledge gap had reduced somewhat by 2003. However,
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this was not because knowledge of devolved issues in Wales had caught up with Scotland, but rather
that Scottish respondents knew less about devolved issues in 2003 than they did in 1999. As has al-
ready been argued, this could be a result of the lack of a coordinated information campaign in 2003
in Scotland as there had been in 1999. It is also possible that the devolved elections were just not
considered salient by voters at that time. The Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales
were dissolved just days after the start of the 2003 IraqWar, andWyn Jones and Scully (2006) have
shown that voters were considerably influenced by the war at the time of the election.
The next question to address is whether this knowledge gap is unique to devolved issues, or
whether it is replicated across all aspects of politics in Scotland andWales? For this, I turn to the
British Election Study (Fieldhouse et al., 2018). Here, respondents in England, Scotland, andWales
were asked a number of questions about UK and international politics across the first 12 waves of
the British Election Study Internet Panel, between 2014 and 2018. The results are displayed in Table
3.8. In this data, there is very little difference between what Scottish andWelsh citizens know about
politics, although on average respondents in Scotland do slightly better on these questions. The
more consistent trend in the data is that respondents in Wales and, in particular, Scotland perform
better on the survey’s knowledge questions than respondents in England. By this reading at least, the
knowledge gap identified by the 1999 and 2003 devolved elections studies has not carried through to
the BES and questions about non-devolved issues.
Because of the absence of comparable questions since 2003, we do not know whether a knowl-
edge gap still exists on devolved issues between respondents in Scotland andWales. It could be the
case that knowledge inWales has caught up with Scotland since 2003, or that knowledge in Scot-
land has declined to the level seen inWales, as happened between 1999 and 2003. However, there is
at least some anecdotal evidence that this may not be the case. First, turnout at Scottish Parliamen-
tary elections has remained substantially higher than elections to the National Assembly for Wales
and numerous studies have demonstrated a link between political knowledge and participation (e.g.
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Question England Scotland Wales
Know EdMilliband’s Job (W1,2,3) 92 91 92
KnowNick Clegg’s Job (W1,2,3) 91 90 92
Polling stations close at 10pm on election day (W11) 86 92 88
KnowGeorge Osborne’s Job (W1,2,3) 87 88 88
Know Vladimir Putin’s Job (W2,3,4) 84 86 88
Know Angela Merkel’s Job (W2,3,4) 85 84 86
Know Theresa May’s Job (W1,2,3) 83 82 84
Only taxpayers are allowed to vote (W12) 82 84 83
Only taxpayers are allowed to vote (W11) 81 85 82
Know Vladimir Putin’s Job (W10) 82 84 81
Know John Bercow’s Job (W1,2,3) 78 82 79
Know Angela Merkel’s Job (W10) 79 79 71
Correctly Identify MP (W3) 72 72 71
The number of MPs is about 100 (W12) 65 78 70
MPs from different parties are on committees (W11) 66 77 70
MPs from different parties are on committees (W12) 65 76 71
The number of MPs is about 100 (W11) 66 75 70
Correctly Identify MP (W2) 70 69 70
Can’t stand for parliament unless pay deposit (W11) 65 74 69
Can’t stand for parliament unless pay deposit (W12) 62 75 70
Switzerland is a member of the EU (W8) 68 67 70
Correctly Identify MP (W1) 69 67 67
The Lib Dems favour PR for Westminster (W12) 61 70 66
The Lib Dems favour PR for Westminster (W11) 62 70 65
Know Bashar al-Assad’s Job (W2,3,4) 58 61 59
The EU is made up of 15 member states (W8) 49 51 49
Know John Kerry’s Job (W10) 46 49 37
Know Francois Hollande’s Job (W10) 43 52 36
EUmembers elect same number of reps to the EP (W8) 41 45 41
Know Bashar al-Assad’s Job (W10) 42 45 34
Know Benjamin Netanyahu’s Job (W10) 40 41 35
EU spends more on agriculture than any other policy (W8) 33 37 36
Croatia is a member of the EU (W8) 35 36 34
The ECHR only has jurisdiction over EUmembers (W8) 20 21 21
Table 3.8: Briধsh Elecধon Study Internet Panel Knowledge quesধons, with % correct answers for respondents in
England, Scotland and Wales. Source: BESIP (Fieldhouse et al., 2018). All data are weighted.
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Blais, 2000). Second, the influence of the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum has been pro-
found. Fieldhouse and Prosser (2018) have shown how the referendum acted as an electoral ‘shock’
that re-drew the dividing lines upon which Scottish politics take place. Devolved issues, and specif-
ically the question of independence, now play a fundamental role in Scottish politics that is absent
fromWelsh politics. Finally, the media landscape of Scotland andWales differ considerably. The
ease with which voters can access political information on devolved issues plays a substantial, and
understudied, role in the existence of any potential knowledge gap between Scotland andWales.
This is the focus of the next section of this chapter.
3.4 The Supply of Political Information in Scotland andWales
Most models of public responsiveness and democratic accountability depend on voters being able
to acquire accurate information about what incumbents and challengers are doing. Only by doing
so are they able to attribute blame or reward for the policies they pursue in office. This ability de-
pends on a supply of political information where policy responsibility is clear to voters (Soroka and
Wlezien, 2010). The field of political communication has long studied the ways in which citizens
acquire information about politics, focusing in particular on the role of the media in this process.
Iyengar and Kinder (1987), for example, show that certain issues are more likely to influence political
behaviour among voters when those issues are covered prominently in the media. This is due to a
‘priming’ effect, where exposure to a stimulus – in this case a media story – influences a response to
a subsequent stimulus (i.e. voting). This research has been shown to be very robust, supported with
both experimental and survey methodologies (Iyengar and Kinder, 1987; Krosnick and Brannon,
1993; Valentino et al., 2002; Sanders and Norris, 2005; Brandenburg, 2006; Norris, 2006; Stevens
et al., 2011). In his seminal work Public Opinion, Walter Lippman argued that “public opinion is
primarily a moralized and codified version of the facts” (Lippmann, 1922b, pp. 81-82). What facts
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the media do or do not cover is therefore likely to have a substantial impact on public opinion and
behaviour. In particular, the ways in which the media discuss policy responsibility and attribution is
likely to influence how citizens think about politics. This is not a straightforward task in multilevel
systems such as Scotland andWales, where responsibility for policies is divided between multiple
governments operating within distinct geographic boundaries (Downs, 1957).
Where multilevel governance is a relatively recent occurrence, media organizations do not nec-
essarily have the capacity or desire to reflect the multilevel nature of government and policy. In the
UK, large parts of the media market are heavily centralized. All of the major UK serving newspa-
pers are produced and printed in England and, with 84% of the UK’s population living in England,
focus primarily on news and editorial content that relates to England. Scotland has long had a his-
tory of distinct media institutions, and this has continued since the establishment of the Scottish
Parliament. Multiple Scottish national newspapers exist, and several UK newspapers produce Scot-
tish editions, which contain Scotland-specific editorial content (albeit to differing degrees). InWales
however, the news media landscape is considerably different. Only oneWales-wide newspaper re-
mains in-print, and UK newspapers do not produce Welsh-editions. To this degree, the organization
of the UKmedia market has, to a large extent, reflected the uneven multilevel structures of gover-
nance.
Until now, there have been relatively few attempts to analyze how these media organizations
talk about politics in the UK.We are therefore largely unaware of the extent to which the media are
able to reflect the complexities of multilevel governance to citizens. In this section, I provide the
first large-N content analysis of attribution of responsibility in the UK, Scottish, andWelsh me-
dia. To do this, I create a unique dataset of every newspaper article mentioning the ‘NHS’ from the
period of 2000-2017 in 18 newspapers. The newspapers, listed in Table 3.9, were those for which pre-
existing libraries exist in the Lexus Nexus database. This yields a dataset of 190,868 articles on which
to base my analysis. The decision to focus on the NHS as a policy was made for two reasons. The
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Publication Country No. of Articles
Scotland on Sunday Scotland 1,449
Scotsman Scotland 15,365
Scottish Daily Mail Scotland 7,109
Scottish Express Scotland 5,535
Scottish Mail on Sunday Scotland 1,385
The Herald Scotland 19,387
The National Scotland 573
The Daily Telegraph UK 7,443
The Guardian UK 31,949
The Independent UK 14,645
The Independent on Sunday UK 1,576
The Observer UK 5,591
The Sunday Telegraph UK 4,063
The Times UK 74,798
Daily Post Wales 14,299
SouthWales Echo Wales 9,467
SouthWales Evening Post Wales 14,022
WesternMail Wales 18,150
Table 3.9: Number of arধcles per publicaধon in sample.
first, is that it can be used as a policy-specific search term that should provide less ‘noise’ than terms
such as ‘education’ or ‘defence’ (e.g. ‘Welsh rugby’s success is built on strong defence’). The sec-
ond reason I focus on the NHS is that it is a policy area for which responsibility is clearly devolved.
In both Scotland andWales, a majority of respondents knew that responsibility for the NHS was
devolved and is frequently named by respondents in both nations as one of the ‘Most Important
Issue facing Scotland/Wales’ in opinion polls.19 It has also been theWelsh and Scottish government’s
largest area of spending since 1999.
Using this data, I use a search of the text of each article for specific key words that uniquely iden-
tify the Scottish/Welsh Government, and the UKGovernment. A full list of search keywords used
to identify each level of government is provided in Table A.1 in Appendix A. This should allow us
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to understand which level of government is discussed, or not discussed, when the NHS is written
about in the press. For the analysis I divide the newspapers in the dataset into three categories de-
pending on where they are produced and printed: ‘UKNews’, ‘Scottish News’, and ‘Welsh News’.
Scottish editions of UK newspapers are included in the ‘Scottish News’ category. ‘UK’ newspapers
are those produced and printed in England, but target a ‘UK-wide’ audience.20
Figure 3.4 show which level of government each category of newspaper talks about when they
talk about the NHS. In the UK press, articles that mention the NHS are most frequently accompa-
nied by mentions of the UKGovernment: roughly one in every three articles. Mentions of the Scot-
tish andWelsh governments are considerably less frequent in the UK Press, with approximately one
in thirty-three articles mentioning the Scottish Government, and one in every hundred mentioning
theWelsh Government. In the Scottish press, the Scottish government is mentioned in roughly one
in every three articles, and the UKGovernment in one in every five articles. Finally, in the Welsh
press the Welsh Government is mentioned in just over one in every three articles, and the UKGov-
ernment in one in every ten.
The next question I focus on is whether these patterns have changed over time. It is conceivable
that as devolution has become more established in the UK, the press may have adapted the ways
in which responsibility for policy areas is discussed. Figure 3.5 therefore shows these data disaggre-
gated over time. In UK newspapers mentions of the Scottish Government have increased slightly
over time, from less than one mention in every hundred articles in January 2000 to roughly four of
every hundred articles in December 2017. Two noticeable and dramatic spikes occur in UK news-
paper mentions of the Scottish Government, both of which coincide with significant Scottish po-
litical events that had a substantial impact on the UK as a whole. The first occurs between August-
October 2014 at the time of the Scottish Independence Referendum. The second occurs at the time
of the UK general election inMay 2015, a time when the Scottish National Party were expected to
make historic gains. Mentions of the Welsh Government in the UK press have stayed at a relatively
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Figure 3.4: To whom do the news media aħribute responsibility for the NHS? % of newspaper arধcles that menধon
UK, Scoষsh, and Welsh Government search terms when discussing the NHS, 2000-2017. N = 190,868
stable low level since 2000, although there was a far less dramatic spike in mentions between Decem-
ber 2015 andMarch of 2016.
Since January 2000, mentions of the Scottish Government in the Scottish Press have nearly
quadrupled. In particular there was a considerable and sustained increase in mentions of the Scot-
tish Government in the aftermath of the 2007 Scottish Parliamentary elections. This was the first
election that saw the SNP as the largest party in Scotland (Johns andMitchell, 2016). In the Welsh
press, mentions of the Welsh Government have been more consistent over time with just under 40%
of articles mentioning theWelsh Government.21
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Figure 3.5: Monthly % of arধcles menধoning the ‘NHS’ that also include Scoষsh and Welsh Government key words. Full list of search key words provided in
Table A.1 in Appendix A.
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3.4.1 Why does this matter?
Drawn from a unique dataset of every newspaper citation of the NHS in 18 newspapers between
2000 and 2017, this analysis demonstrates that a newspaper’s country of origin largely dictates the
level of government discussed in articles mentioning the NHS. When talking about the NHS, the
Scottish andWelsh press talk most frequently about the Scottish andWelsh Governments, whilst
also regularly talking about the UKGovernment. This is probably an accurate reflection of respon-
sibility for the NHS in both countries. The devolved governments are responsible for the major-
ity of policy and allocation of funds to the NHS, yet the UKGovernment maintains an influence
through the transfer of a substantial proportion of the devolved institutions’ budgets. The UK
press, however, rarely talks about the devolved governments of Scotland andWales when discussing
the NHS. Instead, discussions of the NHS are more commonly combined with mentions of the UK
Government (which only has legislative competence over the NHS in England). Given the role that
the media plays in framing issues and priming citizens, the differences in how different outlets cover
politics is likely to have profound effects on citizens.
If the majority of citizens in Scotland andWales received political information from primarily
Scottish/Welsh media sources, these differences would not be an issue. Yet media consumption in
Scotland andWales is remarkably uneven. Table 3.10 shows the breakdown in newspaper readership
in Scotland andWales according to the 2016 SES andWES. In Scotland, a large majority of news-
paper readers said they read a Scottish newspaper or Scottish edition. In stark contrast, only 6% of
WES respondents say they read aWelsh newspaper, with the vast majority of newspapers readers
opting to read UK newspapers. Citizens in Scotland andWales are therefore accessing very different
types of political information, at least when they are reading articles about the NHS. It is possible,
of course, that the NHS is a unique policy area and that press coverage of other policy areas is differ-
ent. I think this is implausible however, and would argue that this is a trend that exists across press
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Scotland % Wales %
Scottish/ Scottish Edition Newspaper 45.6 Welsh/Welsh Edition newspaper 6.0
UKNewspaper 11.2 UKNewspaper 45.6
None 32.6 None 42.7
N 4,074 N 3,272
Table 3.10: Percentage of Scoষsh and Welsh Elecধon Study (2016) respondents’ newspaper readership.
coverage more generally.
As a result of these patterns presented in the data, I would expect two consequences. The first,
already illustrated in the previous section, is the existence of a knowledge gap between Scotland and
Wales on devolved issues. The second is that in Wales a respondent’s news consumption habits are
likely to be a strong predictor of their ability to answer knowledge questions about devolved issues. I
address this in the next section of this chapter.
3.5 Explaining Political Knowledge
Which factors distinguish citizens who know a lot about politics from those who know less? The
same question could be asked about any subject or topic of course. What separates citizens who
know lots about football or music from those who do not? Luskin (1990) has argued that in order
to learn about politics, as with all topics, citizens need to have the ability, motivation and oppor-
tunity to do so. Motivation in particular is often highlighted in the literature as a key factor (Con-
verse, 1964; Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Johns, 2011b; Bartels, 2006). In The Nature of Belief Systems
in Mass Publics, Converse (1964) was among the first to recognize the importance of individual mo-
tivation. He noted that “different controversies excite different people to the point of real opinion
formation” (pp. 245). Again, there is evidence to suggest that this is not unique politics. Burnett and
McCubbins (2018) asked university students a series of questions about a range of topics, including
questions designed to measure their levels of knowledge about politics. Their results showed that
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respondents’ knowledge about politics is constructed in a similar way to their knowledge of other
subjects. They also showed that a positive relationship, albeit not a particularly strong one, tended
to exist between political knowledge and knowledge of other subjects. In other words, students who
knewmore about politics tended to knowmore about topics such as the economy, sports, popular
culture, and geography (Burnett andMcCubbins, 2018).
The opportunity to learn about politics can be interpreted in two different ways. The first was
discussed in the previous section of this chapter that focused on the supply of political information.
If political information about politics – or a particular domain of politics – is not widely accessible
through the media, this reduces the opportunity of citizens to access this information. The second
way to interpret the importance of opportunity is to consider it through a society-wide angle. This
requires identifying the factors that have been shown to reduce the opportunity of individuals or
groups to take part in other aspects of citizenship. Numerous socio-demographic factors such as race
and ethnicity (Gilroy, 2013; Sobolewska et al., 2018; Allen, 2018), education (Allen, 2018), social class
(Evans and Tilley, 2017), and gender (Russell et al., 2002; Campbell et al., 2010; Stirbu et al., 2018;
Allen and Cutts, 2018) have been shown to have a substantial impact on the ability of citizens to
engage fully in the social, economic and political system.
Aspects of citizens’ identities beyond social demographics are also likely to affect their ability to
answer certain questions. In social psychology, Taylor and Doria (1981) have argued that individuals
often assign responsibility for actions using a “group-serving” bias. Positive outcomes are claimed
for the group (or groups) they identify with, whilst negative outcomes are blamed on out-groups.
Knowledge questions which ask about attribution of responsibility are therefore particularly sen-
sitive to this bias. Numerous studies have shown that partisan identity biases citizens’ attributions
of responsibility (Tilley and Hobolt, 2011; Bisgaard, 2019; Sulitzeanu-Kenan and Zohlnhöfer, 2019).
This partisan bias has also been observed in mulitilevel systems (see Cutler, 2004; Rudolph, 2003;
Johns, 2011b). In Scotland andWales national identity has also been shown to have an impact on
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political attitudes and behaviours. Work by Scully et al. (2004) has shown that Welsh identifying
citizens are more likely to participate in devolved elections, and more likely to be satisfied with the
institution (Wyn Jones, 2001; Trystan et al., 2003). Curtice (2006d) found a similar effect in Scot-
land, although the effect was less prominent than inWales. It might be expected therefore that
Scottish andWelsh identity are a useful predictor of knowledge of devolved politics. Citizens who
identify more closely with the substate identity (i.e. Scottish or Welsh) may feel more invested in the
devolved institutions, and therefore have the motivation to seek out information about devolved
politics. Recent experimental work by León and Orriols (2019) has also shown how national iden-
tity in Scotland andWales may bias citizens’ attributions of responsibility, although not to the same
extent as partisan identity.
3.5.1 Analysis
To examine the correlates of political knowledge I use survey data from the 2016WES and SES, the
most recent devolved election studies. I estimate a series of logistic regression models predicting
whether a respondent gave a correct answer to the knowledge questions included in these surveys.
This will allow an analysis of the impact of explanatory variable on different domains of knowledge,
rather than an abstract additive or factor scale. The full wording of all knowledge questions used in
the analysis as dependent variables is available in Appendix A. For explanatory variables, the same
measures are used for the analysis of Scottish andWelsh data, with the exception of respondents’ TV
viewership: the 2016 SES does not ask respondents about which TV news stations they watch. As
there is substantial evidence that television news has an impact on political knowledge (e.g. Iyengar
and Kinder, 1987), I include these controls in the Welsh analysis. I also include variables that mea-
sure whether a respondent reads a Scottish or Welsh, UK, or no newspaper. We might expect that
respondents who read newspapers generally to perform better in knowledge questions; however,
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given the analysis in the previous section of this chapter, I am particularly interested in any associa-
tions between reading Scottish/ Welsh papers and political knowledge.
Motivation is a trait that we are unable to measure in survey research. Citizen motivation is there-
fore measured by way of a proxy variable that asks respondents how interested they are generally in
politics on a five-point scale ranging from ‘Very interested’ to ‘Not at all interested’. Citizens with a
particular interest in politics would be expected to be most motivated to seek out political informa-
tion (see Hobolt and Klemmemsen, 2005). To measure national identity, I include the commonly
used ‘Moreno’ scale of national identity (see Moreno, 1988). This asks respondents to place them-
selves on a five-point scale ranging from ‘Scottish/Welsh not British’ to ‘British not Scottish/Welsh’.
I also include variables to control for socio-demographic factors like ethnicity, gender, education, so-
cial class, age, and household income. Household income is measured using a binary variable, coded
1 if the respondent’s household earnings are above the median income in Scotland andWales, and 0
if it is below the median household income (see McGuinness, 2018, for figures).
3.5.2 Explaining political knowledge in Scotland
Table 3.11 displays maximum discrete changes in the probability of SES respondents correctly identi-
fying which level of government is responsible for different policy areas. Full regression tables, along
with results for additional policy areas, are included in Appendix A. For each policy area, political
interest has the strongest association with being able to correctly identify which level of government
is responsible for what. Respondents who are more interested in politics were substantially more
likely to be able to correctly attribute responsibility for reserved and devolved policy areas. This is
entirely consistent with existing research on political knowledge that shows motivation and interest
to be one of the strongest predictors of political knowledge (see Luskin, 1990, , for example).
The results also show that systematic factors are powerful predictors of political knowledge. The
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effect of formal education is comparable in size to that of political interest: respondents with more
formal education are more likely to correctly assign responsibility. This effect is symptomatic of the
broader societal benefits associated with formal education that extends beyond its role of teaching
students facts about politics. It also plays a central role in setting career paths and building personal
and social networks that provide citizens with greater opportunities to access information and learn
about politics. Social class operates in a similar fashion. Those in higher social classes have far greater
opportunities to access political information in society (Evans and Tilley, 2017).
Socio-demographic factors also appear to play a substantial role in respondents’ ability to answer
SES knowledge questions. Respondent gender shows a consistent effect: respondents who identify
as female are less likely to answer SES knowledge questions correctly than those who identify as
male. This may reflect the fact that women have historically been excluded and underrepresented
in the political sphere in the UK (Lovenduski, 2005; Russell et al., 2002). Although devolution has
seen an increase in representation of women in elected office, the majority of politicians at every level
of government in Scotland andWales are men (Stirbu et al., 2018). Yet given that the majority of
citizens – and by extension eligible voters – are women, it remains unclear why this gender gap in
knowledge still exists.
As Figure 3.6 shows, even powerful predictors of political knowledge like education and politi-
cal interest do nothing to mediate the knowledge gender gap. The size of this gap is, at least in part,
due to the different ways that men and women answer survey questions. Considerably higher pro-
portions of respondents identifying as female answered ‘Don’t know’ to all types of knowledge
questions asked in theWES and SES. Table 3.12 illustrates the difference in questions of attribution
in the 2016 SES.
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Schools Agriculture NHS Defence Pensions Welfare
Age (Centred) 0.261* 0.065 0.280* 0.284* 0.447* 0.219*
Female -0.058* -0.067* -0.062* -0.076* -0.104* -0.049*
Education (Ref = No formal quals)
GCSE 0.015 0.001 0.015 0.023 0.041 0.011
A-level 0.057* 0.036 0.053* 0.063* 0.063* 0.054*
Degree 0.122* 0.082* 0.116* 0.097* 0.094* 0.062*
Social Class (Ref = DE)
AB 0.091* 0.092* 0.090* 0.077* 0.077* 0.035
C1C2 0.055* 0.056* 0.057* 0.051* 0.058* 0.012
Ethnic Minority 0.016 0.003 0.014 -0.023 -0.054 -0.080
Income 0.0013 -0.019 -0.0053 -0.0105 0.005 -0.003
Party ID (Ref = Other/None)
Conservative 0.021 0.064* 0.001 0.003 -0.010 -0.031
Labour -0.025 0.024 -0.026 -0.012 0.015 -0.046
Liberal Democrat 0.077 0.081 0.044 0.037 0.032 0.072
SNP 0.002 -0.034 -0.006 0.014 0.046* 0.043
Political Interest (Ref = Very Interested)
Fairly Interested -0.140* -0.071* -0.190* -0.106* -0.084* -0.036*
Not very Interested -0.361* -0.211* -0.414* -0.315* -0.249* -0.138*
Not at all Interested -0.664* -0.370* -0.649* -0.575* -0.398* -0.267*
Moreno Nat ID (Ref = Scottish not British)
More Scottish than British 0.060* 0.015 0.047 0.026 0.008 -0.003*
Equally Scottish and British 0.027 0.009 0.029 0.001 0.005 -0.061*
More British than Scottish 0.049 -0.003 0.044 0.037 0.015 -0.051
British not Scottish -0.017 -0.080* -0.004 -0.002 0.025 -0.028
Scottish Newspaper -0.001 0.013 -0.012 0.010 0.014 0.007
UKNewspaper 0.053* 0.066* 0.050* 0.049* 0.022 -0.002
Table 3.11: Maximum Discrete Changes in Probability of Answering Quesধons Correct, Scotland
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Figure 3.6: Effect of educaধon and poliধcal interest on the probability a respondent knows which level of govern-
ment is responsible for immigraধon. Effects are separated by respondent gender. Source: SES 2016
Literature on the psychology of survey responses suggest that in most cases ‘Don’t know’ means
don’t know (Beatty et al., 1998; Grichting, 1994). But this in itself is linked to the deep cultural and
gendered norms rooted in society. Men tend to overestimate the levels of expertise they have on a
whole range of topics, whilst women are less confident in their knowledge (Voyer and Voyer, 2014).
It may also be the case that women also have less access to political information in their day-to-day
lives. Much like education, gender still remains a powerful predictor of which employment sectors
men and women go into (Roberts et al., 2019). Within these sectors women may have less opportu-
nity to access political information. More broadly, it is also likely the case that women generally have
less opportunity to learn about politics, as society still sees the political world as an inherently male
sphere of society (Lovenduski, 2005).
Gender is not the only group identifying factor that provides a consistent effect. For almost ev-
ery responsibility question, older respondents performed better than younger respondents. This
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Schools Defence NHS Pensions Immigration
Male 11 10 10 14 11
Female 22 23 21 28 24
Table 3.12: % of respondents who answered ‘Don’t know’ to quesধons about government responsibility, by gender
is a common finding in the study of political knowledge (for example, Carpini and Keeter, 1993):
older citizens have been exposed to the political world for a greater amount of time, and are there-
fore exposed to a greater amount of political information. This life-cycle effect, can be further iso-
lated from a potential cohort or generational effect that may also influence citizens’ levels of polit-
ical knowledge. Citizens born into different generations will have found themselves coming of age
though distinct political times and events. For example, citizens who came of age during the 1960s
were eligible to vote at a time where political participation and polarization was particularly high.
Conversely, citizens who came of age during the early 2000s faced a period of historically low po-
litical participation. These effects may work in tandem with each other to result in older citizens
placing higher importance on political events than younger citizens (Blais, 2000). That said, it is still
perhaps surprising in the context of Scotland andWales. Here, we might expect those respondents
who have only known devolution since reaching voting age (at this point anyone under the age of 38
years old) to have a better understanding of the divisions of power in Scotland. The models do not
provide any evidence of this however, with the effect of age consistent over the majority of questions
asked.
3.5.3 Explaining political knowledge inWales
InWales, I present results predicting whether respondents are able to correctly identify different po-
litical actors. Again, additional regressions for all knowledge questions are provided in Appendix A.
Table 3.13 gives the results as maximum discrete changes in probabilities.22 Appendix A also contains
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regressions asking respondents to identify the level of government responsible for different policy
areas. Many of the effects are similar to those in Scotland: political interest, gender, education, age
and social class all influence respondents ability to correctly answer political knowledge questions.
Analysing Table 3.13, the results differ substantially from Scotland in that media consumption
and national identity appears to play a more consistent role amongWelsh respondents than in Scot-
land. Specifically, these two factors appear to influence WES respondents’ ability to identify political
actors. Respondents at the ‘British’ end of the Moreno national identity scale were generally more
likely to be able to identify UK-level political actors, and less likely to identify devolved-level actors
relative to respondents who felt ‘Welsh not British’. Party identity also appears to be a more consis-
tent predictor inWales, with Labour and Plaid Cymru support particularly associated with certain
forms of knowledge.
Respondents who consumedWelsh media were substantially more likely to be able to match de-
volved political actors to their job titles compared to those who did not read or watch news. The
effect of Welsh media consumption appears to be unique to knowledge of devolved political issues
and actors; it does not to appear to have an influence on respondents’ knowledge of UK-level po-
litical actors. Consumption of UK news media does not appear to have any effect of knowledge of
devolved political actors, but respondents who watched UK television news were more likely to be
able to identify UK political actors.
These results should be interpreted with some caution. While it could be the case that respon-
dents who consumeWelsh media knowmore about devolved politics as a result, self-selection may
also play an important role. Unlike in Scotland, consumption of Welsh media ( specifically news-
papers) instead of UKmedia is not the norm (see Section 3.4). It is plausible therefore that citizens
who choose Welsh media over other forms are already more inclined to have an interest in and learn
about devolved political issues. This may also explain the role that national identity plays. Respon-
dents who considered themselves to be more Welsh than British were more likely to be able to cor-
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rectly answer questions about devolved political actors than respondents who felt more British.
Conversely, respondents who are more British were more likely to answer questions about UK polit-
ical actors compared more Welsh-identifying respondents (except for respondent’s MP).
When respondents were asked about the level of government responsible for certain policy ar-
eas, the Welsh results were more in-line with Scottish results. Here, national identity and media
consumption appear to play a less consistent role, with knowledge better explained by political in-
terest and socio-demographic factors. Media still appears to play at least a limited role here though,
with consumers of UK television news more likely to be able to correctly attribute responsibility for
policy areas, and UK newspaper readers less likely to be able to do so. The reference point for both
categories are those respondents who said they did not generally watch or read any news.
3.6 Conclusion
Against a backdrop of political science literature that stresses the central importance of political
knowledge (e.g. Converse, 1964; Carpini and Keeter, 1993; Achen and Bartels, 2016), this chapter
provides the first comprehensive review of what citizens in Scotland andWales know about politics.
The results are stark. Substantial proportions of citizens in Scotland andWales are unable to
answer questions about politics. InWales, there was no knowledge question asked in theWES be-
tween 1999-2016 where more than 75% of respondents were able to provide the correct answer. In
Scotland, only 5% of the questions asked between 1999-2016 were answered correctly by more than
75% of respondents. The electoral system in particular is a source of confusion for respondents. This
is a theme that is repeated in subsequent chapters of this thesis.
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Butler Drakeford Williams R’s AM Bercow Hunt Farron R’s MP
Age (Centred) 0.052 0.236* 0.320* 0.324* 0.426* 0.047 0.094 0.245*
Female -0.022 -0.022 -0.096* -0.015 -0.099* -0.057* -0.161* -0.017
Education (Ref = No formal quals)
GCSE 0.043 0.018 -0.014 -0.025 0.039 0.061* 0.133* 0.045
A-level 0.053 -0.015 0.033 0.052 0.061 0.084* 0.107* 0.073*
Degree 0.094* 0.084* 0.085* 0.106* 0.128* 0.150* 0.203* 0.112*
Social Class (Ref = DE)
AB 0.060* 0.107* 0.091* 0.006 0.056* 0.120* 0.105* -0.004
C1C2 0.014 0.025 -0.001 -0.020 0.025 0.046* 0.042 -0.024
Ethnic Minority 0.038 -0.038 -0.114 -0.067 -0.087 -0.058 -0.069 -0.095*
Income 0.011 0.058* 0.067* 0.045* 0.068* -0.033 0.036 0.014
Party ID (Ref = Other/None)
Conservative 0.023 0.027 0.001 0.015 0.077* 0.029 -0.003 0.030
Labour 0.060* 0.061 0.092* 0.124* 0.082* 0.086* 0.076* 0.096*
Liberal Democrat -0.021 0.017 0.206* 0.099* 0.023 0.039 0.183* 0.054*
Plaid Cymru 0.143* 0.152* 0.188* 0.127* 0.025 0.056 0.094 0.058
Political Interest (Ref = Very Interested)
Fairly Interested -0.071* -0.116* -0.130* -0.081* -0.148* -0.140* -0.296* -0.053*
Not very Interested -0.101* -0.144* -0.304* -0.151* -0.407* -0.388* -0.484* -0.217*
Not at all Interested -0.061* -0.151* -0.394* -0.180* -0.464* -0.449* -0.587* -0.259*
Moreno Nat ID (Ref = Welsh not British)
MoreWelsh than British -0.013 -0.019 0.075 0.015 0.061* 0.065* 0.031 0.025
Equally Welsh and British -0.001 -0.043 0.058 -0.005 0.064 0.073* 0.070 0.017
More British thanWelsh 0.003 -0.049 0.011 -0.020 0.081 0.077* 0.096* -0.037*
British not Welsh -0.054* -0.122* -0.049* -0.062* 0.085 0.048 0.088* -0.015*
Welsh Newspaper 0.090* 0.155* 0.126 0.092* 0.057 -0.015 0.043 0.078*
UKNewspaper 0.007 0.009 -0.035 0.002 0.085* 0.022 0.041 0.003
Welsh TV 0.090* 0.181* 0.174* 0.033 -0.024 -0.004 -0.055* 0.015
UK TV 0.036 0.003 0.092* 0.023 0.082* 0.057* 0.131* 0.012
Table 3.13: Maximum Discrete Changes in Probability of Answering Quesধons Correct, Scotland
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Several factors differentiate those who are able to correctly answer knowledge questions. Primar-
ily, it appears that it is individual interest in politics that is associated with better political knowl-
edge, though this itself is likely driven by other factors such as social class, age, education, and gen-
der. Media consumption and national identity also play a role, but only for certain types of informa-
tion.
Analysis of the supply of political information in Scotland andWales share many similarities,
but also one important difference. In both cases, Scottish andWelsh newspapers appear to attribute
responsibility to the devolved governments for the NHS. ‘UK’ press rarely, if ever, mention the de-
volved administrations when discussing the NHS. This is of particular consequence inWales, where
the majority of citizens consume UKmedia. This likely contributes to the knowledge-gap between
Scottish andWelsh respondents identified in Figures 3.2 and 3.3. Such a gap does not appear to exist
to the same extent when asking questions about UK and international politics (see Table 3.8). More
work needs to be done here to establish whether a knowledge gap on devolved issues still exists, al-
though there is little reason to think it does not.
It is important to stress that this analysis is not seeking to castigate voters over their lack of knowl-
edge. Quite the opposite. Instead it should highlight how the current system is failing them. If po-
litical decentralization continues to be a rapidly growing trend across the world, then policy-makers
must find a way to respond to the sort of evidence presented in this chapter. If decentralization is to
have a real improvement on the everyday lives of citizens, they must be empowered to access its ben-
efits. When voters are unable to access the information to make judgments of incumbents records,
they are likely to ‘fall-back’ on heuristics linked to group identity to make political choices (Achen
and Bartels, 2016). The next chapter in this thesis examines the role of some of these identities –
namely national identity – in shaping how voters make electoral choices.
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Notes
1At time of writing.
2Notable exceptions include Catalonia and Quebec, where sub-state election have garnered a larger turnout
relative to statewide elections on multiple occasions.
3In Scully’s analysis of the 2011 devolved elections he concluded that “the greater extent of Scottish autonomy
and distinctiveness helped to make their sub-state election inMay 2011 significantly more ‘Scottish’ than the si-
multaneous contest in Wales was ‘Welsh” (Scully, 2013).
4The British Social Attitudes survey was founded in 1983, but focused on questions measuring social attitudes.
It also suffered from the same issues as the BES regarding limiting sample sizes in Scotland andWales. In 1999, the
semi-regular Scottish Social Attitudes Survey was founded partly in response to this limitation.
5The British Election Study cross-section, American National Election Study, General Social Survey etc.
6During the period of 2012-2017, the demand for landline calls in the UK has dropped from 103 billion min-
utes in 2012 to 54 billion. 21% of households do not have a landline in 2019, compared to 16% in 2014 (Ofcom, 2019).
7This is not to say, however, that these provide a exhaustive limits on the scope of questions included. In Scot-
land, for example, a substantial number of SES questions, and subsequently research, have explored the various
electoral systems used in elections in Scotland, focusing particularly on the transition to Single Transferable Vote
voting at the 2007 Scottish local elections (Curtice et al., 2000; Curtice and Seyd, 2011; Johns and Shephard, 2011;
Denver et al., 2009a,b; Hepburn, 2008b; Curtice andMarsh, 2008), and the rapid growth and success of the SNP
(Mitchell, 2012; Johns andMitchell, 2016).
8Soon to be renamed ’Senedd’ - the Welsh word for Parliament
9Dewar was Secretary of State for Scotland at the time of writing.
10Although it is important to note that weighting is unable to correct for serious composition bias (see Tourangeau
et al., 2013)
11Unfortunately, surveys that use probability sampling such as the British and Scottish Social Attitudes sur-
veys, and the British Election Study cross-section do not ask comparable knowledge questions.
12See discussion in introduction
13Although welfare benefits are reserved to the UKGovernment, the Scotland Act 2016 devolved responsibil-
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ity for 11 benefits (see https://www.deliveringforscotland.gov.uk/at-work/benefits-entitlement/). The
establishment of a Scottish social security agency was a talking point of the campaign and a manifesto pledge sev-
eral parties (for example, SNP, 2016, pp. 7). Responsibility for agriculture is devolved to the Scottish Parliament,
but is also heavily influenced by the European Union’s Common Agriculture Policy. The SES was carried out less
than ten weeks prior to the EU Referendum, making this topic highly salient at the time.
14Respondents were asked to select their AM from the following list: Gemma Davies, Simon Jones, Lowri Jenk-
ins, Paul Granger, Martyn Hughes and [Actual AM].
15TheWES 2016 also asked provided respondents with the names of nine different political actors, three from
each level of government with legislative power inWales; the National Assembly for Wales, Westminster, and the
European Union (EU). For each name they were given a number of different positions, and asked to match the
name with their position. Respondents were most familiar withWestminster political actors, and least familiar
with EU actors. This may tell us some information about the relative importance that voters place on these three
institutions. However, these results should be interpreted with caution. It is again worth asking “Is this knowl-
edge key for individuals to carry out their tasks?”(Lupia, 2006a). Being able to match the names of three senior
EU officials to their job titles is arguably not information that is beneficial to the majority of voters. Their job ti-
tles are all also far less simple to distinguish between: they all start with ‘President of the European X’.
16The Scottish Parliamentary elections in 2007 saw perhaps the most obvious case of widespread voter confu-
sion in recent UK political history. These elections occurred the same day as the Scottish local elections which were
to be run using a single-transferable vote (STV) system for the first time. The subsequent confusion led to over
140,000 votes (7% of all votes cast) declared invalid (Hepburn, 2008a).
17The inaugural devolved elections were preceded by educational programs to inform the public about the new
electoral system. Both the Scottish andWelsh offices committed £2 million to these programs (White et al., 1999).
18In 1999 and 2003 the SES andWES were both carried out by NatCen. In 2007 the two studies diverged, with
the SES carried out by YouGov, and NatCen retainingWES.
19See https://blogs.cardiff.ac.uk/electionsinwales/2016/08/08/the-most-important-issue-part-iii/,
accessed 15/05/19.
20In many cases ‘UK-wide’ means ‘England andWales’. This is because several newspapers may produce sep-
arate Scottish editions of the newspaper, and several are not for sale in Northern Ireland.
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21The sharp dip observed in mentions of the Welsh Government in the Welsh press observed in October 2013
is due to missing data. For this period the records for the Daily Post andWesternMail were not available.
22The same analyses are repeated in Appendix A on knowledge of EU political actors
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4
Explaining Scotland andWales’ Electoral
Distinctiveness
4.1 Introduction
Since the earliest surveys of elections across the UK, voters in Scotland and
Wales have behaved in a systematically differentway from voters in England.
This difference has been defined by the electoral success and dominance of left-of-centre parties.
Both countries have seen extended periods of success for the Labour Party and Conservative Party
weakness, and both countries are home to substantial non-statewide or ethno-regionalist parties:
the Scottish National Party (SNP) and Plaid Cymru. In Scotland, the SNP have risen to become
the dominant political party, having won the most votes and seats at the previous two statewide
general elections and the three previous sub-state elections. InWales, Labour continue their near-
century of electoral dominance at every level of government, while the Conservatives continue to
under perform compared to elections in England. Plaid Cymru continue to play an influential role
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in Welsh politics, but are yet to match the SNP’s success. This comes as the UK is in a period of seis-
mic constitutional flux and uncertainty, accompanied by increasing social, political, and geographic
polarization (Hobolt, 2018). If we are to understand long-term political change in the UK, it is vi-
tal to understand where diverging political attitudes are generated, and how they are solidified into
political behaviours.
In this chapter I argue that Scotland andWales’ electoral distinctiveness can be explained by the
presence of strong sub-state national identities. As Chapter 2 makes clear, national identity has long
been used as an explanatory variable in studies of political behaviour in Scotland andWales (for
example Balsom et al., 1983; Bennie et al., 1997a). More recently, explanations of voting in Scotland
andWales have turned to choice-based models, which have questioned the role of national identity
in decisions of vote choice (Johns et al., 2010, 2009b; Scully andWyn Jones, 2012).
I depart from the existing literature by proposing that national identity does indeed play a central
role in vote choice. I argue that the main left-of-centre parties – Labour and the SNP/Plaid Cymru
– form a bloc that is strongly associated with Scottish andWelsh national identity. The main right-
of-centre parties – the Conservative Party and (at time surveys were carried out) UKIP – form a bloc
of parties heavily associated with British identity. I argue that these Scottish/Welsh and British party
blocs can explain Scotland andWales’ electoral distinctiveness.
The next section of this chapter focuses on describing Scotland andWales’ electoral distinctive-
ness. I then review of existing work on political behaviour in Scotland andWales, before outlining
my theoretical framework and hypotheses. To test these, I use a series of analyses using survey data
from the BES, and the SES andWES. Finally, I present my results and discuss the implications for
future research.
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4.2 Scotland, Wales, and the territorial cleavage
The UK is a multinational state. So said Rose (1971) in his analysis of the cultural, sociological, and
political differences of the constituent countries of the UK. Nearly two decades hence, Hearl et al.
(1996, pp.180) argued that “the central class cleavage in British politics has a strong territorial di-
mension as well, if that does not in fact now predominate.” These works were heavily grounded in
the sociological approaches to political science that explain electoral dissimilarity between areas as
a function of the politicization of a ‘territorial cleavage’ (Lijphart, 1977). By this reading, degrees
of territorial heterogeneity are influenced by a host of factors such as language, religion, ethnicity,
culture, history and economy (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Rokkan and Urwin, 1982).
In Scotland andWales, this territorial cleavage has manifested itself in two main ways. The first
has been the consistent success of the Labour Party and the Conservative Party’s poor performance
relative to England, as shown in 4.1. InWales, Labour has won the largest number of votes and seats
at every general, devolved and local election since 1922, making the Party inWales arguably the most
successful election winning force in anyWestern democracy. In contrast, the Conservative Party
has gained a smaller vote share inWales than in England at every general election since 1859, prior to
the Representation of the People Act 1867. The Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party has been
more successful electorally, having been the largest party in Scotland as recently as 1959 and over-
taking Labour to become the second largest party in Scotland at the 2017 general election. Yet the
intervening period was associated with a decline in Conservative electoral fortunes that accompanied
Labour’s ascendancy.
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Figure 4.1: Labour and Conservaধve General Elecধon vote share in England, Scotland, and Wales (1900 - 2017) Source: House of Commons Library
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Since the mid-1960s, Scotland andWales’s electoral systems have differentiated from England’s in
a second way, namely the presence and success of ‘ethno-regionalist’ political parties: the SNP23 and
Plaid Cymru.24(Hough and Jeffery, 2003) These parties have had considerable impact on politics in
Scotland andWales. Both political parties have been in government in the devolved institutions: the
SNP as sole governing party since 200725 and Plaid Cymru as junior coalition partners withWelsh
Labour from 2007-2011. Furthermore, advocacy of devolution within the Labour Party were em-
boldened at least in part as a reaction to SNP/Plaid Cymru electoral success of the late 1960s and
mid 1970s (Bogdanor, 2001; Mitchell, 2009; Wyn Jones and Scully, 2012; Johns andMitchell, 2016).
In the first two decades of the 21st Century, the ‘territorial cleavage’ remains. The SNP have been
in government at Holyrood since 2007 and returned a majority of Scotland’s MPs in the 2015 and
2017Westminster elections. In 2014, the Scottish Independence Referendum saw 44.7% of the Scot-
tish electorate vote to leave the UK, a vote which Fieldhouse and Prosser (2018) argue constituted
a fundamental re-drawing of Scottish politics. To use Sartori (1976)’s distinction, the referendum
shifted the constitutional cleavage from a ‘cleavage of identity’ to a ‘cleavage of conflict’. The 2016
EU Referendum also highlighted Scotland’s continued distinctiveness with 62% of voters electing to
Remain part of the EU in contrast to the UK-wide result of 51.9% in favour of Leave.
InWales, longstanding patterns continue unabated. Even at the most recent general election in
2017, where the Conservatives achieved their highest Welsh vote share since 1935, they lost three seats
to Labour. Labour has been the largest party at every National Assembly election by a considerable
margin, holding uninterrupted power since 199926. Plaid Cymru remains a significant influence in
Welsh political life particularly through its roles as coalition partners and supply arrangements for
government budgets, although it has not replicated the electoral success of its Scottish sister party
the SNP.
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4.3 Explaining the Territorial Cleavage
Scotland andWales have long been recognized as electorally distinct from England in the British
political science literature. Several decades prior to devolution, Blondel (1963)’s pioneering work
Voters, Partiॽ and Leaders : The Social Fabric of British Politics highlighted the particularly unique
patterns of electoral support in Wales27, noting above-average levels of support for Labour among
the ‘lower and middle classes’ and uniquely low levels of support for the Conservative Party among
the ‘middle class’(Blondel, 1963, pp. 62-64). Likewise, in their seminal analysis of British voting
behaviour Political Change in Britain, Butler and Stokes (1969, pp.171) recognized that Wales was
uniquely hostile to the Conservative party.
Yet the currently dominant understanding of voting behaviour in Scotland andWales - the va-
lence model - is unable to explain this territorial cleavage. First proposed by Clarke et al. (2004) this
approach advocates a focus on competence, or ‘valence’28 as a way of understanding electoral choice
in Britain29 (see Clarke et al., 2009a; Whiteley et al., 2013, also), by using a number of performance-
based survey measures to predict individuals’ vote choice. Specifically, vote choice can be predicted
as a function of three key variables:
1. Party identification (PID hereafter), i.e. the political party a voter feels closest to. Unlike the
more traditional understanding of PID as a long-held psychological attachment to a par-
ticular political party (Campbell et al., 1960; Butler and Stokes, 1969), Clarke et al. (2004)
subscribe to Fiorina (1981)’s argument that PID is instead a running tally that voters keep for
the main political parties, which is relatively frequently updated by new information.
2. Party best on most important issue. Respondents are asked an open-ended question about
the most important issue facing Britain today, followed by the question “and which party do
you think is best-suited to handle this issue?”
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3. Party leader evaluations. Respondents are asked to rate party leaders on a scale ranging from
‘Dislike strongly’ to ‘Like strongly’. This is frequently measured in election surveys using a
0-10 thermometer score for each party leader.
These three variables act as heuristics, or information shortcuts, for voters that have little incen-
tive or time in their day-to-day lives to research the detailed policy proposals of each political party.
Using these measures, the valence model has been very successful at predicting vote choice at UK
general elections, and has become “the new orthodoxy in British voting studies and in British party
thinking alike” (Pattie and Johnston, 2009, pp.342).
Following in the footsteps of Clarke et al. (2004), subsequent Scottish andWelsh Election Studies
(SES andWES) turned to ‘valence’ explanations of voting behaviour in devolved elections (Scully
and Elias, 2008; Johns et al., 2009a; Johns, 2011a; Scully, 2013; Johns et al., 2013b; Scully and Larner,
2017). In Scotland Johns et al. (2010) illustrated how ‘performance politics’ was a major factor in
the SNP’s shock victory and Labour’s defeat, arguing that “the SNP did not win due to its pol-
icy stances, whether on the constitution, council tax or anything else. Rather, it overtook Labour
by persuading enough voters that it was a credible and competent party of government” (pp. 181).
When examining a binary vote choice of Labour or SNP, they conclude that “national identity ex-
erts virtually no independent influence over vote choice” (pp.185). Likewise, in Wales the valence
model has challenged Balsom et al. (1983)’s ‘Three-Wales Model’ as a primary explanation for vote
choice (Scully andWyn Jones, 2012).
Despite the obvious contribution the valence model has made to understanding of vote choice in
the UK it cannot explain the central question of Welsh (and Scottish) electoral distinctiveness. This
is for three key reasons. The first, and perhaps most obvious reason, is that many valence models ac-
tively avoid addressing the issue of political distinctiveness across the UK empirically. In Clarke et al.
(2004)’s Political Choice in Britain, geographic variation in general election vote is acknowledged
but subsequently ignored. Models of vote choice simply include ‘dummy’ controls for the regions
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and nations of the UK. This does nothing to address the cause of these territorial cleavages. Instead,
the coefficients in these models actually highlight that significant territorial distinctiveness exists and
that this variation is unexplained by existing explanatory variables. Far more recently, Clarke et al.
(2017) ’s attempt to apply a valence approach to explaining individual-level EU referendum vote falls
victim to similar methods. Once again, the distinctiveness of the Scottish vote in the referendum is
controlled away by including a dummy control for respondents in Scotland30. Again, coefficients for
these variables tell us that more information is needed.
Second, in order to understand the long-term territorial cleavage that exists between Scotland and
Wales on the one hand and England on the other, it is first necessary to address the process of how
political attitudes are generated. As Evans (2017) argues, political attitudes are often better under-
stood by examining longer-term identities and beliefs. For example, a voter’s social class may help
us to understand attitudes towards certain economic issues such as income redistribution, which in
turn influences their vote choice (Evans, 2017, pp.180). In a similar vein, if we are to understand the
distinctive electoral success and weakness of certain parties in Scotland andWales, then we should
examine the factors unique to voters in Scotland andWales that have driven support for these parties
for decades (or even centuries).
Third, at least part of the valence model’s success lies in how valence measures are operationalized
from individual-level survey data:
1. Valence measures tend to lead to less error compared to measures of identity, as they are often
easier for respondents to answer, giving them greater statistical power (Green and Jennings,
2017).
2. Questions are asked in ways that increase the likelihood that answers are related to party
choice. These questions specifically mention party names and party leaders, which has the
potential to have a priming effect for respondents who wish to be consistent in their answers
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(Tourangeau et al., 2000a; Green and Jennings, 2017). This is especially true when models use
performance-based measures taken from post-election surveys. In such cases, respondents are
providing information on their vote choice and performance-evaluations in a short space of
time within the same survey, potentially increasing the risk of bias in their answers.
3. Performance evaluations are likely to exhibit greater variation than questions of identity,
which by their very nature tend to be more constant (Green and Jennings, 2017). This means
that performance-based measures will again display greater explanatory power in statistical
modelling.
These factors tend to mean that valence models of vote choice give the false impression that fac-
tors further back in the funnel of causality, such as social class or national identity, are not highly
important in determining vote choice.
The valence model has therefore provided a necessary but insufficient progression of the un-
derstanding of electoral behaviour in Scotland andWales. The model aims to explain individual
vote choice, and has demonstrated great success in doing so. Valence cannot, however, explain all
aspects of political behaviour. As the primary authors of the valence model themselves acknowledge
“The variables in the valence politics model presented [...] do not explain everything about elec-
toral choice, but they provide powerful [...] insights into what is going on in the minds of voters.”
(Whiteley et al., 2016, pp.236). If we are to understand the longer term trends of distinctiveness, we
must explore additional factors that distinguish Scottish andWelsh voters from voters in England.
4.3.1 The role of national identity
To gain an understanding of what drives the territorial cleavage observed in Scotland andWales, it is
not necessary to reinvent the wheel, nor to throw out the contributions made by more recent anal-
ysis of vote choice. As already discussed, political scientists have for decades identified and sought
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to explain the electoral distinctiveness of Scotland andWales. Early political science scholarship
explained these patterns via the dominant understanding of electoral politics of the time: the ‘so-
ciological model’. First introduced to the UK by Butler and Stokes (1969), the model was heavily
influenced by the ‘Michigan model’.31 32 According to this reading, vote choice is heavily influenced
by party identification, a psychological attachment to a political party developed during early so-
cialization and influenced by a voter’s social position. Butler and Stokes (1969) argued social class
was particularly important in the UK, as illustrated by apparent patterns of ‘class voting’; that is, the
tendency of voters belonging to a particular class to vote for a certain party compared to voters in a
different class (Evans, 2017, pp. 178). This in turn built on earlier sociological work by Andersen and
Davidson (1943), who argued that elections should be seen as ‘democratic class struggle’. This early
work viewed the electoral distinctiveness of Wales (and subsequently Scotland) as an expression of
the differing class make-up of the two nations, relative to that of England.
Yet this approach was, and remains, unable to account for the rise of the SNP and Plaid Cymru
whose voters are drawn from across the class boundaries. As a result, scholars broadened their un-
derstanding of the sociological model to include other measures of identity. InWales, Balsom et al.
(1983) developed what became known as the ‘Three Wales Model’ to explain the distinctiveness of
Welsh electoral behaviour. Welsh voting behaviour, they argued, was driven by three central cleav-
ages in Welsh society; social class, national identity, and language (Balsom et al., 1983, 1984; Scully
andWyn Jones, 2012). In particular, the authors emphasised the role that an attachment to partic-
ular cultural aspects of ‘Welsh identity’ played in influencing political behaviour inWales. Voters
who identified as exclusively Welsh, or more Welsh than British, were substantially more likely to
support the Labour Party. Voters who considered themselves to be British rather thanWelsh were
more likely to vote Conservative. Ability to speakWelsh (or one’s family’s ability to speakWelsh) was
strongly correlated with support for Plaid Cymru.
In Scotland, scholars also turned to national identity as a way of explaining Scotland’s electoral
103
distinctiveness. Bennie et al. (1997a) used survey data from the 1992 Scottish Election Study to show
that vote choice for the Conservatives and SNP was highly correlated with national identity, with
support for Labour also correlated with feelings of ‘Scottishness’. They also framed Conservative
weakness in Scotland in terms of national identity, arguing the party was viewed as ‘anti-Scottish’.
This was identified by the Conservative party themselves. An inquiry by two Scottish Conservative
vice-presidents concluded that the party’s poor performance in the 1987 general election was due
to perceptions of it being “English and anti-Scottish” (Mitchell, 1990a). InWales, Wyn Jones et al.
(2002) arrived at the same conclusion in exploring the underlying causes of Conservative weakness
in Wales: the Conservatives were seen as a fundamentally ‘English’ party.
The focus on national identity as a key variable for explaining political behaviour in Scotland and
Wales continued with the establishment of the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for
Wales (Curtice, 1999; Wyn Jones and Trystan, 1999; Surridge andMcCrone, 1999; Wyn Jones, 2001;
Wyn Jones et al., 2002; Curtice, 2006d; Johns et al., 2010; Pattie and Johnston, 2009; Scully, 2016;
Henderson et al.). Curtice (1999) used national identity to explain the differing outcomes of the
1997 devolved referendums. Despite levels of pride in Scottish andWelsh culture being almost iden-
tical, ‘Scottishness’, ‘Welshness’, and even ‘Britishness’ manifested themselves differently in both
countries. British identifiers in Wales were more likely to oppose the NAW and less likely to view
the institution as important as compared to British identifiers in Scotland. In Scotland, even a ma-
jority of those who identified as British or English voted in favour of establishing the SP (Surridge
andMcCrone, 1999). ‘Welsh’ identifiers were also less warm to the idea of devolution compared to
their ‘Scottish’ identifying counterparts (although it was still the case that a majority of Welsh iden-
tifiers voted in favour of devolution) (Curtice, 1999). These differences, combined with the differing
size of groups who identified as ‘Welsh’ compared to ‘Scottish’ explained the differing outcomes.
Wyn Jones (2001) argued that “national identity has become one of the most significant determi-
nants in influencing howmembers of the Welsh electorate have viewed the reforms to their country’s
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political system”(Wyn Jones, 2001, pp.53).
I argue that these factors can be used to explain Scotland andWales’ electoral distinctiveness.
Fortunately, this does not mean disregarding more contemporary choice-based models of political
behaviour. Rather, I argue that a holistic understanding of voting behaviour can view these strands
as complementary explanations, rather than rival approaches. This interpretation is contingent on
the fundamental logic that underpins the work of Campbell et al. (1960): the ‘funnel of causality’.
Examining the role of variables whose influence is sequentially prior to those captured in the valence
model also has important theoretical benefits. Much like social class and other sociological identities,
an individual’s national identity is unlikely to be solely a result of their partisan identity. It is a man-
ifestation of geography, attachment to history, literature, sport, community, language, and shared
myths (Anderson, 1991). Therefore, unlike several of the performance-based measures in valence
models of political behaviour, there are unlikely to be issues of endogeneity, or ‘reverse causality’33.
In the next section I outline why variables further back in the funnel of causality, specifically na-
tional identity, can help us to understand the electoral distinctiveness of Scotland andWales.
4.3.2 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
How does national identity drives the electoral distinctiveness of Scotland andWales? As the dis-
tinctiveness is characterized by the success of left-of-centre parties and weakness of right-of-centre
parties, one obvious starting point would be to show how national identity influences left-right po-
litical attitudes. There is, of course, nothing about voters in Scotland andWales that make them
inherently more left-wing. Rather, I argue that left-wing politics has become an important feature
of Scottish andWelsh identity. Thus, it is the presence of a substantial number of voters in Scot-
land andWales who identify as ‘Scottish’ or ‘Welsh’ that drives the decade long dominance of this
bloc of parties. The connection between left-wing political parties and these identities can be at least
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partially explained by two contextual factors.
First, this alignment may be a reaction to what is widely perceived to be the ideological position
of the Conservative Party. Evidence fromWyn Jones et al. (2002) andMitchell (1990a) has shown
that the Conservative Party is perceived to be inherently ‘un-Scottish’ or ‘un-Welsh’. Therefore,
voters who identify as primarily Scottish of Welsh are likely to see the act of voting for the party
as a contradiction to their identity. This is not to say, of course, that people who feel Scottish and
Welsh will never vote for the Conservative Party. A voter’s national identity is unlikely to be the
most salient issue at election time. Yet as discussed in the previous section, it can nonetheless yield
important impact. The natural opposition to a party perceived to be un-Scottish and un-Welsh
is therefore those parties which are aligned with Scottish andWelsh identity. This opposition has
been, to differing extents, the Labour Party and the SNP in Scotland and Plaid Cymru inWales. As
Anthony King surmised during the BBC’s 1997 general election coverage : “The Celts clearly don’t
like the Tories” (King, 1997).
The second reason for the dominance of the left-of-centre bloc in Scotland andWales can trace
its beginnings to social factors that historically aligned voters in these countries with the Labour
Party. These are factors such as different religious traditions (Bennie et al., 1997a), the presence of
a substantial non-English-speaking minority inWales34(Balsom et al., 1983) combined with highly
industrialized population centres and a large public sector (Dunleavy and Husbands, 1985). The
SNP and Plaid Cymru then themselves adopted a left-of-centre policy platform, in part, as a reaction
to the Labour Party’s success in Scotland andWales (Massetti and Schakel, 2015). This alignment
between left-of-centre political support and Scottishness andWelshness remains as an integral part
of the ‘imagined communities’ of Scotland andWales, even though many of the social features of its
origin are in decline or no longer exist (Anderson, 1991).
I therefore proceed to examine the role of national identity in shaping Scotland andWales’ elec-
toral distinctiveness by testing two hypotheses:
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H1: There is a strong positive relationship between identifying as primarily Scottish andWelsh,
and left-wing political identity.
H2: There is a strong positive relationship between identifying as primarily Scottish andWelsh,
and voting for left-of-centre parties.
Confirming these hypotheses will demonstrate the central role that national identity plays in
Scotland andWales’s electoral distinctiveness.
4.4 Data
To explore the impact of national identity on political behaviour in Scotland andWales, I use data
from the 2015-2017 British Election Study Internet Panel (BESIP), the 2016 Scottish Election Study
(SES), and 2016Welsh Election Study (WES) (Fieldhouse et al., 2018; Henderson et al., 2016; Scully
et al., 2016). This provides data covering two general elections (2015 and 2017) and one devolved elec-
tion (2016) in both Scotland andWales. Although this is the period of time which has the best avail-
able data for testing my hypotheses, it also raises challenges. The three years captured by the data are
perhaps some of the most politically turbulent of the last 50 years in the UK. The 2014 Scottish In-
dependence Referendum and 2016 EU Referendum have generated substantial political uncertainty:
the 2015 and 2017 general election were two of the most volatile general elections ever measured by
the BES (Mellon, 2016). Both referendums also led to a substantial shift in the salience of group
identities within the electorate (for example, see Fieldhouse and Prosser, 2018; Hobolt et al., 2018).
The politicization of ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ voters in Scotland, and ‘Leave’ and ‘Remain’ voters across the
UKmeans we might expect that national identity effects may be more difficult to capture than at
previous time-points. The data used therefore presents a difficult test for this chapter’s hypothesis.
The main explanatory variable of interest, national identity, is operationalised using the BES
national identity scales:
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Where would you place yourself on these scales (1-7)?
- Britishness
- Scottishness (if in Scotland)
- Welshness (if in Wales)
- Englishness
From this information I create a ‘modified moreno’ scale ranging from ‘British not Scottish/Welsh’
to ‘Scottish/Welsh not British’, with a midpoint that marks ‘Equally British and Scottish/Welsh’. I
create this variable by subtracting a respondents’ ‘Britishness’ score from the ‘Scottishness/Welsh’
score creating a 13-point scale, ranging from ‘-6’ to ‘6’. A ‘6’ denotes someone who sees themselves
as strongly Scottish/Welsh but not British, with ‘-6’ denoting the opposite. The distributions of this
variable among the Scottish andWelsh samples are provided in Figure 4.2. The distribution shows
a clear pattern, with the plurality of respondents feeling a mixture of British and Scottish/Welsh.
There are also key differences in the distributions in Scotland andWales, namely that Scottish iden-
tity is more widespread thanWelsh identity. In Scotland, a substantial proportion of the sample feel
Scottish and not British. This number is considerably smaller in the Welsh sample. A higher propor-
tion of respondents in Wales feel more British thanWelsh compared to those in the Scottish sample.
4.5 Analysis
Perhaps the most obvious question that arises from the dominance of left-of-centre parties in Scot-
land andWales is: are Scottish andWelsh voters just more left wing than voters in England? To an-
swer this question, I rely on two variables contained in the BES: an ‘objective’ left-right scale, and a
subjective left-right placement. The BES’s left-right scale places respondents on a 0-10 scale which in-
creases in increments of 0.5. A respondent’s place on that scale is calculated from their answers to the
five questions shown in Table 4.1. Each item presents a statement that captures aspects of left-wing
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Figure 4.2: Kernel density esধmates of modified Moreno score in Scotland and Wales. ‘X = Scoষsh’ in Scotland and
‘X = Welsh’ in Wales. Source: BESIP
political sentiment, with voters being asked the extent to which they agree with each. The BES scale
is then constructed using this information, and the distributions of voters in England, Scotland, and
Wales are shown in Figure 4.3.
The differences are between respondents in each country are small, but consistent in their direc-
tion: fewer respondents in England agreed with each statements compared to Scotland andWales.
This is reflected in Figure 4.3, which shows higher numbers of Scottish andWelsh respondents on
the left-hand side of the Left-Right Scale, and higher numbers of English voters on the right-hand
side. This suggests voters in Scotland andWales are at least marginally more left-wing than voters in
England35.
When dealing with questions of identity, however, it is often more useful to look at subjec-
tive evaluations of left-right placement. If, as I propose, alignment with left-wing political parties
and thinking is an integral part of the Scottish andWelsh national identities, then we would ex-
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England Scotland Wales
Government should redistribute incomes 49.1 59.0 52.0
Big business takes advantage of ordinary people 73.7 81.0 79.3
Ordinary working people do not get their fair share 70.1 75.5 74.6
There is one law for the rich and one for the poor 68.0 74.0 73.5
Management will always try to get the better of employees 66.2 69.3 68.7
N 15,151 1,553 945
Table 4.1: % of respondents who ‘Strongly Agree’ or ‘Agree’ to BES Leđ-Right scale items, in England, Scotland, and
Wales. All data are weighted
Figure 4.3: Kernel density esধmates of BES leđ-right scale in England, Scotland and Wales Source: BESIP
pect higher proportions of people in these countries to consider themselves left-wing regardless of
whether they ascribe to various left-wing ideas. In the 2015-2017 BES, respondents were asked to
place themselves on a 0 to 10 scale, where 0 is very left-wing and 10 is very right-wing. Figure 4.4
illustrates the distribution of voters in England, Scotland, andWales across the 0 to 10 ideological
scale. The distributions show that subjective left-right placement follows a slightly exaggerated pat-
tern to the BES left-right scales. Higher proportions of Scottish andWelsh voters place themselves
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on the left-hand side of the 0-10 scale than English voters, and higher proportions of English voters
place themselves on the right-hand side of the spectrum. A plurality of voters in the three countries
place themselves towards the centre of the spectrum. An important aspect of this question is omit-
ted from the figure however. Approximately one in five respondents were unable to place them-
selves on the left-right spectrum, instead opting to select ‘Don’t know’. The distribution of ‘Don’t
knows’ was consistent across all three countries36 but it does highlight the important point that the
left-right ideological spectrum is something of an elite concept, marginalizing many people by its
very design. It appears substantial numbers of voters do not conceptualize their political attitudes in
this way.
Figure 4.4: Kernel density esধmates of leđ-right self placement in England, Scotland and Wales. N:England = 20,400,
Scotland = 2,094, Wales = 1,160. Source: BESIP Wave 1
However, a pattern nevertheless remains in the data, confirmed by both subjective and objective
measures of left-right identity, that higher proportions of voters in Scotland andWales than England
are ‘left-wing’.
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Next I test hypothesisH1, that Scottish andWelsh identity has a positive effect on left-wing place-
ment on left-right scales. To do this, I use four linear regression models, using BES left-right scale
and subjective left-right placement as dependent variables, and run each model in both Scotland and
Wales. The model is as follows:
LEFTRIGHT = ( ”β0 + β1AGE+ β2GENDER+ β3EDUCATION+ β4CLASS+
”β5NATID + β6TENANT)
Where:
LEFTRIGHT is either a respondents’ placement on the BES left-right scale or their self-placement
on a left-right scale. In both measures, 0=left and 10=right. Therefore, a negative coefficient will in-
dicate that Welsh/Scottish identity has a positive effect on left-wing placement. Respondents who
answered ‘Don’t know’ are treated as missing observations;
NATID is the modified Moreno scale as a measure of national identity;
EDUCATION is a binary variable of whether a respondent has graduated from university;
CLASS is a binary measure of subjective class identity, using the BES question:
Do you ever think of yourself as belonging to any particular class??
- No
- Yes, middle class
- Yes, working class
- Yes, other
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Respondents who identify as working class are coded as 1 and all others coded as 0;
TENANT is a binary variable of home ownership.
The results, provided in Table 4.2, indicate that national identity has substantial effect on both
measures of left-right placement among respondents in Scotland andWales. Figure 4.5 provides a
more intuitive visualization of the effect. Respondents who identify as primarily Scottish or Welsh
place further to the left on subjective and BES left-right placement. Conversely, respondents who
identify as primarily British place further to the right on both measures. The effect of national iden-
tity on subjective left-right placement in Scotland andWales is remarkably similar, but there is a sig-
nificant difference between respondents in the two countries with regard to the BES left-right mea-
sure. Here, Scottish identity appears to have a larger effect thanWelsh identity. It is possible that
this is a product of the smaller samples for the subjective left-right measure due to the high number
of ‘Don’t knows’. The people who were unable to place themselves on the left-right spectrummay
be disproportionately distributed towards the right on the BES scale. However, it does also empha-
size the importance of the collective national ’myth’ that attaches left-wing politics to Scottish and
Welsh identity. Regardless of whether Welsh identifiers are ‘objectively’ more left-wing than British
identifiers, they still believe this to be the case. Ultimately, the findings offer support to Hypothesis
1: that there is a positive relationship between left-wing political sentiment and Scottish andWelsh
national identity.
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Figure 4.5: Marginal effects of naধonal idenধty on leđ-right placement Source: BESIP
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Scotland Wales
BES L-R Scale Subjective L-R BES L-R Scale Subjective L-R
National Identity -0.217*** -0.204*** -0.163*** -0.220***
(0.021) (0.025) -(0.032) (0.033)
Working Class -0.583*** -0.698*** -0.947*** -0.609***
(0.141) (0.159) (0.181) (0.195)
Age (Centred) -0.020*** 0.006 -0.008 0.002
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Female 0.143 -0.351** 0.142 0.113
(0.129) (0.158) (0.173) (0.180)
Homeowner 0.145 0.025 0.137 0.308
(0.145) (0.192) (0.222) (0.243)
Graduate 0.098** -0.256*** 0.141** -0.226***
(0.045) (0.066) (0.059) (0.065)
Constant 2.593*** 6.022*** 2.609*** 5.217***
(0.258) (0.321) (0.358) -(0.440)
Observations 2301 2105 1302 1180
Table 4.2: OLS Regression predicধng Leđ-Right Placement with standard errors in parentheses. Note, coefficients are
not probabiliধes. Levels of significance: *** 99% ** 95% * 90%
4.5.1 National Identity and party blocs
Now that the relationship between left-right placement and national identity has been established,
the analysis can turn to the link between national identity and political behaviour. In particular, it
is the specific behaviour of voting for left-of-centre parties that clearly differentiates Scotland and
Wales from England electorally. I begin by examining descriptive patterns of voting in relation to
national identity. Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show the distribution of ‘bloc’ voting across the modified
Moreno national identity scale. The blocs in question are a left-of-centre bloc, and a right-of-centre
bloc. The left-of-centre bloc consists of Labour and the SNP/Plaid Cymru, and the right-of-centre
bloc consists of the Conservative party and the UK Independence Party. In both countries, the data
displays a stark pattern. In Scotland, a near negligible number of voters who identify as more Scot-
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tish than British cast a vote for the right-of-centre bloc. InWales, the proportion of more Welsh
than British identifiers voting for the right-of-centre bloc is slightly larger, but overall, very small.
Figure 4.6: % of voters who voted for leđ-of-centre bloc vs. right-of-centre bloc by naধonal idenধty in Scotland
Source: BESIP
At the ‘British’ end of the identity spectrum we can observe a different and less homogeneous
pattern. In Scotland in 2015, a majority of respondents at the extreme end (-6 and -5) voted for the
right-of-centre bloc, but a significant minority also voted for the left-of-centre bloc. At every other
point on the national identity spectrum a majority of voters cast votes for the left-of-centre Bloc
(although these majorities are considerably smaller at the British end of the spectrum). But 2015
is unique in Scotland in this regard: far greater majorities at the British end voted for the right-of-
centre bloc in 2016 and 2017. This is likely due to the highly unusual nature of the 2015 General
Election in Scotland. Held just eight months after the Scottish Independence Referendum, the SNP
and Labour Party had a combined vote share of 74.3%. InWales, the British end of the spectrum has
a majority of votes cast for the right-of-centre bloc in every year. The overall pattern is clear however:
there remains stark and substantial differences in vote choice between those respondents who hold
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Figure 4.7: % of voters who voted for leđ-of-centre bloc vs. right-of-centre bloc by naধonal idenধty in Wales Source:
BESIP
different national identities in Scotland andWales.
Next, I employ a more robust modelling of the relationship between vote choice and national
identity. I employ a set of binomial logit models, using a binary dependent variable of whether a
respondent voted for the Scottish/Welsh Bloc (coded as 1) or British Bloc (coded as 0). The model is
specified as follows:
BLOC VOTE = f(”β0 + β1AGE+ β2GENDER+ β3EDUCATION+ β4CLASS+
”β5NATID+ β6TENANT+ β7EUREFVOTE
”β8INDYREF[+β8WELSH])(4.1)
Where
NATID,AGE,GENDER, EDUCATION, CLASS, and TENANT are the same measures
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used in Table 4.2, and
EUREFVOTE is a binary variable coded 1 if respondent voted Leave, 0 if respondent voted Re-
main;37
INDYREF is a binary variable coded 1 if a respondent in Scotland voted for Independence and a
0 otherwise38
WELSH is a binary measure of whether a respondent inWales speaks Welsh or not.
Respondents that cast votes for political parties not considered part of the two Blocs are ex-
cluded39.
Table 4.3 displays discrete changes in predicted probabilities of factors influencing Scottish/Welsh
Bloc vote at the 2015, 2016, and 2017 elections. Figures given are the change in the probability of
voting for the Scottish/Welsh Bloc when a given explanatory variable moves from its minimum
value to its maximum value, holding all other explanatory variables constant. For example, in 2015,
the probability of a respondent voting for the Welsh Bloc would increase by 59% if that respondent
moved from ‘Strongly British not Welsh’ to ‘Strongly Welsh not British’. For binary explanatory
variables, the change in probability is the change seen moving from 0 to 1.
Wales Scotland
2015 2016 2017 2015 2016 2017
Nat ID Scale 0.587* 0.481* 0.529* 0.273* 0.350* 0.5578*
Voted Leave -0.447* -0.503* -0.480* -0.113* -0.095* -0.328*
Working Class 0.256* 0.263* 0.284* 0.057* 0.101* 0.113*
Age (Centered) -0.093 -0.469* -0.447* -0.073* -0.231* -0.143*
Female 0.020 0.106* -0.003 0.011 -0.067 0.052
Homeowner -0.001 -0.0245 -0.130* -0.022 -0.015 -0.094*
Graduate 0.044 -0.139 0.105 0.012 0.012 0.027
Cymraeg 0.074 0.318* 0.022 - - -
Voted for Indy - - - 0.192* 0.293* 0.357*
Table 4.3: Maximum Discrete Changes in predicted probability of voধng for Scoষsh or Welsh Bloc, 2015-2017.
Significant results denoted with *.
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For every election covered by the data in both Scotland andWales, a respondent’s national iden-
tity has a substantial and significant effect on bloc vote choice. InWales, the effect is more constant
than in Scotland which has substantial variation between election years. At elections inWales, mov-
ing from the minimum to the maximum value of national identity yields an increase of 48-59% in
the probability of voting for the Welsh Bloc. In Scotland there is more variation, with changes in
probability ranging from 27-56%. Here, the effect of national identity is smallest in 2015, although
it is still considerably greater than all other factors including a respondent’s vote choice at the Inde-
pendence Referendum. This, again, is likely due to the highly unusual context of the 2015 general
election in Scotland. The results confirm that national identity plays a large and important role in
creating the parameters of vote choice in Scotland andWales. Even when controlling for powerful
predictors of vote choice like as subjective class, EU Referendum vote and Independence Referen-
dum vote, national identity exerts a large effect.
Other substantial effects include subjective class identity and, in Scotland, a respondent’s Inde-
pendence Referendum vote. A respondent’s EU Referendum vote also has large impact on bloc
vote choice. InWales, respondents who voted or intended to vote Leave were considerably less likely
to vote for the Welsh Bloc at any of the three elections covered by the data. The effect in Scotland
was considerably smaller, suggesting that attitudes towards the EU and the impending referendum
played a much larger role in Wales in 2015 and 2016 than in Scotland.
In addition to the main models, I include interactions of national identity and Leave vote (vote
intention in 2015 and 2016)40. Figure 4.8 displays the full effect of the interactions across all possible
values as marginal effects, in line with Brambor et al. (2006). The results emphasize the findings pre-
sented in Table 4.3, that; 1) national identity plays substantial role in setting the parameters of vote
choice in Scotland andWales among both Remain and Leave voters, and 2) that the EU Referen-
dum had a greater impact on voting inWales compared to Scotland.
Finally, to ensure that the effect of national identity is not driven solely by the inclusion of the
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two ‘nationalist’ parties in my operationalization of the left-of-centre bloc, I employ a multinomial
logistic regression that separates out Labour from the SNP and Plaid Cymru. Here, the probabili-
ties of voting for each party are relative to the probability of a voter voting for the British party bloc.
Doing so, we can identify whether national identity is only a predictor of voting for the SNP and
Plaid Cymru, or if it is also a significant factor in predicting Labour vote choice. Results are pre-
sented as discrete change in predicted probabilities in Tables 4.4 and 4.5.
Although the effect of national identity is, unsurprisingly, substantially larger for SNP and Plaid
Cymru voters, national identity remains a significant factor in differentiating Labour voters from
Conservative and UKIP voters in Scotland andWales. For both the 2015 and 2017 general elections,
voters who identified as more Scottish or Welsh than British were significantly more likely to vote
for either Labour or the SNP/Plaid Cymru compared to the right-of-centre bloc of parties. Na-
tional identity appears to have had a substantially large impact in 2015 in driving the Labour vote
in Scotland, yet this is likely inflated due to the highly unusual 2015 general election result in Scot-
land which saw nearly three in every four Scottish voters vote SNP or Labour. The effect is weakest
at predicting voting for Labour inWales, yet is still a larger association than that between speaking
Welsh and voting for Plaid Cymru, a relationship that is often stressed as particularly important
(Balsom et al., 1983; Wyn Jones et al., 2002).
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Figure 4.8: Marginal effect of naধonal idenধty interacted with EU Referendum vote on probability of voধng for the X bloc 2015-2017
121
Scotland Wales
Labour SNP Δ Labour Plaid Cymru Δ
National ID 0.428* 0.858* 0.643 0.090* 0.524* 0.307
Leave -0.149* 0.040* -0.055 -0.398* -0.048* -0.223
Working Class 0.069* 0.001 0.035 0.275* -0.011 0.132
Female 0.001 0.015 0.008 0.046 -0.236 -0.095
Age 0.067 -0.190* -0.062 -0.079 -0.016 -0.048
Homeowner -0.027 0.001 -0.013 -0.016 0.018 0.001
Graduate 0.072 -0.074 -0.001 0.007 0.035 0.021
Indy -0.502 0.716* 0.107 – – –
Welsh Speaker – – – -0.009 0.070* 0.031
Table 4.4: Maximum discrete changes in probability from mulধnomial logit predicধng Labour/SNP/Plaid Cymru vote
choice in Scotland and Wales at 2015 general elecধon. Base outcome = voধng for Conservaধves or UKIP. All other
predictors are set to their means. * denotes significant effect. Full tables available in Appendix B.
4.6 Conclusion
The main purpose of this chapter was to identify the drivers of Scotland andWales’ electoral distinc-
tiveness. Ultimately, my empirical findings strongly and robustly demonstrate that national identity
plays a central role in underpinning this difference. By aligning voters with left-wing political atti-
tudes, identities, and political parties, national identity plays an important role in making voting for
right-of-centre parties not impossible, but improbable, given that such an act would be contradic-
tory to a substantial proportion of the Scottish andWelsh electorates’ identity.
These blocs of parties can therefore be described as a British bloc and a Scottish/Welsh bloc, ref-
erencing the primary identities that drive support for these blocs. Even when vote choice is broken
down into choice of individual party within that bloc, it remains a central predictor of Labour and
SNP/Plaid Cymru vote choice.
Importantly, this effect is not restricted to sub-state elections but is consistent across multiple
elections at different levels of government over time. This is significant because it shows that sub-
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Scotland Wales
Labour SNP Δ Labour Plaid Cymru Δ
National ID 0.155* 0.760* 0.458 0.133* 0.417* 0.275
Leave -0.162* -0.200* -0.181 -0.454* -0.031* -0.243
Working Class 0.129* -0.014 0.058 0.272* 0.018* 0.145
Female -0.007 0.080* 0.037 0.031 -0.030 0.001
Age -0.278* 0.160 -0.059 -0.480* 0.235 -0.123
Homeowner -0.001* -0.116* -0.059 -0.159* 0.028 -0.066
Graduate -0.202 0.263* 0.031 0.069 0.037 0.053
Indy -0.200* 0.585* 0.193
Welsh Speaker -0.037 0.048* 0.006
Table 4.5: Mulধnomial logit predicধng Labour/SNP/Plaid Cymru vote choice in Scotland and Wales at 2017 general
elecধon. Base outcome = voধng for Conservaধves or UKIP. Maximum discrete changes reported. All other predictors
are set to their means. * denotes significant effect. Full tables available in Appendix B.
state identities drive political behaviour at the statewide level. It is also not restricted to Scotland
where the proximity of the 2014 Independence Referendummight lead some to to conclude that
sub-state identities are unusually salient there at the moment. InWales the effect was comparable in
its strength, and consistent over the same period of time.
Finally, this chapter has implications for the wider study of voting behaviour more generally.
The starting point for most of this research is to predict vote choice between individual parties. As
this chapter has shown however, this can hide the effect of prior variables in the funnel of causality.
The suggestion is that voters group identities make themmore likely to vote for a particular group
or bloc of political parties. It then may be the case that voters use more proximate factors, such as
those identified by the valence model of voting behaviour, to differentiate between individual par-
ties within that bloc, before making their vote choice. Indeed, studies in other contexts would help
to shed light on the extent to which the findings in this chapter are generalizable to historic nations.
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Notes
23The SNP had actually elected their first MP Robert McIntyre in 1945 in an unusual Motherwell ‘Wartime’
by-election. However, McIntyre lost his seat just three months later at the 1945 general election.
24Welsh for The Party of Walॽ.
25The 2007-2011 SP term saw the SNP form a minority government supported through a supply and confidence
agreement with the Scottish Green Party. In 2011 the SNP won a surprise majority at Holyrood in an electoral sys-
tem designed to make majorities highly improbable. In 2016, the SNP again formed a minority government as the
largest party by a considerable margin.
26Between 2000-2003 Labour were the senior party in a ‘partnership government’ with the Liberal Democrats,
and between 2007-2011 senior coalition partner with Plaid Cymru. Currently, they rely on the support of former
Welsh Liberal Democrat leader Kirsty Williams, now EducationMinister, and former Plaid Cymru turned Inde-
pendent AMDafydd Elis-Thomas.
27At this point in time, Scottish electoral behaviour was considered in line with ‘average’ UK voting.
28The term ‘valence’ was coined by Stokes (1963) to describe issues that couldn’t be considered ‘spatial’. These
are issues on which there is an absence of divergent policy alternatives. Rather, competition on these issues was
about performance and competence (Green and Jennings, 2017).
29Their analysis does not include Northern Ireland.
30See Henderson et al., , Forthcoming for an extended discussion.
31TheMichiganModel was itself heavily influenced by the earlier work of US journalist Walter Lippmann and
the ‘Columbia model’ (Lippmann, 1922a; Lazarsfeld et al., 1944) of voting behaviour that had emerged from the
US (Campbell et al., 1960).
32Donald Stokes was part of the group of scholars responsible for developing the Michigan model (Campbell,
Converse, Miller, and Stokes, 1960).
33There is a long-standing debate within political science over the issue of endogeneity in valence models of vote
choice. For an excellent summary of this debate see Green and Jennings (2017).
34Scotland has its own ‘indigenous’ Celtic language in Scottish Gaelic, but the language has never had the same
presence across Scotland as Welsh inWales. The 2011 UK Census estimated that roughly 1.1% of the Scottish pop-
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ulation were fluent Gaelic speakers (compared to 24% of the Welsh population according to theWelsh Language
Use Survey 2013-2015) mostly concentrated in the Northern Highlands and Islands, and had been in sharp decline
in Scotland’s population centres from as early as 1400.
35The clear skew towards the left of the spectrum across the UK-wide sample does, however, suggest that the
items used in the BES are ill-equipped to adequately differentiate between respondents of differing political per-
suasions.
36See Appendix B for full table.
37EU vote is operationalised as vote intention for 2015 and 2016 analysis.
38The referendum controls are included as both events have had a substantial impact on vote choice, party af-
filiation, and broader group identities in the UK over the time period covered by the data and as such they likely
had a large impact on political behaviour (Fieldhouse and Prosser, 2018; Hobolt et al., 2018).
39In Scotland, this would cover 90.8% of voters in 2015, 91.1% in 2016, and 92.8% in 2017. InWales, this covers
89.8% of voters in 2015,88.8% in 2016, and 94.9% in 2017.
40Full results provided in Tables B.2 and B.3.
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“Is thॾ a Plaid Cymru election?”
Overheard at polling booth, 2016
5
National Identity andMultilevel Voting
5.1 Introduction
Why do some voters vote for different parties at elections to different levels of
government? TheMultilevel Voting (MLV) hypothesis, first proposed by Trystan et al. (2003),
states that voters in multilevel systems use different logics to make vote choices at elections to dif-
ferent levels of government. As a result, differential voting – where voters cast votes for different
parties at different levels of government – is a common occurrence. Despite not proposing a mech-
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anism for why this occurs, the MLV has had success as a hypothesis of voting behaviour in sub-state
elections in the UK (Trystan et al., 2003; Wyn Jones and Scully, 2006). Comparative research has
also found evidence supporting the hypothesis in cases such as Catalonia and Galicia, but has failed
to do so in others, like the German Länder elections. This poses a challenge to the MLV.Why does
the hypothesis appear to work in certain cases, but not in others? Jeffery and Hough (2003) have
posited that this variation can be explained by the presence of ‘historic nationalities’ or, put another
way, the existence of strong sub-state identities. They found that in sub-state territories where sub-
stantial proportions of the population claim strong attachment to a sub-state identity, differential
voting is more common. Where sub-state identities are weaker, there is less differential voting. This
also explains the success of non-statewide parties at sub-state elections: voters who identify with a
sub-state identity are more likely to ‘switch’ to these parties.
A significant problem remains however: Jeffery and Hough (2003)’s hypothesis has never been
tested at the individual-level. Rather it is a hypothesis derived from observing aggregate-level vote
returns. This is an ecological fallacy: you cannot infer individual-level behaviours (i.e. vote choice)
from aggregate-level patterns. It also fails to acknowledge that national identity within sub-state
territories is heterogeneous. Some voters will identify with a sub-state identity, others will identify
with a statewide identity, and some will identify with both or neither. Given that this is the case,
we would expect to see considerable variation between individuals in their propensity to vote for
different parties at different levels of government, conditional on the national identities they identify
with.
This chapter tests the relationship between national identity and differential voting, usingWales
as a case. Primarily, it tests Jeffery and Hough (2003)’s hypothesis reformulated for the individual-
level: Are people who identify more strongly with a sub-state identity more likely to vote for dif-
ferent parties at elections to different levels of government? Using a unique panel dataset created
by merging the Welsh and British Election Studies at the individual voter level, I show that national
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identity does indeed play an important role in differential voting: respondents who identify as pri-
marily Welsh (rather than British) are more likely to switch the party they vote for between elections
at different levels. This effect is isolated to respondents who voted for statewide parties at statewide
elections. Voters who vote for non statewide parties at statewide elections are no more likely to vote
differently.
5.2 Multi-level voting in sub-state electoral arenas
The previous 30 years has seen a rapid increase in state decentralization across Western Europe.
These new sub-state administrations have required the creation of new electoral arenas whose
boundaries are defined within existing state boundaries. Their development has been accompanied
by a growing body of political science literature focusing on differential voting, or vote switching,
between these levels of government.41 Much of this previous electoral research has suggested that
differential voting is a common practice among electorates across a diverse range of cases (Trystan
et al., 2003; Jeffery and Hough, 2003; Hough and Jeffery, 2003; Fiorina, 2003; Wyn Jones and Scully,
2006; Perez-Nievas and Bonet, 2008; Cutler, 2008b; Johns et al., 2010; Kanji et al., 2012; Jeffery and
Schakel, 2013; Henderson and Romanova, 2016; Schmitt and Teperoglou, 2017).
Perez-Nievas and Bonet (2008) identify two common traits in the differential voting patterns ob-
served between statewide and sub-state elections. The first is lower voter turnout rates in sub-state
elections relative to the statewide elections. The second trait is that the vote share of non-statewide
parties (NSWPs)42 is larger, and the vote share of statewide parties’ smaller, in sub-state elections
(relative to statewide elections).43 (Jeffery and Hough, 2003) This pattern suggests that voters in
multilevel electoral systems systematically vote for different parties at elections to different levels of
government. It is this second trait that is the focus of the remainder of this chapter.
Why do voters switch the party they vote for at different levels of government and why do NSWPs
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benefit at sub-state elections? One current explanation of vote switching in multilevel systems is the
multilevel voting hypothesis (MLV). TheMLVwas developed by Trystan et al. (2003) to explain
voting behaviour at the inaugural 1999 sub-state election inWales. The result of this election was
an unexpectedly close affair, with the historically dominant statewide Labour Party44 performing
worse than expected andWales’ main NSWP, Plaid Cymru, exceeding expectations. In their anal-
ysis of the election Trystan et al. (2003) identified a pattern of voters ‘switching’ from the larger
statewide parties – Labour, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats – to Plaid Cymru at the
sub-state election. This was a result, they argued, of voters using different ‘logics’ at elections to dif-
ferent levels of government.
The hypothesis was developed to counter the so-called second-order election hypothesis (SOE).
This approach divides elections into two categories – first and second-order elections – according
to their relative importance (Schmitt and Teperoglou, 2017). First-order elections are those that are
perceived by voters to be ‘high-stakes’ with statewide general elections considered to be the archety-
pal first-order election (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). Sub-state elections are commonly thought of as
second-order (Schmitt and Teperoglou, 2017). According to the SOEmodel, voting in second-order
elections is driven by first-order issues with the popularity of the state-level government taking par-
ticular prominence in voting considerations (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; van der Eijk and Oppenhuis,
1991; Schmitt and Teperoglou, 2017). In contrast, Trystan et al. (2003) argue that so-called first-order
considerations, or statewide issues, should not be assumed to be the decisive factor in voters’ vote
choice. Utilizing survey data from the 1999Welsh Election Study, the authors asked respondents
which party(ies) they had voted for at the Welsh sub-state election. The authors then asked an ad-
ditional question of which party respondents would vote for had there been a general election the
same day. Contrary to SOEmodel expectations, they found little evidence of voters using statewide
considerations to decide their vote choice, and little evidence of voters “voting with the boot” -
where voters punish the governing statewide party at the midpoint of an electoral cycle (Trystan
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et al., 2003). Instead, they argue, voters used sub-state considerations to determine a sub-state vote.
Research in Scotland has come to similar conclusions, albeit via a different explanatory mechanism.
Johns et al. (2010) have argued that at devolved elections Scottish voters vote for the party they per-
ceive to be the most competent at dealing with issues for Scotland.
Voters considerations at sub-state elections are in part driven by electoral opportunities that they
do not have in statewide elections. The first of these is the opportunity to vote for a NSWP without
worrying that this is a ‘wasted’ vote. In statewide elections NSWPs are seldom in a position to have
a substantial influence on state-wide policy45, as the maximum number of representatives they can
return is limited by the number of available legislative seats in the sub-state they compete in. These
concerns are likely to be exaggerated within electoral systems such as the UK, with has a history of
two-party dominance. This, combined with the plurality voting system used, encourages voters to
cast votes for one of the two main statewide parties at statewide elections; the Conservative party
and the Labour Party. InWales, a NSWP that won every Welsh constituency seat could at best aim
to win third place in a UK statewide election, a position with little possibility of influencing gov-
ernment policy. This provides voters with a strong incentive to not vote for NSWPs at statewide
elections.
Previous electoral research has shown that substantial proportions of voters in plurality elec-
toral systems have an intuitive aversion to casting votes they think will have little influence on the
outcome of an election (Bawn, 1999; Carman and Johns, 2010; Cox, 1997; Curtice, 2006c; Fisher,
1973; Karp et al., 2002; Reed, 1999). This aversion encourages voters to vote for SWPs at statewide
elections, in an attempt to maximize the influence of their vote on the eventual outcome. At sub-
state elections this is less of a concern for voters. While voters still make strategic choices regarding a
party’s chances of winning at the local level (see Chapter 6), it is at least possible for NSWPs to form
a government by themselves. Here, NSWPs will in many cases compete in every seat up for election,
meaning that the possibility of them being able to form a government is a real possibility (see Scot-
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land, Catalonia, Basque Country and Quebec for recent examples).
The second opportunity provided to voters is to make vote choices based on sub-state issues and
as a result seek ‘local answers to local issues’. (Trystan et al., 2003; Wyn Jones and Scully, 2006).
Voters therefore distinguish between levels of government and judge how well a party is suited to
government based on level-specific issues and information. InWyn Jones and Scully (2006)’s exami-
nation of voting at Scottish andWelsh elections in 2003, they found that substantial proportions of
voters were able to distinguish between levels of government, and decide on their vote accordingly.
These findings inWales have been supported by research carried out outside of the UK. Hough
and Jeffery (2003) have shown that the MLV performed better than the SOE at explaining voting
patterns in Spanish regional elections, while Cutler (2008b) found that Canadian voters are able to
distinguish between tiers and take into account different issues when making a vote choice. It has
also influenced more recent work on devolved elections which use valence explanations of voting to
explain voting behaviour (Johns et al., 2009b, 2010; Johns, 2011b; Scully andWyn Jones, 2012; Scully,
2013; Scully and Larner, 2017). In the most in-depth analysis of voting at devolved elections, Johns
et al. (2010)’s tellingly named Voting for a Scottish Government, found clear evidence of voters in
Scotland using primarily Scottish-issues to decide their vote choice at the 2007 SP elections. Simi-
larly, Scully andWyn Jones (2012) found evidence that a valence model of electoral behaviour was an
effective predictor of voting behaviour inWales, though Scully (2013) found that the extent to which
this happened differed in Scotland andWales. A product of these considerations is that voters will
be more likely to vote for ’regional parties’ at sub-state elections, due to their focus on issues relating
to the sub-state territory.
TheMLV is less clear at identifying which voters will switch the party they vote for between lev-
els of government. Trystan et al. (2003)’s original analysis of MLV inWales identified a substantial
proportion of voters who switched party between the 1997 statewide and 1999 sub-state election.
But what separates voters who do switch party from those who do not? In their comparative analy-
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sis of patterns of differential voting inWestern Europe, Jeffery and Hough (2003) have posited that
national identity plays a central role in influencing patterns of multilevel voting. They argue that
territorial heterogeneity “breaks up [the] pattern of subordination of regional elections” (pp. 210).
Put another way, voters in sub-state electoral arenas that are distinct from the state are better placed
to acknowledge the separation of levels of government. This means that their vote is driven “accord-
ing to a distinctive region-specific dynamic” (Hough and Jeffery, 2003, pp. 249). This distinction,
Jeffery and Hough (2003) argue, is facilitated through the presence of ‘historic nationalities’, ‘widely
spoken national languages’ and ‘greater levels of autonomous power’ (pp. 210). This combination
provides voters with a large enough incentive to use different logics for deciding their vote at differ-
ent levels of government.
Although this work focused on aggregate-level voting patterns, it might also provide us with
a potential explanation for differential voting at the individual-level. Namely, that national iden-
tity can influence whether a voter switches the party they vote for between levels of government.
Key within this question, as with Jeffery and Hough (2003)’s analysis, is the distinction between
statewide and sub-state identities. A statewide identity is an identity that refers to the state as a
whole such as ‘British’, ‘Spanish’ or ‘German’ identity. A sub-state identity is one that refers to a
smaller component part of the state (or states) that considers itself distinct somehow from the larger
state, such as Scottish andWelsh in the UK, Catalan or Basque in Spain, or Bavarian in Germany.
The two identities need not be mutually exclusive: citizens are able to consider both statewide and
sub-state identities important aspects of their lives (Cutler, 2008b; Maas, 2013).
There are several good reasons to suspect that identification with sub-state identities in particu-
lar may influence differential voting. First, a large body of research on electoral politics has estab-
lished a positive relationship between sub-state identities and voting for NSWPs (Trystan et al.,
2003; Wyn Jones and Scully, 2006; Scully and Larner, 2017; Scully, 2013; Scully andWyn Jones, 2012;
Curtice, 1999, 2006d; Johns et al., 2010; Jeffery, 2006). As NSWPs benefit from differential voting
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at sub-state elections, it is reasonable to expect that voters that switch from statewide to NSWPs at
sub-state election may identify with a sub-state identity. Second, sub-state identifiers may be more
likely to differentiate between statewide and sub-state political issues. By identifying with a sub-state
identity, a voter is necessarily acknowledging that the sub-state territory in question is different from
the wider state. This could encourage voters to use different logics at different levels of government;
to recognize that these different territories have different issues, and that different parties are best
suited to address them.
To further investigate these propositions, I propose three hypotheses to test the relationship be-
tween national identity and differential voting at the individual-level. The first hypothesis is thus:
H1: Voters that feel a high degree of attachment to the sub-state identity will be more
likely to switch parties between elections.
H1 is a reformulation of Jeffery and Hough (2003)’s aggregate level hypothesis for individual-level
data. However, the relationship between national identity and differential voting may not be this
straightforward. The effect is likely to vary in both strength and direction among different subsec-
tions of the electorate. For example, I would expect that national identity has a very different effect
among voters who vote for NSWPs at statewide elections. TheMLV suggests that voters have in-
centives to vote for NSWPs at sub-state elections but voters who already vote for them at statewide
elections do not have the same incentive to switch. Indeed, this group of voters may face an incen-
tive not to switch the party they vote for at different levels. This second hypothesis is as follows:
H2: Voters that feel a high degree of attachment to the sub-state identity and voted for a
NSWP at the previous statewide election, will be less likely to switch parties between elections.
I then test a modified version ofH1 as a third hypothesis:
H3: Voters that feel a high degree of attachment to the sub-state identity and voted for
a statewide party at the previous statewide election, will be more likely to switch parties between
elections.
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5.3 Data andMethod
5.3.1 Wales as a case
I test these hypotheses usingWales as a case. I do so for five reasons. The first is that elections in
Wales fit the pattern identified by Perez-Nievas and Bonet (2008). Across the previous five statewide
elections, turnout inWales has been approximately 65%, yet turnout at devolved elections has never
exceeded 46%. NSWPs also perform better at sub-state election inWales than they do at statewide
elections. Aggregate-level data displayed in Table 6.3 shows that Plaid Cymru –Wales’ largest NSWP
– receives a considerable devolution dividend.46 Since the inaugural Welsh sub-state election, the
mean Plaid Cymru vote share is 10.2 percentage points higher in sub-state elections relative to state-
wide elections. Every statewide party – the Conservatives, Labour, the Liberal Democrats and UKIP
– record a lower mean vote share at sub-state elections than at statewide elections (ONS, 2016).
Party Mean NAWVote Mean GE Vote NAWAdvantage
Conservative 20.8 25.9 -5.0
Labour 37.2 42.7 -5.5
Liberal Democrat 12.1 12.7 -0.5
Plaid Cymru 22.4 12.1 10.2
UKIP 3.3 4.1 -0.8
Table 5.1: NAW and GE aggregate consধtuency vote advantages by party, 1999-2017. Advantage’ are NAW per-
centage advantages. Source: House of Commons Library.
The second reason for choosingWales as a case is that attachment to a sub-state identity (Welsh)
is widespread throughout the population. The 2011 UK Census showed that a plurality of citizens in
each of Wales’ 22 local authorities identified as primarily Welsh. However, it is also less homogenous
in term of national identity than other comparable sub-state areas, such as Scotland. Considerable
proportions of people living inWales identify as British or both British andWelsh, and a non-trivial
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number identify as English. This will provide enough variation among individuals to adequately
explore the effect of national identity on vote switching.
Third is the availability of data. Election study surveys have been carried out at every Welsh sub-
state election, whilst the British Election Survey has consistently covered each UK statewide election
since 1964 (see Chapter 2. The most recent iterations of these election studies provide additional
benefits as they can be linked. Both the 2015-2017 British Election Study Internet Panel (Fieldhouse
et al., 2018) and the 2016Welsh Election Study (Scully et al., 2016) were carried out online by survey
company YouGov, with a substantial number of respondents taking part in both studies. Each re-
spondent carried a unique identifier which can be used to merge the data to create a panel covering
the 2015 and 2017 UK statewide general elections and the 2016Welsh sub-state election. This has
numerous benefits, the most obvious being that it reduces the risk of respondent bias through false
recall. Previous research on differential voting in the UK has been constrained by the absence of any
form of panel data. This meant that researchers were reliant on voters accurately recalling how they
voted previously (often several years prior) or on hypothetical election questions asked in surveys
(for example, see Wyn Jones and Scully, 2006).
Fourth, Welsh constituency boundaries are identical in statewide and sub-state elections, unlike
in Scotland. This makes direct comparison of votes more straightforward and voters do not have
to take into account shifting boundaries. Finally, the MLV originated from the study of Welsh sub-
state elections. It makes sense to test this in the context it was originally designed to explain.
5.3.2 Data
The British Election Study Internet Panel (BESIP) (Fieldhouse et al., 2018) interviewed roughly
30,000 respondents in Britain47 across 14 waves, with the aim to re-interview as many previous re-
spondents as possible. The panel covers the 2015 and 2017 general elections, and the 2016 EU Ref-
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erendum. The BES also contained booster samples in Scotland andWales, providing large samples
in both nations. A total of 5,450 respondents were contacted across the 14 waves in inWales. The
2016Welsh Election Study (Scully et al., 2016) (SES andWES) interviewed respondents in Wales be-
fore and after the 2016 sub-state elections inWales. 4,163 respondents were interviewed across three
waves.
Both election studies were conducted online by YouGov. These respondents are drawn from
YouGov’s existing panel of respondents and a substantial number of respondents were interviewed
in both the BES andWES. Combining both data provides a sample of 1,716 of WES respondents
that completed at least one wave of the BES. As with any survey, selection bias is a concern when
analyzing data. In particular, in this analysis I assume that the respondents who complete both the
British andWelsh Election Study are not systematically different from those who only took part in
one of the surveys. However, it could be the case that there are certain characteristics among these
respondents that make themmore likely to take part in multiple surveys. For example, respondents
who are more interested generally in politics, may be more likely to take part in and complete multi-
ple surveys on the subject of politics. To identify any of these potential biases I ran a logit regression
where the dependent variable is coded 0 if a respondent only took part in the WES, and 1 if a respon-
dent took part in both theWES and BES. I test for political interest, knowledge, partisanship, and
other socio-demographic variables. The results are shown in Table C.1 in Appendix C.
Generally there are few substantial differences between the two samples. Respondents in the
combined sample are slightly older on average, more likely to be male, and less likely to be partisans.
These biases are corrected with post-stratification weights. The data are also weighted by 2015 gen-
eral election vote to recreate the marginals of vote choice at this election.
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5.3.3 Measures
To test my hypotheses I use a binary dependent variable that measures whether a respondent re-
ported voting for different parties in Wave 6 of the BES and in the constituency vote of Wave 3 of
the WES. The key explanatory variable, national identity, uses the BES’ national identity scales pre-
sented to respondents in Wales:
Where would you place yourself on these scales (1-7)?
- Britishness
- Welshness
The distributions of these scales are provided in Figure C.2 in Appendix C.
In addition to national identity, I control for a number of other variables which may have an
impact on whether a voter switches party between elections to different levels of government. The
first is a variable that I expect to have a negative effect on the probability of switching: the strength
of a respondent’s partisan identity. Voting behaviour in the UK has generally been thought to be
a function of partisan identity (among other things) (Butler and Stokes, 1969; Heath et al., 1991b;
Clarke et al., 2004). Political parties, it is argued, provide a useful heuristic for voters who, in their
day-to-day lives, have little time to seek out the necessary information on individual policy areas
(Clarke et al., 2004, 2009b; Green and Jennings, 2017). It makes sense therefore, that those who
identify as strong supporters of political parties are less likely to deviate from them at the ballot box.
I use a binary variable that takes a value of 1 if a respondent identifies as a ‘Very strong’ or ‘Fairly
strong’ supporter of a particular political party, and 0 otherwise.
To control for how important respondents’ consider sub-state elections inWales, I employ a vari-
able taken from aWES question which asks respondents “On a 0-10 scale, how personally important
do you consider National Assembly for Wales elections?” I include this control following Curtice
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(2006d) who suggested that voters who do not consider sub-state election important might ‘experi-
ment’ with their vote by voting for a party they wouldn’t usually consider.
I employ another binary variable to indicate whether a respondent considers the sub-state Gov-
ernment inWales to be performing well with regards to the NHS. It takes a value of 1 if the respon-
dent thinks the government has done a bad job, and a 0 otherwise. I choose the NHS as a measure
for two reasons. The first is that it is the policy area which takes up the largest amount of the Welsh
Government’s budget. Secondly, more citizens are aware of devolved responsibility for the NHS
compared to most other policy areas (see Chapter 3).
In addition, I use a variable to capture the competitiveness of a respondent’s constituency contest
at sub-state elections. As Chapter 6 shows later in this thesis, there is evidence that voters in Wales
cast strategic votes when it looks as if their preferred candidate has little chance of winning. Voters
may therefore switch parties not due to national identity, but simply due to the different strategic
calculations voters make in different electoral contests. This variable is measured as the the differ-
ence in vote share between a respondents preferred party, and the first placed candidate in their con-
stituency at the previous election. If their preferred party is the first-place candidate this is measured
as 0. The larger the difference, the higher the incentive to cast a strategic vote.
Finally, I control for the influence of the EU Referendum over this period. The referendum and
preceding campaign had profound effect on the UK political system. The referendum disrupted the
traditional economic left vs. right divide of the wider UK party system, creating new salient cross-
cutting cleavages that allowed voters to switch parties in unprecedented numbers. BES analysis has
estimated that 32% of BES respondents (who reported voting) voted for different political parties
at the 2015 and 2017 UKGeneral Elections (Prosser et al., 2018). Their analysis has also highlighted
that the 2017 general election saw the highest number of Labour-Conservative switching in any BES
inter-election panel (Prosser et al., 2018).
The 2016 devolved elections in Scotland andWales occurred just 49 days prior to the EU Referen-
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dum and saturated news content in UKmedia. This was particularly important inWales which lacks
a strong sub-state media.48 As voters align around new socio-political cleavages, we would expect
that a sizeable minority are drawn to political parties they previously did not vote for, as the salience
of the new cleavage ‘overrides’ existing partisan loyalty. Such was the proximity of the EU Referen-
dum to the devolved elections that we would expect this sorting to have began to occur prior to the
elections inWales. We would therefore expect to see unusually high numbers of voters ‘crossing the
divide’, organizing their vote choice around what had previously been a dormant cleavage for large
proportions of the population.
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Figure 5.1: Vote switching in Wales between the 2015, 2016, and 2017 elecধons.
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5.4 Results
Figure 5.1 shows the patterns of vote switching captured by survey respondents in the BES andWES.
It illustrates the flow of votes for political parties at the 2015 and 2017 statewide General Elections
and the constituency vote at the 2016Welsh sub-state election. The size of each stream is reflective
of the proportion of the electorate who voted for a given party. The data is weighted by respon-
dents’ 2015 General Election vote to accurately reflect the marginals of vote choice. Between the
2015 statewide and 2016 sub-state elections, 31% of the sample switched party with 27% switching
between 2016 and the 2017 sub-state election. The individual-level patterns of voting confirm the
aggregate patterns of data displayed in Table 6.3. There is a clear pattern of the two largest statewide
parties, Labour and the Conservatives, losing voters from the 2015 General Election at the 2016 sub-
state election. Conversely Plaid Cymru, Wales’ largest NSWP, gain a substantial amount of support
at the 2016 sub-state election. These patterns are then reversed again at the 2017 statewide election,
with Labour and the Conservatives gaining votes and Plaid Cymru losing a considerable amount of
support. Of particular note is the substantial transfer of voters between the Labour Party and Plaid
Cymru: Approximately one in ten Labour voters in 2015 switched to vote for Plaid Cymru in 2016,
with one in three 2016 Plaid Cymru voters switching to Labour in 2017.
To begin to explain these patterns I estimate a series of logistic regressions to test my hypotheses.
To test H1 I run the models using the whole sample, with results presented in Table C.2. Model 1 es-
timates the likelihood of a respondent switching parties between 2015 and 2016 given their responses
to the BES’ national identity questions. This results in a positive and significant relationship be-
tween respondents who feel more Welsh and vote switching. British identity appears to have very
little effect on whether voters switch between elections. The relationship betweenWelsh identity
and switching is no longer significant once standard socio-demographic controls are introduced in
model 2, however. Therefore, there is insufficient evidence therefore, to confirmH1 with any degree
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Welshness 0.092* 0.080 0.041 0.078 0.075 0.106*
Britishness -0.032 -0.051 -0.037 -0.039 0.001 -0.001
Age (Centred) -0.051 -0.027 -0.005 0.001 0.030
Female 0.127* 0.096* 0.109* 0.121* 0.125*
Social Class (Ref = DE)
AB 0.017 0.019 -0.018 -0.011 0.005
C1C2 0.046 0.082* 0.069 0.068 0.068
Education (Ref = No formal quals)
GCSE 0.030 0.087 0.099 0.096 0.078
A-level -0.035 0.002 0.016* 0.027* 0.015*
Degree -0.064 -0.062* -0.055* -0.062* -0.077*
Strong Partisan -0.087* -0.066 -0.063 -0.055
Personal Importance -0.130 -0.100 -0.082
Gov performance 0.088* 0.076* 0.010*
Brexit at odds -0.006 0.056
Margin 0.223*
Table 5.2: Maximum discrete change in probability of switching vote between levels. * denotes significant effect. See
Table C.2 for full output.
of certainty. There is a significant effect in model 2 for gender however, with respondents who iden-
tify as female more likely to vote for different parties at elections to different levels of government.
This effect remains significant in all models once more controls are added suggesting a robust effect
for gender and vote switching. This is possibly a reflection of women being less likely than men to
identify as a ‘strong’ supporter of a single political party. In this sample, 22% of male and 14% of fe-
male respondents identified as a strong partisan. This pattern is repeated across every wave of the
BES (see Figure C.3 in Appendix C). Previous research has also suggested that women may be less
attached to a single party than men. Carman and Johns (2010) found that female voters in Scotland
were more likely to be in favour of coalition governments than their male counterparts.
Model 3 includes a control for the strength of party identity. As expected, there is a negative re-
lationship between identifying as a strong supporter of a single political party and switching par-
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ties. When the strength of partisan identity is particularly strong, it would likely take a considerable
‘shock’ to break that affinity and vote for another party. Models 4 and 5 introduce more controls for
sub-state importance, government performance evaluation and a variable which captures whether a
respondent’s preferred party took an EU referendum stance different to that respondent. There is
a significant positive effect for government performance evaluations in Models 4 and 5. This means
that respondents who thought the Welsh Government’s performance was poor were more likely to
switch the party they voted for between 2015 and 2016. Finally, Model 6 adds the variableMargin
which is included to capture any strategic voting that might occur. This produces a positive signifi-
cant effect although the effect size is limited. It also suggests that strategic voting is a motivation to
switch parties for some voters: The less competitive their preferred party was in their constituency,
the higher the likelihood of switching parties. In addition to these models I run a random intercept
logit model to explore possible constituency effects. The results are included in Appendix C.
Next, I proceed to testH2 andH3. H2 andH3 both predict that the effect of national identity
on differential voting will vary among different groups of voters. Therefore, I divide the sample
into four smaller sub-samples comprised of respondents who voted for the four largest parties at
the 2015 statewide election; Conservatives (N=190), Labour (N=262), Plaid Cymru (N=106), and
UKIP (N=107). I then estimate four logit regressions using the same explanatory variables used in
Model 6 of Table B.3. Concentrating first on the effect of national identity on vote switching Figure
5.2 illustrates the marginal effect of Welsh national identity on differential voting.
Among 2015 Labour and UKIP voters, the more Welsh a respondent felt, the higher the proba-
bility of that respondent switching the party they voted for at the 2016 sub-state elections. In both
cases the size of the effect is substantial. The probability of switching more than doubles among
both groups of voters moving from one end of the identity scale to the other. There is no visi-
ble effect among 2015 Conservative voters however, suggesting that Welsh identity plays little role
in whether these voters switch party or not. H3 is therefore partially confirmed: voters who feel
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strongly Welsh and voted for statewide parties at the 2015 statewide election are more likely to switch
the party they vote for between election. However, this does not apply to Conservative Party voters.
Why is this the case? One conceivable reason is that Conservative voters in general don’t identify
as beingWelsh. In Chapter 4 I showed how support for the Conservative Party was something of
an anathema to the idea of Welshness. Indeed, in this dataset 2015 Conservative voters felt the least
Welsh of any of the supporters of the largest parties in Wales. The median 2015 Conservative voter
gave a score of 4.2 out of 7 on the BESWelsh identity scale. This compared to 5.1 out of 7 for Labour
voters, 6.1 for Plaid Cymru voters, and 4.7 for UKIP voters. The effect is therefore much weaker
as ‘Welshness’ is impacting considerably fewer respondents. Another conceivable reason is the ten-
dency among 2015 Conservative voters to abstain fromWelsh sub-state elections. Figure 5.1 shows
that, of those 2015 Conservative voters who did not vote for the Conservatives in 2016, a plurality
of them did not vote. It is possible that voters who feel they cannot support the Conservatives at
sub-state elections simply abstain rather than switch to another party.
Conversely, there is a negative effect among 2015 Plaid Cymru voters, indicating that the more
Welsh these voters feel, the lower the probability of them switching parties. The effect is not signif-
icant but this is likely largely due to the low sample size. Whilst this result is most compatible with
no effect, the direction of the effect is as H3 would expect: that voters of NSWP at statewide elec-
tions who identify strongly with a sub-state identity are less likely to switch their vote.
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Figure 5.2: Relaধonship between naধonal idenধty and probability of vote switching, by 2015 General Elecধon party choice
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Table 5.3 displays the models in full. Among 2015 Labour voters, government performance eval-
uation had an effect on the probability of vote switching. Voters who thought the the Welsh Gov-
ernment had performed poorly on the NHS were more likely to switch party at the 2016 sub-state
elections than those who did not. This is to be expected, as the Welsh Government was a Labour
government during this period.
AlthoughWelsh identity seems to have played little role in vote switching among 2015 Conserva-
tive voters, British identity appears to have played a larger role. The more British this group of voters
felt, the less likely they were to switch the party they voted for between elections. An explanation for
this likely lies in the unique relationship between national identity and voting inWales, as outlined
in Chapter 4. The two largest parties at sub-state elections,49 Welsh Labour and Plaid Cymru, speak
explicitly to Welsh identity andWelshness. However, apart from the Conservative Party, the only
significant party that makes an attempt to speak to British identity is UKIP, a party that has adopted
a series of polarizing policies. In this sense, British-identifying Conservative voters have ‘nowhere to
go’ and therefore stay loyal to the Conservatives.
The direction of this effect was reversed among 2015 UKIP voters however. Among this group of
voters, respondents who felt more Welsh and more British were more likely to switch the party they
voted for between elections.
The EU referendum also appears to have had an impact on vote switching among 2015 Conserva-
tive and UKIP voters. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 2015 UKIP voters who were in favour of remaining
in the EU (admittedly a very small sample!) were substantially more likely to vote for another party
at the 2016 sub-state election. Given that leaving the EU has been UKIP’s raison d’etre this is en-
tirely unsurprising. More surprising is that the effect of Brexit on 2015 Conservative voters appears
to work in the opposite direction. That is, 2015 Conservative voters who wanted to leave the EU
were less likely to switch the party they voted for in 2016 compared to 2015 Conservative voters who
wanted to remain in the EU.
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Social class also had a positive effect among 2015 Conservative and UKIP voters, with those in a
higher social class more likely to switch party than those in a lower social class. Finally, tactical voting
also appears to have been a motivation for switching party between elections. The less competitive
voters’ preferred party was in their constituency in 2016, the more likely they were to change the
party they voted for from 2015.
Labour Conservative Plaid Cymru UKIP
Welshness 0.224* 0.027 -0.308 0.298*
Britishness 0.102 -0.425* 0.174 0.137*
Age (Centred) 0.174 0.168 -0.198 -0.370*
Female 0.042 0.115 -0.017 0.139*
Social Class (Ref = DE)
AB -0.001 0.090 -0.072 0.096
C1C2 0.082 0.230* -0.164 0.149
Education (Ref = No formal quals)
GCSE -0.070 -0.080 0.246 0.044
A-level -0.086* -0.125* 0.043 -0.022
Degree -0.002 -0.220* 0.093 -0.053
Strong Partisan -0.004 -0.082 -0.102 0.003
Personal Importance -0.049 -0.193 0.042 -0.061
Gov. Performance 0.171* 0.026 -0.067 0.004
Brexit at odds 0.062 -0.120* -0.098* 0.329
Margin 0.685* 0.383* -0.122 -0.245
Table 5.3: Maximum discrete change in probability of switching vote between levels by 2015 GE vote. * denotes
significant effect. See Table C.3 for full output.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter set out to provide an individual-level explanation of why substantial numbers of voters
switch the party they vote for at elections to different levels of government. Using Trystan et al.
(2003)’s Multi-Level Voting hypothesis as a starting point I proposed that voters who identified
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strongly with a sub-state identity would be more likely to switch the party they voted for between
elections. This is consistent with Hough and Jeffery (2003)’s argument that vote switching was more
common in sub-state areas with strong ‘historic nationalities’. The results I presented confirm this
hypothesis: generally, voters who identify strongly with the sub-state identity are more likely to
switch their vote compared to those who feel less attachment to the identity.
I also tested two additional hypotheses (H2 andH3) which are a considerable development on
the work of Trystan et al. (2003) and Hough and Jeffery (2003). H3 tells us that voters who voted for
the Conservative party at statewide elections. Among this group attachment to the sub-state iden-
tity appeared to play little role in whether they switched votes. Rather, it is the dominant statewide
national identity, Britishness, which affects whether a voters switches party. The more British these
voters felt, the less likely they were to change the party they voted for. It also provides additional in-
formation about those who vote for NSWPs at statewide elections. In the case of Wales this applies
to voters who voted for Plaid Cymru in the 2015 UKGeneral Election. Among this group of voters
the stronger they identify with the sub-state the less likely they are to switch away from the NSWP.
These results allow us to develop a more general testable hypothesis about vote switching in mul-
tilevel systems: The amount of multilevel switching between a statewide and sub-state election will
be a function of two factors. The first is the proportion of voters who vote for statewide parties at
statewide elections but who also identify strongly with the sub-state identities. The larger this group
is within a sub-state the more differential voting that can be expected. The second is the proportion
of voters who voted for NSWPs at statewide elections. Here the larger this group is the less switch-
ing would be expected. Scrutiny of this hypothesis in multiple contexts would shed more light on
the phenomenon of voter switching in multilevel systems.
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Notes
41When elections to different levels of government are held on the same day this is referred to as vertical split-
ticket voting.
42Occasionally these parties have been categorized as ‘ethno-regionalist’ parties (Perez-Nievas and Bonet, 2008).
43Brancati (2008) has found that NSWPs of any party family receive more votes in decentralized countries. In-
terestingly she found this to be true in countries with political decentralization, yet not in countries with fiscal but
not political decentralization.
44See Chapter 4.
45A notable exception here would be the Bloc Quebecois who formed Canada’s Official Opposition after the
1993 Federal Elections.
46It could also be considered a statewide election penalty of course.
47The BES does not collect data on Northern Ireland.
48See Appendix C for more detailed analysis of the effect of the EU Referendum on devolved elections.
49Although the Conservatives were the largest party at the 2011 Welsh election.
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“Splitters!”
Monty Python’s Life of Brian, 1979
6
Do Strategic Considerations Motivate
Split-Ticket Voting in Scotland andWales?
6.1 Introduction
The inaugural devolved elections in Scotland andWales in 1999 exposed Scottish
andWelsh voters to a new electoral system. The additional member system (AMS), also
known as a mixed member proportional system (MMP), provided voters with two separate ballot
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papers, one with a list of parties, and one with a list candidates. The candidate ballot elected mem-
bers via a plurality vote from constituencies (or single member districts), whilst the party list ballot
elected members via the quasi-proportional D’Hondt formula from larger geographic areas referred
to as regions. These regions are made up of multiple constituencies. The new ballot structure pre-
sented Scottish andWelsh voters with a choice that they had not previously been faced with: an
opportunity to split their ticket, or to cast votes for different parties on each ballot.
Existing electoral research on split-ticket voting suggests that strategic motivations are a central
factor for voters considering casting a split-ticket (Cox, 1997; Plescia, 2016; Reed, 1999; Pappi and
Thurner, 2002). The logic here is that voters deviate from their preferred political party in the con-
stituency vote to avoid ‘wasting their vote’ but vote for their preferred party in the list. Scotland
andWales present interesting test cases for this theory for two key reasons. The first is the ‘new-
ness’ of Scotland andWales as electoral arenas. The inaugural devolved elections took place in 1999,
and there have only been five such elections since. Prior to this the only exposure to proportional
representation (PR) electoral systems that voters in Scotland andWales had had was for European
Parliament elections, which suffer from a lack of public (and arguably elite) engagement. Moreover,
the AMS system is largely considered to be one of the most confusing for voters to navigate (Farrell
and Gallagher, 1999; Gschwend, 2006). Analyzing instances and motivations for split-ticket voting
can provide valuable information within the broader electoral research literature: in particular, how
electorates react to new electoral rules and arrangements and whether these new electorates are able
to maximize their electoral interests by casting strategic votes.
The second reason is methodological. Scotland andWales are ideal cases for comparison with
each other. Devolved elections in both countries occur on the same day with near-identical elec-
toral systems. The two countries also have a common political party system and political history. In
both countries the Labour Party had a near-hegemonous position in the post-war period and the
Conservative Party has been historically weak. Furthermore, both countries are home to progressive-
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nationalist parties that advocate political independence from the UK. Importantly, election studies
for every devolved election provide detailed individual-level voter data since the inception of the
devolved institutions. These devolved election studies also contain a number of similar, if not iden-
tical, questions put to voters providing the opportunity for direct comparisons between the two
electorates.
This chapter sets out to test whether split-ticket voting in Scotland andWales is driven by strate-
gic motivations. I do this by analyzing two types of splitting: that due to strategic considerations on
the constituency ballot and splitting due to strategic considerations on the list ballot. My analysis
provides several new contributions to the field of voting in mixed-member electoral systems and the
study of elections in Scotland andWales. My results provide the first evidence of strategic voting at
devolved elections in Scotland andWales with strategic considerations at the constituency level ap-
pearing to play a substantial role in whether a voter split their ticket at every election analyzed. I also
find evidence of confusion among voters. When the strategic incentives to cast split-tickets come
from the list ballot voters do not take the opportunity to cast a split-ticket. These findings are con-
sistent with findings produced in Chapter 3 which question how well voters in Scotland andWales
understand the electoral system. It brings into question the extent to which voters in mixed-member
systems are able to maximize their electoral preferences.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First I provide a brief outline of the electoral system used at
devolved elections. Second, I provide an overview of existing literature on strategic voting and split-
ticket voting and outline my hypotheses. Third, I describe my data and method. Fourth, I provide
descriptive analysis of split-ticket voting in Scotland andWales. Fifth, I test my hypotheses using
multivariate analysis. Finally, I conclude by drawing attention to the implications of the study for
work on mixed-member systems, elections in Scotland andWales and multi-level electoral systems.
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6.2 Elections in Scotland andWales
The inaugural devolved elections in 1999 introduced voters to an entirely new electoral system.
MMP provides voters with two votes to the same legislature; one for a candidate in a single mem-
ber district (SMD) and one for a larger region. SMD seats are decided by a plurality contest and
the regional seats are decided via the D’Hondt system (Dunleavy andMargetts, 1999). An example
of the ballot papers used in these elections is shown in Figure 6.1 and 6.2. In Scotland, voters elect
129 Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) to the Scottish Parliament – 73 from SMDs and 56
from regional lists – and inWales, 60 Assembly Members (AMs) are elected – 40 from SMDs and
20 from regional lists. The effective elective threshold on the lists is therefore relatively high com-
pared to other MMP systems (Carman and Johns, 2010).
The new ballot structure presented Scottish andWelsh voters with a choice that they had not
previously been faced with: an opportunity to give their support to two different parties simulta-
neously by ‘splitting their ticket’. Under MMP, split-ticket voting occurs when a voter casts votes
for two different parties in the constituency and list ballot in voting at the same level of govern-
ment, often referred to as horizontal splitting (see Rallings and Thrasher, 2005) 50. It has been well-
documented and explored in numerous democracies across the world (see Karp et al., 2002; Plescia,
2016; Jesse, 1988; Helmke, 2009) but there has been very little focus on ticket-splitting in the UK.51
The remainder of this chapter aims to fill this glaring gap in understanding voting behaviour in the
UK’s devolved territories.
6.2.1 Strategic Voting
Much of the existing political science literature on split-ticket voting outside of the UK has pre-
sented strategic considerations as a central driver of split-ticket voting (Bawn, 1999; Carman and
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Figure 6.1: Example consধtuency ballot, Naধonal Assembly for Wales elecধon 2016.
Figure 6.2: Example list ballot, Naধonal Assembly for Wales elecধon 2016.
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Johns, 2010; Cox, 1997; Curtice, 2006c; Fisher, 1973; Karp et al., 2002; Moser and Scheiner, 2009;
Reed, 1999). In these analyses the SMD ballot is often viewed as the strategic vote and the list ballot
as a ‘sincere’ vote: a vote for the preferred party of the voter. This assumption is loosely supported
by aggregate patterns of voting across MMP electoral systems: smaller parties receive a greater share
of the party list vote, and larger parties receiving higher shares of the vote in the candidate vote. The
wider literature explains that this is a result of the ‘wasted vote hypothesis’ (Cox, 1997). This refers
to the apparently instinctual desire voters have for their votes to impact the final outcome of an elec-
tion (Riker, 1982).
The term is well illustrated by Anthony Downs inAn Economic Theory of Democracy, where he
noted that in the US Presidential election of 1948, considerable numbers of voters who preferred the
Progressive Party nonetheless voted for the Democratic Party (Downs, 1957). They did so, Downs
argued, in order to ensure that their vote did not contribute to a Republican victory by taking votes
away from the Democratic Party. Another well-known proponent of the wasted vote hypothesis
was Maurice Duverger, who argued that “in cases where there are three parties operating under the
simple-majority, single-ballot system, the electors soon realize that their votes are wasted if they con-
tinue to give them to the third party; whence their natural tendency to transfer their vote to the
less evil of its two adversaries in order to prevent the success of the greater evil.” (Duverger, 1954,
pp.226). It is this “psychological factor” (Duverger, 1954, pp. 226) that leads to the tendency in plu-
rality vote systems for supporters of noncompetitive parties to defect to a more competitive party to
increase the influence of their vote (for example, Lanoue and Bowler, 1992; Kim and Fording, 2001;
Fisher and Curtice, 2006; Blais et al., 2001, 2005; Alvarez and Nagler, 2000; Franklin et al., 1994).
There is evidence that voters in the UK behave strategically at UK general elections, which uses
the same SMD plurality vote system as the candidate ballot in devolved elections. Scholars have
consistently found evidence of significant proportions of the UK electorate who preferred noncom-
petitive parties yet voted in patterns consistent with the logic of strategic voting: the less competitive
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a voter’s preferred party the greater the probability of them voting for another party (Cain, 1978;
Lanoue and Bowler, 1992; Fieldhouse et al., 2007; Fisher, 2004; Fisher and Curtice, 2006; Heath
et al., 1991a; Clarke et al., 2004). It might be expected therefore that this strategic behaviour will
spillover from the one electoral system to the other, given that SMD plurality vote is the most famil-
iar and intuitive systemmost voters are accustomed to. This should hold as long as voters are aware
that the plurality vote under MMP operates under the same electoral rules as that of a UKGeneral
Election.
This hypothesis – that strategic voting occurs in the SMD ballot at devolved elections – is yet to
be tested in Scotland andWales. While these voters might make strategic voting decisions in a single-
ballot plurality vote system, there has been no research on whether these same voters behave in a
similar way when faced with a different electoral system. If voters in Scotland andWales split their
ticket to avoid wasting their vote then we would expect to observe the same patterns as UK general
elections. Assuming that the list vote is more likely to be a sincere expression of political preference,
we would expect the probability of a voter casting a split-ticket to increase as the competitiveness of
their preferred party in their SMD decreases.
These insights informmy first hypothesis:
H1: The less competitive a voter’s first preference candidate is in their constituency,
the greater the probability of them casting a split-ticket.
In MMP systems, strategic voting is not confined solely to the plurality constituency vote. A
growing body of work has shown that voters in PR systems make strategic considerations when
making voting choices (Bargsted and Kedar, 2009; Abramson et al., 2010; Hobolt and Karp, 2010).
Recent comparative scholarship has also had some success in finding evidence of strategic voting oc-
curring within the PR tier of MMP systems (Plescia, 2016). The incentives for voting strategically in
the list ballot are particularly high in the Scottish andWelsh contexts where the electoral threshold
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in these ballots is high relative to international comparisons such as Germany (see Tsebelis, 1986,
for discussion of pre-devolution examples). Yet recent examples of SNP success in the regional list
and SMD ballot highlight how difficult it can be for voters to discern when it makes sense for them
to cast a split-ticket.52
Perhaps uniquely, the Welsh system offers voters the most explicit incentives to vote strategically
on the list ballot. The high ratio of SMD seats to list seats (2:1) creates a very high electoral thresh-
old that parties must meet to win representation. In certain regions this is further exaggerated: in
three of the five Welsh party list regions Labour have won the clear majority of constituencies – if
not every single one – at every election. The consequences are twofold. First, the list seats in these
regions are dominated by Plaid Cymru and the Conservatives, the second and third largest parties at
every election. These two parties receive high shares of the vote, often over 20%, but often win no
SMD seats giving them a small denominator in the D’Hondt list calculations. This means that it is
difficult for other parties to ever win substantial representation through these lists. Second, it means
that a vote for Labour in the list is highly unlikely to have any effect on the outcome of the contest
as their chances of winning any list seats are essentially zero. This should create large incentives for
supporters of Labour to abandon their first preference and cast a vote for a party more likely to win
list representation.
A second and more narrowWales-only hypothesis can therefore be derived to test for the exis-
tence of strategic splitting on the list part of the ballot:
H2: Voters who cast their ballot for the Labour Party in a SouthWales SMDwill be
more likely to cast a split ticket.
Again, this is a context-specific hypothesis where the probability of Labour winning list seats in
SouthWales regions are incredibly small.
Devolved elections in Scotland andWales are unique test-cases for these hypotheses. As relatively
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new electoral arenas, Scottish andWelsh voters were confronted with a new electoral system with
which they were largely unfamiliar. Yet strategic voting in such a system requires a high level of voter
capacity. First, it requires knowledge of an electoral system that is considered one of the most com-
plex for voters to use (Farrell and Gallagher, 1999; Gschwend, 2006). Voters may not even be aware
that they are able to vote for different parties on the two ballots. Indeed, a commonmisconcep-
tion inMMP electoral systems is that the two votes actually represent a first and second preference
ranked vote where voters are required to vote for two different parties. Knowledge of ballot paper
rules cannot be taken for granted, particularly given the evidence outlined in Chapter 3 of a sub-
stantial lack of understanding of the rules of the electoral system. In order to satisfy the criteria of a
strategic vote, voters must know when the cost-benefit balance makes it favourable to cast a straight
vs. split ticket (Plescia, 2016) . This requires access to information regarding the specific political
context of the constituency and list in which they will cast their votes. For the wasted vote hypothe-
sis to apply voters must have an awareness of the competing candidates and parties in constituency
and list contests and their relative probabilities of winning. As devolved elections rarely receive me-
dia coverage by UK-wide media outlets, this means that voters are therefore dependent on sub-state
media sources or the political parties themselves to provide the information required (see Chap-
ter 3 for more information here). Strategic split-ticket voting, therefore, requires a high knowledge
threshold from Scottish andWelsh voters.
The two hypotheses make differing levels of demand on voters’ capacity. It has been long estab-
lished in the literature that voters in the UK are able to make strategic considerations in plurality
systems and that these considerations may spillover into the MMP system. This means that H1 is the
‘easier’ test of strategic split-ticket voting in Scotland andWales. H2 provides a much more difficult
test, especially for a relatively young electoral arena and electoral system. For voters to act strategi-
cally in this sense they need to have an awareness not only of the likely outcome of their own con-
stituency contest, but of the others in their region. They also require knowledge of how the list seats
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are allocated in a system that is far from intuitive.
6.2.2 Alternative explanations
Ticket-splitting can also be explained by other quasi-strategic forms of voting behaviour. Analysis
of split-ticket voting in Germany has suggested that a motivation for voters splitting their ticket is to
express a preference over potential coalition partnerships (Jesse, 1988; Cox, 1997; Schoen, 1999; Pappi
and Thurner, 2002; Abramson et al., 2010). This desire is perhaps unsurprising in a political system
which has only produced coalition governments at the federal level since reunification but there is
some evidence that this behaviour may not be context specific to Germany.
Although voters in the UK as a whole have far less exposure to multi-party government in the
UK government, voters in Scotland andWales have experienced several periods of devolved gov-
ernment by multiple parties: in Scotland, the 1999-2003 and 2003-07 Labour-Liberal Democrat
coalitions. InWales the 2000-03 Labour-Liberal Democrat partnership government and the 2007-
11 Labour-Plaid Cymru coalition. Both countries have also seen periods of minority government
involving more informal cooperation between different parties. Scotland has experienced two mi-
nority SNP governments supported by the Scottish Greens (2007-11 and 2016-present) and the
post-2016Welsh Labour administration is supported via a formal agreement with the sole Liberal
Democrat AM and support from an independent member.
This additional exposure to coalition governments may lead voters in Scotland andWales to take
note of their coalition preferences when casting their votes, similar to voters in Germany. Carman
and Johns (2010) tested this hypothesis at the 2007 SP election. They found that voters who profess
a preference for coalition government are more likely to split their ticket. They attribute this find-
ing to the intuitive, albeit misguided, belief that voting for more than one party was more likely to
produce a coalition between those parties.
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There are several reasons why investigation of split-ticket voting needs to be expanded however.
This hypothesis has not been tested inWales as Carman and Johns (2010) only examine the 2007
Scottish election. There is an argument that 2007 in Scotland was a uniquely inappropriate elec-
tion at which to study split-ticket voting in isolation because it was overshadowed by considerable
problems with the voting system (see Hepburn, 2008a). This was due to the introduction of a sin-
gle transferable vote (STV) electoral system for local elections that were held at the same time. This
electoral system asked voters to rank candidates by preference. The resulting confusion led to almost
150,000 votes (roughly 7% of all votes cast) rendered invalid. In order to confirm this behaviour this
hypothesis must be tested in more than one case.
Not all split-tickets are cast due to strategic considerations. One straightforward occasion when
split tickets will be cast is when a voter casts their ballot for a candidate in a constituency that be-
longs to a party not represented on the party list (or vice-versa). In this instance, voters are ‘forced’
to cast a split-ticket. This is a relatively common occurrence as parties themselves behave strategically
in terms of which ballot paper they stand candidates. For example, smaller parties that are unlikely
to win any constituency contests may concentrate on regional party lists where the probability of
winning a seat is far greater (Curtice, 2006c, pp.126).
A further possible motivation for ticket-splitting is a ‘personal vote’ - a vote for a specific can-
didate in a constituency who is popular enough to win votes from supporters of several different
political parties. But the list vote may also be subject to a personal vote effect: Parties may elect to
place candidates with a high profile at the top of the list to attract attention for that party in the
hope of electing a particular politician. This tactic has been used in both Scotland andWales. For
example, at the 2007 Scottish elections the SNP was labelled as “Alex Salmond for First Minister” on
the party list, a tactic that was repeated in 2011, and again with Nicola Sturgeon’s name in 2016(see
Figure D.5). 53 Although there has been a very limited amount of analysis on incumbency effects or
personal voting in a devolved context, there is some evidence that it may drive voters to cast a split
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ticket. At the 1999 and 2003 SP elections Curtice (2006c) found that half of voters who reported
that their constituency vote was for a specific candidate cast a split ticket.
Aside from considering motivations for ticket-splitting, it is equally important to discuss mo-
tivations for casting straight ballots. The primary and most intuitive motivation for not casting a
split ticket is partisanship. Voters with strong levels of partisan attachment are unlikely to deviate
from a straight ticket for reasons that are self-explanatory. This has been tested in several studies
of split-ticket voting behaviour where models have found there to be a strong negative coefficient
between ticket-splitting and partisanship (Karp et al., 2002; Roscoe, 2003; Rallings and Thrasher,
2005; Gschwend, 2006). Partisanship may play a particularly prevalent role in the case of new elec-
toral arenas such as Scotland andWales.
6.3 Data andMethod
The study of split-ticket voting has generally used two forms of data: aggregate-level data (Johnston
and Pattie, 2003; Gschwend et al., 2003; Plescia, 2016), and individual-level data from surveys (Jesse,
1988; Karp et al., 2002; Carman and Johns, 2010; Plescia, 2016). Individual-level surveys represent
the only point of access to voters’ considerations when casting their ballot. They can therefore be
used to identify those individual-level respondents who cast split tickets. Since 1999, the Scottish
andWelsh Election Studies (SES andWES) have asked voters in Scotland andWales their vote choice
– in addition to a range of other attitudinal and preference questions – at every devolved election.
These two sets of studies therefore provide the best available data for analyzing split-ticket voting in
the two countries. I use these datasets to test my hypotheses.
These individual-level data also have limitations that must be addressed. Both the SES andWES
suffer from sampling and respondent biases. These biases are a concern as they may introduce bias
into the analysis and subsequent results. One pertinent example of how this bias may affect the anal-
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ysis is political participation. Table 6.1 shows the reported turnout among the SES andWES samples
using population weights and official turnout figures for each devolved election. In each dataset, and
in particular SES 2007, 2011, and 2016, andWES 2011 and 201654, respondents are considerably more
likely to vote than the real population.
Scotland Wales
SES Official WES Official
1999 72.5 59.1 57.2 46.0
2003 60.1 49.4 49.3 38.2
2007 78.0 52.4 49.1 43.7
2011 81.4 50.4 74.9 42.2
2016 78.2 55.6 68.3 45.3
Table 6.1: Reported SES and WES turnout with populaধon weights and official turnout figures for devolved elecধons,
1999-2016. Figures given as percentages. Source: SES, WES, and Electoral Commission.
It is well established that political participation is correlated with education, political interest, and
political knowledge (Blais, 2000). These factors have also been shown in the past to be correlated
to both strategic voting and split-ticket voting (Plescia, 2016). This means that it is possible that the
election studies over-recruit respondents with a high propensity to cast split-tickets meaning our
analysis overestimates the quantity of this group of voters.
Similarly, the data does not accurately reflect the vote choice of the whole electorate. Carman
and Johns (2010, pp. 386) found considerable sampling and respondent bias in the 2007 SES. These
biases are present throughout the devolved election studies. For example, each sample considerably
underestimates the vote share of the Conservatives and overestimates the vote share that smaller
parties receive in both the constituency and regional list ballots. These biases are uncorrected by
post-stratification weights constructed with socio-demographic information only. To correct for
some of these biases I follow Carman and Johns (2010) by creating additional post-stratification
weights to recreate the the distributions of vote choice for each year. This reverse-weights the data
to make it look more like the ‘real’ population, using distributions in the population we know to be
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accurate such as socio-demographics, turnout and party choice.
6.3.1 Descriptive Analysis
Using these data I proceed with some initial descriptive analysis. This is complemented by some
aggregate-level data. The aim here is to contextualize the individual-level behaviours within the ‘big-
ger picture’ of aggregate patterns. First, I establish the prevalence of split-ticket voting at devolved
elections. Namely, what proportion of voters have cast split tickets at each devolved election? Af-
ter all, if ticket-splitting is a rare occurrence, then analysis of this behaviour is of limited use. The
data suggest that this is not the case. Using SES andWES data we can infer that substantial propor-
tions of voters cast split-tickets at every devolved election in Scotland andWales. Figure 6.3 reports
these proportions. In Scotland, as many as one in four SES respondents cast a split-ticket in 2003,
although this has declined to fewer than one in five voters at the 2016 SP election. InWales, the 2011
NAW election saw the highest proportion of WES respondents reporting splitting their ticket at
28%, with the fewest at the 2003 election. These proportions of voters casting split-tickets is consis-
tent with international comparisons of voter behaviour in MMP systems where between 20-30% of
voters do (Mcallister andWhite, 2000; Carman and Johns, 2010; Plescia, 2016).
Once established that this is a common behaviour among voters, aggregate and individual-level
data can be used to explore the patterns of split-ticket voting. Aggregate-level voting returns provide
information on which political parties perform better on each ballot. Tables 6.2 and 6.3 give the
mean constituency and list vote shares for parties in Scotland andWales at devolved elections. In
Scotland, the two largest parties over the period 1999-2016, Labour and the SNP, have won higher
vote shares on the constituency ballot while the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats have fared
better on the party list. In Wales, all of the four largest parties over the period have performed better
on the constituency ballot to varying extents. This means that substantial numbers of voters are
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Figure 6.3: % of SES and WES (1999-2016) respondents who cast a split ধcket at SP and NAW elecধons. All data are
weighted. Source: SES and WES, 1999-2016
casting their list ballot for another party. This is the case in both Scotland andWales. Several of these
‘other’ parties tend to be smaller parties who have little chance of winning a constituency contest.
They therefore do not stand on the constituency, a move often made for financial reasons in order to
minimize the cost of losing candidate deposits.
Party Mean Vote Share (C) Mean Vote Share (L) List Advantage
Conservative 16.9 18.3 +1.4
Labour 32.0 27.6 -4.4
Liberal Democrat 12.3 14.4 +2.2
SNP 35.4 28.9 -7.2
Table 6.2: Mean Consধtuency (C) and List (L) vote shares (%) with mean List advantage, by party at SP elecধons,
1999-2016.
Figure 6.4 shows the percentage of the constituency votes cast for candidates or parties only
present on one part of the ballot at every devolved election. Considerable numbers of voters at each
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Party Mean Vote Share (C) Mean Vote Share (L) List Advantage
Conservative 20.8 19.7 -1.2
Labour 37.4 34.0 -3.4
Liberal Democrat 12.1 10.3 -1.9
Plaid Cymru 22.4 22.0 -0.4
Table 6.3: Mean Consধtuency (C) and List (L) vote shares (%) with mean List advantage, by party at NAW elecধons,
1999-2016.
election vote for parties or candidates on one of the ballots that are not represented on the other.
Although there is a considerable amount of variation between elections, substantial numbers of vot-
ers are voting for candidates of parties only represented on one half of the ballot. The list vote, in
particular, sees considerable numbers of voters cast ballots for parties that do not stand candidates in
constituencies.
The considerable variation between elections in the proportions of voters casting votes for par-
ties only present on one ballot can be attributed to two main factors. Firstly, and most straightfor-
ward, is the number of parties or candidates standing. For example, in the 2003 SP elections, there
was an average increase of two parties standing in each party list that were not standing in any con-
stituencies compared to 1999. When voters are given a greater range of parties to vote for there is a
higher probability that their votes will therefore be spread among a greater number of parties and
in cases where these parties only stand in one half of the ballot, there will be a greater number of
ticket-splitting by necessity.
The second factor is the relative strength of political parties. Consider, for example, the case of
UKIP inWales at the 2011 and 2016 NAW elections. In 2011, UKIP were only starting to emerge
as significant players in the UK political scene and had not had any substantial electoral success in
Wales. As a result, they did not stand in any constituency contests, instead focusing on the party
lists, winning 4.6% of the national vote. In the following years however, UKIP achieved consider-
able success across the UK, winning a considerable number of votes in the 2013 English local elec-
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Figure 6.4: % votes of consধtuency and regional list votes cast for candidate or party not represented on the other
ballot. Source: House of Commons Library
tions, the 2014 European Parliamentary elections and the 2015 UK general election. In 2016, they
stood candidates in 38 of Wales’s 40 constituencies, winning 12.5% of the vote nationally and 13%
in the party lists. This explains the considerable drop in the share of the regional vote cast for half-
ballot parties in Wales between 2011 and 2016.
The SES andWES can also help us to understand the patterns of split ticket voting in Scotland
andWales and how they may have changed over time. Figures 6.5 and 6.6 illustrate these patterns of
split-ticket voting in Scotland andWales at each devolved election. In Scotland, the major beneficia-
ries on the regional list are the Scottish Green Party, as well as other smaller parties. There are several
patterns which emerge in these figures. The first is the decline in Scotland of Labour and SNP con-
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stituency voters voting for the other party in the regional list. In 1999, a plurality of Labour SMD
voters voted for the SNP in the list vote. The same was true of SNP SMD voters voting for Labour
in the list vote. Since 1999, the proportions of both sets of SMD voters voting for the other party
in the list has been in decline, except for 2011 Labour SMD voters likely contributing to the SNP’s
historic victory. In fact, in 2016, fewer Labour SMD voters voted for the SNP on the list than for any
other party.
Over the same time period the proportion of Labour and SNP SMD voters voting for the Scot-
tish Green Party has increased at each election. One of the factors that may explain this success can
also be used to explain the high number of voters splitting to other minor parties; namely that the
majority of these parties will not stand on the SMD ballot. As Figure 6.4 illustrated, these voters
may be forced to cast split ballots as they are unable to vote for their preferred party in their con-
stituency. Additionally, it may be the case that Labour and SNP voters, who historically would have
split among themselves, now split to the Greens as an alternative.
InWales, several different trends appear. The first unique trend, which has been notably absent
from SP elections, is the considerable increase in UKIP vote share at the 2011 NAW election. Con-
siderable proportions of Conservative and Plaid Cymru constituency voters split to UKIP on the list
in 2011 and, among Conservative constituency voters, in 2016. The second trend is the increase since
2003 in the proportion of Labour constituency voters who vote for Plaid Cymru in the list. In 2016
this extended to more than one in every ten Labour constituency voters.
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Figure 6.5: Percentage of Conservaধve, Labour and SNP consধtuency voters who cast a list for for a different party. Source: SES, 1999-2016
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Figure 6.6: Percentage of Conservaধve, Labour and Plaid Cymru consধtuency voters who cast a list for for a different party. Source: WES, 1999-2016
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Constituency List
Always vote this way 34.1 32.7
The party has the best policies 33.4 35.4
The party has the best leader 14.6 16.0
Vote for specific candidate, regardless of party 4.2 2.4
Tactical vote to stop another party 10.1 10.5
Preferred party had no chance of winning 2.0 1.3
Preferred party didn’t stand a candidate 0.5 0.3
Other reasons 1.3 1.5
N 2,172 2,172
Table 6.4: Scoষsh responses to the quesধon “Sধll thinking of this [consধtuency/list] vote, which of the follow-
ing comes closest to the reason you voted the way you did?” Figures given are percentages. All data are weighted.
Source: SES 2016
6.4 Multivariate Analyses
Prior to testing my hypotheses, I first show descriptive statistics from the 2016 SES andWES to ex-
amine the reasons respondents themselves gave for the ways they voted. In 2011 and 2016 SES and
WES respondents were asked which party they voted for in their constituency vote, and then asked
“[Still] thinking of this constituency vote, which of the following comes closest to the reason you
voted the way you did?”. Respondents were then presented with a series of options to select. The
question was repeated for respondents’ list vote. Tables 6.4 and 6.5 give the proportion of respon-
dents who selected each option.
I use these responses as explanatory variables in a logistic regression where the dependent variable
identifies whether a voter casts a straight or a split ticket. This uncovers which explanations lead to
a higher probability of a voter casting a split-ticket. The dependent variable is a binary variable that
takes a value of 1 whenever a respondent reported voting for different parties in the constituency and
list votes and a 0 if the respondent reported voting for the same party on both ballots.
I also include a number of control variables. To control for the role of political knowledge in
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Constituency List
Always vote this way 31.7 30.8
The party has the best policies 39.2 42.4
The party has the best leader 8.9 9.1
Vote for specific candidate, regardless of party 6.4 3.7
Tactical vote to stop another party 6.6 7.3
Preferred party had no chance of winning 2.9 2.3
Preferred party didn’t stand a candidate 0.4 -
2nd preference; voted 1st in constituency - 0.5
Other reasons 3.7 4.0
N 1,781 1,781
Table 6.5: Welsh responses to the quesধon “Sধll thinking of this [consধtuency/list] vote, which of the following
comes closest to the reason you voted the way you did?” Figures given are percentages. All data are weighted.
Source: WES 2016
split-ticket voting I employ a categorical variable of a respondent’s highest educational qualifica-
tion. It is important to note that any positive effect between education and split-ticket voting will
not necessarily be a direct effect. It is unlikely to be the case, for example, that voters who complete
their A-levels or attend university are taught about the electoral system. Rather, education may play
an indirect role through other important social factors. For example, those with higher educational
qualifications are more likely to participate politically in elections and exist in social circles who par-
ticipate (Blais, 2000). It is possible that voters gain knowledge of the electoral system through these
connections. Partisan identity is controlled for using a categorical variable measuring the strength
of a respondent’s identification with a political party. Finally, standard demographic variables of age
and gender are also included as controls.
If strategic voting is a key motivation for voters casting split tickets then we should expect a posi-
tive relationship between split-ticket voting and respondents who said their vote was to stop another
party from winning or preferred another party but didn’t think that party had a chance of winning.
Figures 6.7 and 6.8 show the change in probability of a respondent casting a split-ticket, depending
on the reason they gave for the way they voted. The reference category is ‘I always vote this way’, so
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all probabilities are relative to the group of voters who selected this option. Full regression tables
with controls are provided in Appendix D.
The results show that strategic considerations have a significant and substantive positive effect
on the probability of casting a split-ticket. Among those who indicated their SMD or list vote was
to stop another party, the probability of casting a split-ticket was between 18 and 41% greater than
those respondents who indicated they ‘always voted this way’. Similarly, the probability of casting a
split-ticket increased by between 27% and 40% among those who said that they voted the way they
did because they didn’t think that their preferred candidate/party could win. Both of these results
lend support to the hypothesis that strategic motivations drive split-ticket voting. These two effects
are not mutually exclusive and in many instances complement each other. It is likely that the reason
why voters decide not to stick with a preferred candidate or party they think has little chance of
winning is because the cost of remaining loyal to that candidate/party is that a party they do not
like will win. Strategic voting may therefore be driven as much by what McGregor et al. (2015) call
‘negative partisanship’, than it is deterred by partisan identity.
There is also strong evidence of a personal vote influencing split-ticket voting. In the constituency
vote, respondents who said they voted for a specific candidate regardless of party, the probability of
casting a split-ticket increased by 44% in Scotland and 37% inWales. On the list vote, there is a larger
discrepancy between Scotland andWales, with personal vote having a larger effect in Scotland com-
pared toWales. This is perhaps a reflection of the use of party leader names on list ballot papers
being a more established and prevalent feature of SP elections. Unsurprisingly, there was also a large
positive effect among respondents who cast split-tickets out of necessity or, in other words, those
whose preferred party did not stand on the list or stand candidates in their constituency.
The results also provide some information that is indicative of voters not understanding the elec-
toral system. InWales, voters who thought that their list vote was for their second preference and
their constituency was for their first preference were substantially more likely to cast a split ticket.
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Figure 6.7: First differences plot. How do ধcket-spliħers explain their consধtuency and list vote? Source: SES 2016
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Figure 6.8: First differences plot. How do ধcket-spliħers explain their consধtuency and list vote? Source: WES 2016
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It is of course unsurprising that respondents who selected this option should report casting a vote
for two different parties (indeed, it is puzzling that not every respondent who selected this option
reported casting a split ticket). However, it also illustrates that those respondents who do not under-
stand the electoral system (and this is a substantial number, see Chapter 3) are not expressing their
political attitudes in an efficient and effective manner.
I nowmove on to test my two main hypotheses,H1 andH2. Restated, these are:
H1: The less competitive a voter’s first preference candidate is in their SMD, the
greater the probability of them casting a split-ticket.
H2: Voters who cast their ballot for the Labour Party in a SouthWales SMDwill be
more likely to cast a split ticket.
To testH1 andH2, I employ two further sets of binomial logit regressions, this time using data
frommultiple election years. Again, the data are taken from the SES andWES over the period of
1999-2016.
Focusing first onH1, I create a variable that captures the competitiveness of a respondent’s pre-
ferred party in their SMD. The previous analysis has established that the probability of a voter cast-
ing a split-ticket increases when strategic considerations motivate vote choice. This is consistent
with the ‘wasted vote’ hypothesis which tells us that voters have an intrinsic aversion to casting votes
for parties or candidates that have little chance of winning (Riker, 1982). The SES andWES do not
ask respondents what they think the chances of their preferred party’s candidate winning their con-
stituency or winning representation through the party list. Therefore, I follow Niemi et al. (1992,
pp. 232) who suggest incorporating aggregate-level information to measure strategic voting, primar-
ily district competitiveness, when individual-level expectations about the election outcome are not
available.
To measure candidate competitiveness in the constituency ballot (H1), I take the difference in
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vote share between a respondent’s preferred party candidate and the first placed candidate in that
respondent’s constituency at the previous election. The ‘preferred party’ is assumed to be the party
that the respondent identifies in their response to the question “Which of the following parties do
you feel closest to?”. If the respondent states they are not close to any party then this is measured as
zero. For those respondents whose preferred party came first in their constituency at t-1 this is also
measured as zero. In the following analysis this variable is referred to as the ‘candidate gap’.
The construction of this variable means that some election years have to be excluded from the
analyses. In order to be eligible data must to contain geographic data for each respondent, namely
the constituency or SMD that respondent cast their vote in. Without this information it is not pos-
sible to calculate the distance between a respondent’s preferred party and the first placed candidate
in their area. Only five of the ten devolved election studies contained this information. In Scotland
these are the 2007 and 2016 SES, and inWales these are the 2007, 2011, and 2016WES. The 1999 and
2003WES have the required constituency data, but missing data means that the samples are too
small to use in many multivariate analyses. The dependent variable is the same as that used in my
earlier analysis; a binary variable that indicates whether a voter cast a split-ticket or not.
In addition to the controls listed in the previous analysis, I include variables that test for alterna-
tive motivations to cast a split-ticket. To measure for quasi-strategic coalition motivations I employ
an additional binary variable measuring whether a respondent preferred a single-party government
or a coalition government between more than one political party. This is taken from responses to
the question “What do you think would generally be better for [Scotland/Wales] nowadays: to have
a government in Cardiff formed by one political party on its own; or to have a government in [Ed-
inburgh/Cardiff] formed by two political parties together in coalition?” The same measurement
is used by Carman and Johns (2010) in their analysis of the 2007 Scottish Parliamentary election,
and is shown to be a significant predictor of split-ticket voting. The 2016 SES does not include this
question or any comparable questions on coalition attitudes. The 2016 analysis of Scottish voting
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therefore excludes this measure. More information regarding respondents coalition attitudes are
provided in Appendix C.1.
Given that the previous analysis indicated the presence of a strong personal vote driving split-
ticket voting, I include a control for an incumbency effect. This is a binary variable which takes a
value of 1 if a respondent voted for the incumbent in their constituency, and a 0 otherwise. All in-
dependent variables are measured in the pre-election wave of each election study. This is done to
prevent voters from retroactively changing their reported attitudes, reducing the likelihood of en-
dogeneity problems created by false recall. The dependent variable is necessarily measured at the
post-election stage.
Results are provided in Table 6.6 with the effect of candidate competitiveness illustrated as
marginal effects in Figure 6.9. Full regression tables are provided in Appendix D. Focusing first on
Figure 6.9, the marginal effects provide strong support forH1. In every election year with eligible
data there is a substantive positive association between the probability of casting a split-ticket and
the size of the candidate gap. This is the same in Scotland andWales. The effect is significant in all
years except for 2007 inWales, although this is due to the small sample size that year.
These results suggest that voters do generally understand that the SMD vote in MMP operates
the same way as the UKGeneral Election voting system. They are also able to effectively maximize
the impact of their vote: when information from previous elections suggests that a voter’s preferred
candidate has little chance of winning, they are more likely to cast a split-ticket. When the informa-
tion suggests that their preferred party’s candidate is more competitive, they are less likely to cast a
split-ticket. This confirmsH1, and represents the first recorded evidence of strategic voting in de-
volved elections in the UK.
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Figure 6.9: Probability of casধng split-ধcket given difference in vote share between voters preferred party and the first placed party’s candidate at elecধon
t-1
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Scot ’07 Scot ’16 Wales ’07 Wales ’11 Wales ’16
Gap 0.212* 0.364* 0.190 0.306* 0.254*
Voted for Incumbent -0.044 0.009 -0.152* 0.004 0.074*
Age (Centred) -0.060 -0.119* 0.138 -0.077 0.087
Female 0.017 -0.083* -0.034 -0.001 -0.052*
Education (Ref = No formal quals)
GCSE -0.005 0.034 0.040 0.105 0.020
A-level 0.193* 0.113* 0.041 0.110* 0.083*
Degree 0.159* 0.156* 0.155* 0.027 0.056
Prefers coalition 0.120* 0.059 0.042 0.138*
Party support strength (Ref = None)
Very strong -0.116 -0.070 -0.046 0.048 0.022*
Fairly strong 0.024 0.000 0.026 -0.003 0.097
Not very strong 0.081 -0.015* 0.043 0.161 0.047
Table 6.6: Maximum Discrete Changes in Probability of Casধng Split-ধcket. * denotes significant effect. See Table D.4
for full output.
To testH2 I restrict the sample to respondents in three SouthWales electoral regions: South
Wales East, Central, andWest. I do this as it is only in these regions where Labour SMD voters face
explicit incentives to vote strategically on the list due to the overwhelming dominance of the Labour
Party on the constituency ballot. This means that I only test this hypothesis on data from the 2011
and 2016WES. The 2007WES is dropped as it had an insufficient sample size when restricted to the
three electoral regions. In this model, the main explanatory variable of interest is whether a respon-
dent reports voting for the Labour party in the SMD ballot. I therefore include 2016 SMD reported
vote as a categorical variable in the model, with the reference category being respondents who did
not vote for one of the five main parties. IfH2 is correct, we should see a positive effect between vot-
ing Labour in the SMD and a respondent casting a split-ticket.
The results in Table 6.7 show this is not the case. Instead, the direction of the effect is the exact
opposite of what would be expected if voters were casting strategic votes on the list. Indeed, it ap-
pears that voters who voted for the Labour party in their SMD ballot were the least likely of any
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2011 2016
Age (Centred) -0.010 0.182*
Female 0.035 -0.061
Education (Ref = no formal quals)
GCSE 0.030 -0.023
Alevel 0.046 0.047
Uni 0.045 0.042
2016 SMD Vote (Ref = Other)
Conservative 0.040 -0.425*
Labour 0.038 -0.616*
Liberal Democrat 0.085 -0.277*
Plaid Cymru -0.068 -0.418*
UKIP -0.387*
Voted for Incumbent -0.001 0.134
Prefers Coalition 0.130* 0.210*
Party Support Strength (Ref = None)
Very Strong 0.058 -0.109
Fairly Strong -0.005 -0.018
Not Very Strong 0.202 -0.070
Table 6.7: Maximum Discrete Changes in Probability of Casধng Split-ধcket. Sample is restricted to respondents in
South Wales East, Central, and West. * denotes significant effect. See Table D.5 for full output.
other group of voters to cast a split-ticket. This means that we can say with some confidence thatH2
fails.
6.5 Discussion
The results represent something of a mixed picture regarding strategic split-ticket voting in Scotland
andWales. On the one hand, the results presented in Table 6.6 represent the first confirmation of
strategic voting at devolved elections in Scotland andWales. In the SMD ballot there is strong evi-
dence of a substantial effect between the competitiveness of a voter’s preferred party and the prob-
ability of that voter casting a split-ticket. Voters demonstrate understanding of this process, with
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those describing their SMD vote as a strategic one being substantially more likely to split their bal-
lot. This is likely the result of a ‘spillover’ of knowledge from the electoral system used at UK general
elections which provides voters with the same incentives to vote strategically (Cain, 1978; Lanoue
and Bowler, 1992; Fieldhouse et al., 2007; Fisher, 2004; Fisher and Curtice, 2006; Heath et al., 1991a;
Clarke et al., 2004).
Yet results presented in Table 6.7 suggest that voters do not appear to cast strategic votes on the
list ballot even when faced with explicit incentives to do so. In three SouthWales electoral regions
where the probability of the Labour Party winning list seats is infinitesimally small, voters who cast
their SMD ballot for Labour were the least likely of any group to cast a split ticket. The most likely
explanation for these results is that the party list vote is simply not a straightforward or intuitive
ballot. Farrell and Gallagher (1999) and Gschwend (2006) have both argued that MMP system is a
confusing one for voters to navigate, and that this confusion stems from the method used to allocate
party list seats. Evidence in Chapter 3 backs this up, suggesting a worrying lack of understanding of
the MMP electoral system among voters.
To conclude, I focus on two of the wider implications of this research for the study of electoral
behaviour. The first relates to the study of elections in multilevel systems. The results show that
the MMP electoral system creates incentives for voters to cast ballots for multiple parties. This has
the potential to influence future vote choice in elections to other levels of government. Evidence
suggests that vote choice is habit-forming and that once this habit is broken, it is more likely to be
broken again in the future Shachar (2003). Strategic split-ticket voting has the potential therefore to
be a ‘gateway’ into supporting other political parties at other elections. Future research should seek
to address the influence that different electoral systems at different levels have on the outcomes of
elections and the voting choices and political attitudes of citizens.
The second implication of these findings is a more troubling one. There is now strong evidence
presented throughout this thesis that voters do not understand how to maximize their political in-
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terests at devolved elections. Even when confronted with the optimal situation to cast a strategic
vote they do not. This is an obvious problem facing the devolved administrations. TheMMP sys-
tem was implemented in the first place to produce a more representative reflection of the political
views of the populations of Scotland andWales (see The Scottish Office, 1997; TheWales Office,
1997) but is failing to do so. The implications of this extend beyond devolved elections however, and
represent a far more existential challenge to the study of electoral systems. Dozens of states, and even
more sub-state areas, use mixed-member electoral systems to elect representatives (Plescia, 2016).
If voters do not know how to maximise their preferences through the ballot box in even the most
obvious and straightforward of cases it is incredibly unlikely that voters elsewhere are able to do so.
Future comparative research must look to respond to this challenge.
Notes
50This is opposed to ‘vertical splitting where voters vote for different parties at different levels of government
(Pappi and Thurner, 2002) See Chapter 5 for more information.
51The notable exceptions being Curtice (2006c) and Carman and Johns (2010).
52For example, at the 2011 Scottish Parliamentary election the SNP won every SMD seat in the Northeast Scot-
land region and a regional list seat.
53See, for example, Scotsman – Row over Alex Salmond for First Minister ballot label (accessed 05/01/19) or
The National – SNP will use Nicola Sturgeon’s name on every ballot paper at the upcoming election (accessed 05/01/19).
54These surveys were carried out online, compared to previous devolved election studies carried out via a true
random sample.
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7
Conclusion
This thesis began with the premise that politics is not constant within the boundaries of states. Ac-
celerating political and economic decentralization has changed how hundreds of millions of citizens
experience politics, providing sub-state societies – some old and some new – with increasing con-
trols over their lives (Schakel and Romanova, 2018). These societies inevitably shape and influence
the attitudes and behaviours of those living in them, in turn affecting how they vote. The influence
of these societies is also not confined to political questions within the boundaries of that society.
There is no switch that people activate when moving from an election at one level to another: no
option to press “on” for UK political attitudes, or “off” for Scottish political attitudes at a given mo-
ment. Instead, these attitudes and preferences are interdependent, with statewide issues affecting
how people think about sub-state politics and vice versa.
In my introduction I noted that this is not reflected in many analyses of elections. Instead, our
understanding of political attitudes and behaviours is held back by methodological nationalism: the
assumption that the state ought to be the sole or primary unit of focus in the social sciences (Jef-
fery andWincott, 2010b). This bias is inherent in not only theories of electoral behaviour, but also
many methods of data collection and, as such, is built in to much of our understanding of electoral
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behaviour. I noted that Reif and Schmitt (1980)’s second order election model is the archetypal ex-
ample of this bias. Yet despite extensive evidence that the SOE often performs poorly at explaining
certain sub-state electoral behaviours, it’s use remains widespread, both as a model and as a descrip-
tive moniker for non-statewide elections (Jeffery and Hough, 2003; Hough and Jeffery, 2003; Johns
et al., 2010; Schmitt and Teperoglou, 2017; Schakel and Romanova, 2018). Importantly, I suggested
that the field of electoral studies has accumulated insufficient knowledge of how sub-state factors
can influence and drive political attitudes and behaviours at multiple levels of government. Despite
the efforts of notable exceptions, methodological nationalism still shapes not just how data is col-
lected, but the research questions and analyses that are derived from it.
For political science to provide a meaningful account of how people interact with politics, it must
reflect the realities of the social world. Such an approach requires political scientists to start their
inquiries from a position that rejects the assumption that sub-state political issues, behaviours, and
attitudes are merely a reaction to statewide political issues. By failing to reject this assumption, po-
litical scientists are blinkered to the multitude of ways in which sub-state factors can – and do –
exercise a central and substantial role in influencing political behaviour. By interrogating sub-state
politics and political behaviour as phenomena driven by more than reaction to state-wide factors,
the preceding chapters are firmly located within this discipline, and aim to be an example of the ben-
efits of carrying out research in this manner.
As a point of departure, I argued in Chapter 2 that the devolved election studies in the UK have
opened up new possibilities for analyzing political behaviour at multiple levels, and exploring cases
where sub-state factors can spillover and influence politics at the statewide level. One need not look
further than political events in the previous five years in the UK to realize that an understanding of
these factors has never been more timely or necessary. As I outlined in the introduction to this the-
sis, the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum has had a seismic effect on politics across the whole
of the UK, kick-starting a period of substantial territorial divergence. Using this as a foundation, I
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employed Scotland andWales as case studies through which to explore pressing issues in the study of
elections.
To conclude this thesis, this chapter highlights and re-emphasizes some of these findings and
methodological innovations presented in the preceding chapters, and looks ahead to future direc-
tions in my research agenda.
7.1 Contributions
7.1.1 Political Information
In Chapter 3 I undertook the first comprehensive review of what voters know about politics in Scot-
land andWales. Focusing primarily on knowledge of sub-state politics, I provided a descriptive anal-
ysis of how respondents in every devolved election study have answered questions about politics.
This analysis pointed to substantial levels of confusion among voters with regards to the electoral
system, governmental responsibility, and who political actors are. This descriptive analysis also
pointed to the existence of a ‘knowledge gap’ between Scotland andWales: in cases where the SES
andWES asked the same questions, WES respondents were less likely to answer them correctly.
This dissertation has also sought to chart new ground through its analysis of the supply of po-
litical information in a multilevel system. This has been a glaring gap in the literature of elections
in sub-state areas, with negligible quantitative analysis carried out. I suggested that the source of
the knowledge gap might lie in the different patterns of media consumption and coverage between
Scotland andWales. My analysis showed that there was a considerable gap between howmedia at
different levels attribute responsibility for the NHS. ‘Statewide’ media focus almost entirely upon
the UKGovernment, which is responsible only for the health service in England. It falls solely upon
sub-state media to discuss government policy and responsibility in Scotland andWales. While the
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consequences of this are limited in cases where large proportions of citizens consume sub-state news,
such as in Scotland, they are far-reaching in cases where sub-state media is only consumed by very
small proportions of the population, such as Wales.
Building on this descriptive foundation, I also presented evidence of the unequal distribution of
political knowledge across different groups in society. Several of these findings merit highlighting
again. First, certain groups of citizens were more likely to answer questions correctly – and hence
demonstrate greater political knowledge – than others. Social class, political interest, gender, age, ed-
ucation and national identity were all associated in one way or another with the ability to correctly
answer questions about politics. Second, my analysis uncovered a substantial gap in what voters
knew about politics in Scotland andWales, with citizens in Scotland being more likely to answer
knowledge questions correctly on nearly every topic about which they were asked.
So, why does this matter? First, devolution and decentralization more broadly are often advo-
cated to voters and political actors as a way of increasing democratic accountability and citizen in-
volvement in politics. Yet in the UK, two decades after the establishment of the devolved institu-
tions, considerable proportions of citizens have little knowledge of politics at that level. Policy mak-
ers must take note of this. If the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales are to become
permanent and relevant to the everyday lives of voters, their citizens need to know about them.
Second, and perhaps most importantly, is the impact a lack of political knowledge can have on
the lives of the people we study as social scientists. When citizens are unable to correctly attribute
blame for percieved failures in different policy areas, bad policy making and poor governance can
go unpunished at the ballot box. Even when citizens do have a good idea of who is responsible for
particular policy areas, this matters little if they cannot use their ballots effectively. TheMMP system
– while admirable in its ambition to create a locally responsive and nationally representative group
of elected officials – is poorly understood by those who have to use it. This cannot continue if the
desired end-result is responsive and responsible government.
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7.1.2 Sub-state Identities
In much of the existing political science literature on vote choice, national identity is treated as
something of a ‘second-class’ explanatory variable, behind factors such as social class, education and
religion, and frequently excluded from analyses of UK voting behaviour. Taken together, however,
the chapters in this dissertation bring new evidence to challenge this position. My findings provide
compelling evidence that sub-state identities not only play a central role influencing how citizens
participate in politics at the sub-state level, but at the statewide level too.
In Chapter 4 I provided new analysis on why the electoral politics of Scotland andWales appear
to be so different to England. I argued that this electoral distinctiveness is driven in large part by the
existence of strong sub-state identities. These identities are highly associated with left-right political
attitudes, which I illustrated with subjective left-right placement and a left-right index from British
Election Study data (see Figure 4.5). These results showed that citizens with a strong attachment to
the sub-state identity – i.e. Scottish or Welsh identities – are considerably more left-wing than those
who identify more strongly with the statewide identity – Britishness.
Breaking from existing literature, I developed a novel approach to conceptualizing vote choice in
Scotland andWales as a two-step process, where voters first choose between blocs of parties before
picking an individual party to vote for at each election event. These can be labelled as a sub-state
(Scottish/Welsh) bloc, and a statewide (British) bloc. I then presented evidence showing that na-
tional identity – operationalized here as a measure of relative territorial identity – is consistently the
strongest predictor of which bloc of parties a voter supported, exercising a stronger effect than either
social class or education. This effect is consistent in both Scotland andWales across three different
elections, and is even stronger than contemporary political actions and attitudes, such as Scottish
Independence and EUReferendum vote choice.
These findings have clear implications for the debate surrounding vote choice in the UK and be-
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yond. First, the conception of party competition occurring between blocs of parties is one that can
be tested in other contexts. It is plausible, and perhaps even likely, that in sub-state territories with
strong sub-state identities voters’ use these identities as heuristics to group together blocs of parties.
This is a hypothesis that is testable with pre-existing survey data in these cases, and as such will con-
tribute to my agenda for future work. Second, it affirms the importance of sub-state identities as a
heuristic within the funnel of causality. The analysis shows that this is not an effect limited to sub-
state elections, or those voters casting their vote for ‘nationalist’ parties. Where analyses of UK or
Britain-wide elections exclude national identity as an explanatory variable – as is the norm at present
– it restricts our ability to understand the motivations driving citizens’ votes.
7.1.3 Vote switching
Two of the chapters in this thesis focused on voters switching the party they voted for. Chapter 5
examines voters switching party between elections to different levels of government, and Chapter
6 examines split-ticket voting at the same election. These are far from uncommon occurrences: be-
tween one fifth and one-third of voters either switched the party they voted for between levels of
government or voted for two different parties at a devolved election during the period covered in my
analysis.
In chapter 5 I began by highlighting that the ‘Multi-Level Voting’ theory – as proposed by Trys-
tan et al. (2003) and carried forward by Hough and Jeffery (2003) – offers only an incomplete expla-
nation of why voters switch parties at different levels. Importantly, I proposed a new individual-level
hypothesis that could fill gaps left by existing theory; namely, that the phenomenon of voters vot-
ing for different parties at different levels of government could, at least in part, be explained by a
voter’s attachment to a sub-state identity. I tested this hypothesis using an innovative dataset that
combined the British andWelsh Election Studies, creating a panel of respondents across elections
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to different levels. I presented evidence confirming my hypothesis: strong attachment to a sub-state
identity is associated with switching parties between elections, with stronger statewide identity asso-
ciated with not changing the party voted for at elections to different levels.
This chapter makes three substantial contributions to the literature. First, it represents a further
challenge to the theoretical integrity of the second-order election model as an explanatory tool for
election in a multilevel system. Vote switching is not merely a reaction to more ‘important’ statewide
issues and factors, but a systematic process driven by sub-state identities. The second contribution
is the development of a hypothesis that can be tested in a multitude of cases. The work of Hough
and Jeffery (2003) has shown that there are a number of cases where patterns of multilevel voting are
comparable toWales and, as such, may be subject to the same relationships and drivers identified in
this thesis. Finally, it reaffirms the findings I presented in Chapter 4 that sub-state identities have a
considerable influence on the behaviours of voters.
In Chapter 6, I examined the extent to which split-ticket voting could be considered a strategic
act. The evidence pointed to mixed results. When asked why they voted the way they did, respon-
dents who split their ticket were considerably more likely to say their vote choice was strategic. Fur-
thermore, I presented evidence that voters did split their ticket when their preferred party candidate
in their SMD had little chance of winning. However, this behaviour did not hold when voters were
faced with similar information about their preferred party on the list vote, even in positions where
it was nearly impossible for their preferred party to win. This reaffirms the evidence presented in
Chapter 3 with regard to widespread confusion regarding the MMP electoral system in Scotland and
Wales.
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7.1.4 Summary
The research herein suggests that political scientists must account for these sub-state factors in any
thorough analysis of electoral behaviour within multilevel states. The study of these dynamics
should not be the sole purview of a sub-field of territorial specialists when there is strong evidence
that they impact political behaviour and attitudes across multiple levels of government. This is not
a new argument: Lipset and Rokkan (1967) identified the concept of a territorial cleavage over five
decades ago. While I am certainly not advocating a full return to cleavage politics, the evidence pre-
sented in this thesis should compel political scientists to take sub-state issues and identities more
seriously as explanatory variables at all levels.
The findings presented on political knowledge challenge the theoretical underpinnings of fre-
quently used models of vote choice. As I have outlined throughout this thesis, the dominant expla-
nation of vote choice in Scotland andWales is one of competence-evaluation. Yet when the evidence
points to citizens having little knowledge of which government is responsible for different policy ar-
eas, can we really be confident that their vote choices are based on government performance? Johns
(2011b) identified that evaluations of responsibility played little role in vote choice, and were likely
derived from information shortcuts such as party ID. Again, this simply reinforces the importance
of including sub-state explanatory variables in models of vote choice.
7.2 Methodological Innovations
In Chapter 3 I employ a dataset that may be of interest to researchers in the wider field of social sci-
ences. Using LexisNexis, I collected every article published in 18 sub-state and statewide newspapers
using the search term ‘NHS’. The result was a wholly unique dataset of over 190,000 newspaper ar-
ticles. These data contains the full article text, title, author, date, and word length as usable variables.
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Although the collection process was computationally taxing, its low financial cost makes these data
an invaluable tool for the analysis of media content in a range of contexts. Given the paucity of po-
litical communication research undertaken in sub-state environments, this dataset will remain an
important resource for future research to draw upon.
In Chapters 4 and 5 I use a methodological innovation that may be of interest to the wider dis-
cipline. I combine the BES with theWES/SES to create a quasi-panel of respondents over multiple
elections to different levels of government. This was possible as all three studies were carried out
by the same polling company and, as such each respondent was assigned an ID that could be trans-
ferred across studies. The combination of separate surveys offers considerable opportunities for
researchers to create quasi-panels with other surveys to create time-series data that otherwise would
not be available to them. This method also maintains respondent anonymity across ‘waves’.
7.3 Limitations and agenda for future work
The central empirical findings of this dissertation represent a partial exploration of political be-
haviour in multilevel electoral systems. As with any study, this project has limitations that should be
acknowledged.
First, is that my project only focuses on two cases: Scotland andWales. On the one hand, this has
provided many benefits such as similar survey data sources and ease of comparison. On the other,
the analytic framework I put forward in my introductory chapter is generally applicable and hence
both could, and should, be tested in a wider comparative context. As things stand, the small number
of cases I examined in this project limits the extent to which my findings may be applied to other
contexts. Comparative work also opens up new avenues of research, allowing for more in-depth
analyses of the particular political contexts in which voting takes place. In future work, I will thus
seek to replicate my findings across further sub-state contexts.
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The second limitation this project faces is linked to the quality of survey data available in my cho-
sen cases. TheWelsh and Scottish devolved election studies represent perhaps the most extensive
election studies carried out in the last two decades in any sub-state context, yet still present chal-
lenges to the researcher. Perhaps most pressing among these is the absence of any long-standing
time-series data dating back to the earliest devolved elections. There has also been little continuation
of questions or question wording from the first devolved election studies through to the most recent
studies. In several of my chapters, this limited the extent to which I was able to make direct compar-
isons between the Scottish andWelsh cases, and between election studies at different points in time.
To take an example, in Chapter 3 I described the existence of a knowledge gap between citizens in
Scotland andWales. This claim, however, was made using data that is now over a decade old. While
I do not have any reason to think that this gap has closed over time, I also cannot state with certainty
that this gap is still present in contemporary Scotland andWales.
Several of these studies have also been carried out using opt-in online panel surveys instead of
probability sampling. Whilst the use of these panels is now widespread, limitations remain on the
confidence of the inferences we draw from these data. While I address this issue in Chapter 2, it is
also the case that it is an inevitable challenge of research using secondary data, which will not always
capture the information you would like it to. To (reluctantly) quote Donald Rumsfeld: “You go to
war with the army you have, not the army you might want or wish to have at a later time” (Rums-
feld, 2004).
A third limitation relates to the pace of change taking place in contemporary politics. The last
five years have been among the most politically turbulent periods in recent UK history. In this
respect, this period has not been kind to those undertaking a PhD in political science through ex-
ploring UK case studies. With multiple elections, referendums, and changes in government, it has
become something of an inevitability that some aspects of this thesis might seem out of sync with
the political context at the time of reading. A prime example of this is the fate of the Liberal Demo-
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crat Party. In Chapter 4 my formulation of party blocs does not include minor parties, which at that
time included the Liberal Democrats. In the BES data of 2014-2017, fewer respondents identified as a
supporter of the Liberal Democrats or reported voting for them at the 2015 or 2017 UK general elec-
tions than at any previous wave of the BES. As such, the sample of Liberal Democrat voters was so
small in my analysis it made sense to include them in the category of ’other’ minor parties. However,
since the time of writing this chapter the party have undergone an apparent revival, gainingMPs
through defections and gaining substantial support in opinion polls. It remains to be seen whether
this is a merely a ‘blip’ or a more permanent shift in support.
This limitation is not unique to this project, but an obstacle that all social scientists must con-
front. While I am confident that the analysis presented still stands up to scrutiny, future replications
will have to take account of the contemporary political context.
Finally, as with any wide-ranging study, this research project has been a gateway to additional
research projects and future research. To conclude, I will outline three avenues for future research.
First, the dataset I collected of news coverage of the NHS in Scotland andWales also lends itself to
research that can inform debate about political communication in sub-state areas. In this thesis, my
analysis was restricted to what words the media use to discuss the NHS. In the future, this dataset
could be used for a more in-depth analysis of the tone of this language. For example, when the UK
media discuss the Scottish andWelsh NHS, is the tone positive or negative? This analysis can fur-
ther inform how governmental responsibility is framed, and the effect this has on voters’ behaviours
and attitudes. Policy attribution is therefore a key area for future work.
Second, I aim to link the research carried out on vote switching in this thesis. Specifically, are
people who cast split-tickets more likely to also switch the party they vote for between elections
to different levels? We might expect that voters who are happy to change the party they vote for in
their SMD between elections might also be those most comfortable with casting ballots for different
parties at devolved elections. This is a research question that previously would have had to rely on
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voter recall, and thus would have been prone to a greater degree of measurement error. However,
with the ability to combine the BES with the devolved election studies, research should be able to
measure these patterns with a relatively high degree of accuracy.
Third, is to examine whether a knowledge gap still exists between Scotland andWales. The im-
plications of such analysis may help us to inform the dramatic political divergence between Scotland
andWales that has occurred since 2007.
In closing, this thesis has argued that political science must adapt to the realities of politics. This
means the jettisoning of biases that place the state as the primary organizing unit of societies and
analysis, and adapt to political systems that are inherently multilevel. It is my hope that the preced-
ing pages will inform this adaptation.
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A
Supplementary Information for Chapter 3
A.1 Newspaper Data Information
Level of Government KeyWords
UK ‘house of commons’, ‘westminster’, ‘commons’,
‘matt hancock’, ‘jeremy hunt’, ‘andrew lansley’,
‘andy burnham’, ‘alan johnson’, ‘patricia he-
witt’, ‘john reid’, ‘alan millburn’, ‘frank dobson’,
‘theresa may’, ‘david cameron’, ‘gordon brown’,
‘tony blair’
Scottish ‘scottish executive’, ‘scottish government’,
‘holyrood’, ‘sturgeon’, ‘salmond’, ‘mcconnell’,
‘mcleish’, ‘dewar’, ‘jeane freeman’, ‘shona robi-
son’, ‘alex neil’, ‘andy kerr’, ‘malcolm chisholm’
Welsh ‘welsh assembly government’, ‘welsh govern-
ment’, ‘welsh assembly’, ‘senedd’, ‘assembly’,
‘carwyn jones’, ‘rhodri morgan’, ‘mark drakeford’,
‘vaughan gething’, ‘lesley griffiths’, ‘edwina hart’,
‘brian gibbons’, ‘jane hutt’
Table A.1: List of key words and names used in analysis.
Table A.1 displays the list of keywords used in content analysis of data in Section 3.4. The full
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news article dataset can be accessed via this link: https://www.dropbox.com/s/7hlcfhuzisa3o5h/
_nhs.Rdata?dl=0.
A.2 Full Regression Tables for Section 3.5
The below tables display results for logistic regressions predicting whether voter correctly answered a
given question. Results are presented as log-odds with standard errors in parentheses.
A.2.1 Scotland
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Defence Foreign Affairs Income Tax Pensions Welfare Immigration
Age (Centred) 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.006* 0.030*** 0.012*** 0.022***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Female -0.590*** -0.521*** -0.011 -0.481*** -0.170** -0.674***
(0.103) (0.100) (0.094) (0.081) (0.073) (0.095)
Education (Ref = No formal qualifications)
GCSE/National 5 0.210 0.130 -0.189 0.198 0.011 0.060
(0.171) (0.167) (0.176) (0.151) (0.140) (0.163)
A-level/Higher 0.564*** 0.551*** -0.076 0.305** 0.186* 0.387***
(0.144) (0.141) (0.138) (0.123) (0.112) (0.136)
University Degree 0.808*** 0.766*** -0.236* 0.431*** 0.218** 0.621***
(0.145) (0.142) (0.137) (0.121) (0.110) (0.136)
Social Class (Ref = DE)
AB 0.668*** 0.661*** -0.044 0.395*** 0.150 0.545***
(0.147) (0.144) (0.136) (0.118) (0.108) (0.135)
C1C2 0.438*** 0.432*** -0.101 0.336*** 0.079 0.382***
(0.117) (0.114) (0.118) (0.100) (0.094) (0.110)
Ethnic Minority -0.098 0.104 0.145 -0.211 -0.207 -0.171
(0.206) (0.207) (0.187) (0.162) (0.150) (0.186)
Income -0.093 -0.026 0.008 0.028 -0.009 -0.083
(0.108) (0.105) (0.103) (0.088) (0.080) (0.100)
Party ID (Ref = None/Other)
Conservative 0.010 -0.039 -0.038 -0.052 -0.113 0.032
(0.181) (0.177) (0.161) (0.138) (0.122) (0.167)
Labour -0.058 -0.150 -0.036 0.114 -0.165 -0.126
(0.152) (0.149) (0.143) (0.123) (0.108) (0.140)
Liberal Democrat 0.440 0.182 -0.276 0.203 0.318 0.081
(0.415) (0.374) (0.334) (0.270) (0.235) (0.331)
SNP 0.155 0.025 0.205* 0.241** 0.147 0.081
(0.136) (0.133) (0.123) (0.110) (0.099) (0.126)
Political Interest (Ref = Very interested)
Fairly interested -0.751*** -0.640*** 0.184 -0.371*** -0.156* -0.537***
(0.159) (0.150) (0.117) (0.105) (0.089) (0.135)
Not very interested -1.683*** -1.577*** 0.290** -1.038*** -0.561*** -1.295***
(0.172) (0.163) (0.146) (0.126) (0.114) (0.151)
Not at all interested -2.706*** -2.467*** 0.136 -1.628*** -1.132*** -2.103***
(0.223) (0.216) (0.230) (0.194) (0.188) (0.205)
Continued on next page
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page
Defence Foreign Affairs Income Tax Pensions Welfare Immigration
Moreno Nat ID (Ref = Scottish not British)
More Scottish than British 0.158 0.235* 0.025 0.001 -0.073 0.190
(0.141) (0.138) (0.132) (0.117) (0.106) (0.132)
Equally Scottish & British -0.012 0.092 -0.035 0.01 -0.324*** 0.042
(0.149) (0.147) (0.145) (0.125) (0.115) (0.140)
More British than Scottish 0.269 0.164 -0.064 0.06 -0.265* 0.216
(0.230) (0.220) (0.210) (0.178) (0.160) (0.210)
British not Scottish -0.082 -0.143 -0.238 0.056 -0.202 0.041
(0.212) (0.205) (0.212) (0.174) (0.156) (0.200)
Other description 0.079 -0.019 0.080 -0.045 -0.215 -0.093
(0.237) (0.230) (0.217) (0.189) (0.173) (0.212)
Scot Newspaper 0.070 0.004 -0.085 0.048 0.011 0.106
(0.105) (0.103) (0.101) (0.087) (0.079) (0.098)
UKNewspaper 0.482*** 0.501*** 0.057 0.130 0.004 0.324**
(0.156) (0.153) (0.127) (0.112) (0.098) (0.137)
Constant 1.787*** 1.607*** -1.505*** 0.736*** 0.311* 1.573***
(0.229) (0.220) (0.205) (0.179) (0.163) (0.208)
Observations 3409 3409 3409 3409 3409 3409
Nagelkerke R2 0.262 0.241 0.012 0.181 0.06 0.199
LL -1381.958 -1432.974 -1580.977 -1944.96 -2282.725 -1567.333
AIC 0.825 0.855 0.942 1.155 1.353 0.934
Table A.2: Logisধc regression predicধng SES 2016 respondents’ knowledge of which level of government is responsible for different policy areas. Standard
errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: *** 99% ** 95% * 90%
Schools Agriculture NHS Local Gov Environment
Age (Centred) 0.023*** 0.004 0.021*** 0.019*** 0.008***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Female -0.362*** -0.266*** -0.333*** -0.133 -0.385***
(0.096) (0.074) (0.088) (0.095) (0.074)
Education (Ref = No formal qualifications)
GCSE/National 5 0.098 0.019 0.129 0.198 0.102
Continued on next page
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Table A.3 – continued from previous page
Schools Agriculture NHS Local Gov Environment
(0.161) (0.143) (0.155) (0.165) (0.144)
A-level/Higher 0.406*** 0.169 0.349*** 0.328** 0.151
(0.134) (0.114) (0.127) (0.135) (0.115)
University Degree 0.829*** 0.363*** 0.699*** 0.582*** 0.454***
(0.137) (0.111) (0.127) (0.135) (0.112)
Social Class (Ref = DE)
AB 0.592*** 0.365*** 0.467*** 0.646*** 0.144
(0.138) (0.109) (0.127) (0.138) (0.110)
C1C2 0.365*** 0.237** 0.316*** 0.355*** -0.059
(0.111) (0.095) (0.105) (0.110) (0.096)
Ethnic Minority 0.095 0.011 0.120 -0.100 0.117
(0.202) (0.151) (0.184) (0.191) (0.154)
Income 0.003 -0.087 -0.037 -0.012 -0.023
(0.101) (0.082) (0.094) (0.101) (0.082)
Party ID (Ref = None/Other)
Conservative 0.149 0.265** -0.010 0.199 0.202
(0.171) (0.125) (0.151) (0.171) (0.125)
Labour -0.155 0.103 -0.135 0.043 0.061
(0.141) (0.110) (0.131) (0.143) (0.111)
Liberal Democrat 0.695* 0.35 0.304 0.477 0.345
(0.414) (0.238) (0.322) (0.369) (0.239)
SNP 0.037 -0.128 -0.024 0.161 -0.035
(0.127) (0.100) (0.117) (0.127) (0.101)
Political Interest (Ref = Very interested)
Fairly interested -0.884*** -0.249*** -0.983*** -0.554*** -0.386***
(0.147) (0.090) (0.130) (0.136) (0.091)
Not very interested -1.784*** -0.813*** -1.821*** -1.323*** -0.965***
(0.161) (0.115) (0.146) (0.152) (0.117)
Not at all interested -3.177*** -1.717*** -3.122*** -2.502*** -1.899***
(0.227) (0.214) (0.224) (0.208) (0.221)
Moreno Nat ID (Ref = Scottish not British)
More Scottish than British 0.363*** 0.029 0.192 0.111 -0.118
(0.134) (0.107) (0.124) (0.133) (0.109)
Equally Scottish & British 0.175 0.017 0.111 0.028 -0.168
(0.141) (0.116) (0.133) (0.142) (0.117)
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Schools Agriculture NHS Local Gov Environment
More British than Scottish 0.300 -0.045 0.170 0.072 -0.067
(0.213) (0.163) (0.195) (0.207) (0.165)
British not Scottish -0.170 -0.353** -0.106 -0.083 -0.490***
(0.196) (0.159) (0.185) (0.199) (0.161)
Other description 0.213 -0.012 -0.045 0.010 -0.466***
(0.228) (0.176) (0.207) (0.220) (0.179)
Scot Newspaper -0.022 0.042 -0.074 0.110 0.012
(0.099) (0.080) (0.092) (0.099) (0.080)
UKNewspaper 0.389*** 0.266*** 0.313** 0.293** 0.216**
(0.145) (0.100) (0.128) (0.139) (0.101)
Constant 1.493*** 0.068 1.465*** 1.276*** 0.468***
(0.214) (0.164) (0.199) (0.207) (0.166)
Observations 3409 3409 3409 3409 3409
Nagelkerke R2 0.266 0.101 0.243 0.188 0.123
LL -1518.083 -2228.879 -1727.974 -1550.118 -2197.261
AIC 0.905 1.322 1.028 0.924 1.303
Table A.3: Logisধc regression predicধng SES 2016 respondents’ knowledge of which level of government is responsible for different policy areas. Standard
errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: *** 99% ** 95% * 90%
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Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Age (Centred) 0.011*** 0.001 -0.005** 0.003
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Female -0.100 -0.575*** -0.565*** -0.659***
(0.095) (0.076) (0.084) (0.078)
Education (Ref = No formal qualifications)
GCSE/National 5 0.289* 0.139 -0.094 -0.065
(0.162) (0.145) (0.172) (0.155)
A-level/Higher 0.463*** 0.484*** 0.125 0.534***
(0.133) (0.116) (0.132) (0.121)
University Degree 0.779*** 0.479*** 0.114 0.780***
(0.134) (0.113) (0.127) (0.118)
Social Class (Ref = DE)
AB 0.359*** 0.251** 0.239* 0.457***
(0.138) (0.111) (0.126) (0.115)
C1C2 0.147 0.161* 0.239** 0.285***
(0.112) (0.096) (0.112) (0.101)
Ethnic Minority -0.363** -0.098 0.059 -0.039
(0.185) (0.155) (0.165) (0.160)
Income -0.002 -0.023 -0.002 -0.034
(0.101) (0.083) (0.093) (0.086)
Party ID (Ref = None/Other)
Conservative 0.308* -0.076 -0.137 -0.096
(0.170) (0.127) (0.140) (0.131)
Labour 0.172 0.086 -0.155 0.059
(0.143) (0.114) (0.124) (0.117)
Liberal Democrat 0.511 0.185 0.084 0.462*
(0.367) (0.244) (0.248) (0.256)
SNP 0.454*** -0.058 -0.304*** 0.121
(0.129) (0.103) (0.115) (0.106)
Political Interest (Ref = Very interested)
Fairly interested -0.471*** -0.578*** -0.258*** -0.771***
(0.134) (0.094) (0.096) (0.096)
Not very interested -0.983*** -1.187*** -0.508*** -1.498***
(0.152) (0.119) (0.132) (0.124)
Not at all interested -2.135*** -1.876*** -1.112*** -2.315***
(0.202) (0.205) (0.249) (0.233)
Moreno Nat ID (Ref = Scottish not British)
More Scottish than British 0.207 0.046 0.012 0.196*
(0.133) (0.110) (0.121) (0.114)
Equally Scottish & British 0.128 -0.142 -0.168 0.002
(0.140) (0.119) (0.132) (0.124)
More British than Scottish 0.430** 0.011 -0.008 0.170
(0.217) (0.168) (0.178) (0.173)
British not Scottish 0.187 -0.279* -0.125 -0.189
(0.204) (0.162) (0.176) (0.168)
Other description 0.010 -0.318* -0.199 -0.320*
(0.216) (0.180) (0.199) (0.187)
Scot Newspaper -0.063 0.123 0.025 -0.281***
(0.099) (0.081) (0.091) (0.084)
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Schools Agriculture NHS Local Gov
UKNewspaper 0.365** 0.375*** 0.335*** 0.255**
(0.143) (0.104) (0.107) (0.106)
Constant 1.091*** 0.549*** -0.686*** 0.375**
(0.206) (0.169) (0.186) (0.174)
Observations 3409 3409 3409 3409
Nagelkerke R2 0.152 0.145 0.062 0.227
LL -1548.004 -2157.122 -1871.786 -2044.128
AIC 0.922 1.28 1.112 1.213
Table A.4: Logisধc regression predicধng SES 2016 respondents’ knowledge of the devolved electoral system. Q1 =
“You can’t vote for the same party in both the consধtuency and the region”, Q2 = “If you’re going to vote for a small
party, you’re beħer off choosing it in the list vote”, Q3 = “Where a party is very strong, there isn’t much point voধng
for it on list”, and Q4 = “The number of seats won by a party is decided only by the number of consধtuency votes”.
Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: *** 99% ** 95% * 90%
A.2.2 Wales
Respondent AM Butler Drakeford Williams
Age (Centred) 0.020*** 0.006 0.020*** 0.020***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Female -0.038 -0.199 -0.121 -0.370***
(0.080) (0.173) (0.151) (0.133)
Education (Ref = No formal qualifications)
GCSE/National 5 -0.112 0.324 0.137 -0.031
(0.139) (0.362) (0.282) (0.236)
A-level/Higher 0.194 0.388 -0.082 0.143
(0.122) (0.311) (0.252) (0.211)
University Degree 0.426*** 0.765*** 0.478** 0.326*
(0.114) (0.282) (0.224) (0.197)
Social Class (Ref = DE)
AB 0.042 0.547** 0.646*** 0.450**
(0.112) (0.274) (0.231) (0.194)
C1C2 -0.093 0.133 0.145 0.036
(0.100) (0.270) (0.224) (0.176)
Ethnic Minority -0.154 0.497 -0.282 -0.283
(0.181) (0.404) (0.414) (0.327)
Income 0.201** 0.091 0.319* 0.271*
(0.084) (0.190) (0.164) (0.141)
Party ID (Ref = Other/None)
Conservative 0.058 0.152 0.065 -0.062
(0.109) (0.249) (0.209) (0.177)
Labour 0.527*** 0.452** 0.254 0.324*
Continued on next page
202
Table A.5 – continued from previous page
Respondent AM Butler Drakeford Williams
(0.098) (0.217) (0.189) (0.167)
Liberal Democrat 0.428*** -0.25 0.022 0.878***
(0.165) (0.426) (0.327) (0.290)
Plaid Cymru 0.458*** 0.863*** 0.637** 0.657**
(0.160) (0.306) (0.279) (0.274)
Political Interest (Ref = Very interested)
Somewhat interested -0.370*** -0.683*** -0.716*** -0.575***
(0.094) (0.179) (0.160) (0.150)
Not very interested -0.657*** -1.309*** -1.163*** -1.336***
(0.124) (0.356) (0.273) (0.225)
Not at all interested -0.847*** -0.979* -1.420*** -1.918***
(0.167) (0.566) (0.511) (0.373)
Moreno Nat ID (Ref = Welsh not British)
MoreWelsh than British -0.107 -0.251 -0.201 0.099
(0.140) (0.291) (0.256) (0.246)
Equally Welsh andWelsh -0.214 -0.135 -0.335 0.051
(0.133) (0.272) (0.239) (0.229)
More British thanWelsh -0.238 -0.126 -0.412 -0.151
(0.164) (0.331) (0.294) (0.271)
British not Welsh -0.440*** -0.696** -0.886*** -0.399*
(0.140) (0.309) (0.264) (0.237)
None of these/DK -0.458** -0.457 -0.537 -0.526
(0.186) (0.428) (0.377) (0.328)
Welsh Newspaper 0.396** 0.655** 0.693** 0.427
(0.173) (0.300) (0.286) (0.292)
UKNewspaper 0.007 0.06 0.042 -0.17
(0.081) (0.180) (0.156) (0.137)
Welsh TV 0.119 0.793*** 1.076*** 0.667***
(0.085) (0.193) (0.167) (0.141)
UK TV 0.094 0.337 -0.029 0.344**
(0.091) (0.227) (0.193) (0.157)
Constant 0.270 -2.748*** -1.707*** -0.206
(0.187) (0.468) (0.379) (0.330)
Observations 3143 1254 1252 1279
Nagelkerke R2 0.122 0.226 0.284 0.29
LL -1976.318 -487.537 -599.108 -723.451
AIC 1.274 0.819 0.999 1.172
Table A.5: Logisধc regression predicধng WES 2016 respondents’ knowledge of devolved poliধcal actors. Standard
errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: *** 99% ** 95% * 90%
Respondent MP Bercow Hunt Farron
Age (Centred) 0.023*** 0.036*** 0.004 0.005
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
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Respondent MP Bercow Hunt Farron
Female -0.073 -0.587*** -0.306* -0.711***
(0.097) (0.159) (0.159) (0.141)
Education (Ref = No formal qualifications)
GCSE/National 5 0.239 0.268 0.509** 0.633***
(0.161) (0.262) (0.251) (0.245)
A-level/Higher 0.403*** 0.382 0.590*** 0.442**
(0.143) (0.238) (0.228) (0.219)
University Degree 0.624*** 0.745*** 0.921*** 0.822***
(0.136) (0.225) (0.215) (0.203)
Social Class (Ref = DE)
AB 0.040 0.440* 0.943*** 0.488**
(0.138) (0.227) (0.225) (0.206)
C1C2 -0.141 0.176 0.381** 0.192
(0.118) (0.195) (0.188) (0.186)
Ethnic Minority -0.374* -0.378 -0.384 -0.208
(0.203) (0.364) (0.354) (0.345)
Income 0.098 0.412** -0.201 0.159
(0.101) (0.162) (0.163) (0.149)
Party ID (Ref = Other/None)
Conservative 0.172 0.505** 0.186 -0.011
(0.131) (0.220) (0.204) (0.187)
Labour 0.695*** 0.488** 0.588*** 0.324*
(0.122) (0.195) (0.200) (0.179)
Liberal Democrat 0.362* 0.122 0.277 0.917***
(0.201) (0.319) (0.339) (0.327)
Plaid Cymru 0.302 0.154 0.353 0.444
(0.193) (0.298) (0.313) (0.285)
Political Interest (Ref = Very interested)
Somewhat interested -0.410*** -0.980*** -1.035*** -1.355***
(0.126) (0.208) (0.215) (0.173)
Not very interested -1.234*** -1.981*** -2.024*** -2.241***
(0.147) (0.259) (0.260) (0.240)
Not at all interested -1.431*** -2.207*** -2.334*** -3.106***
(0.184) (0.350) (0.331) (0.407)
Moreno Nat ID (Ref = Welsh not British)
MoreWelsh than British 0.04 0.499* 0.561** 0.189
(0.170) (0.270) (0.271) (0.255)
Equally Welsh and British -0.051 0.502** 0.571** 0.326
(0.160) (0.252) (0.251) (0.237)
More British thanWelsh -0.320* 0.652** 0.657** 0.492*
(0.194) (0.317) (0.309) (0.286)
British not Welsh -0.277* 0.624** 0.346 0.434*
(0.166) (0.264) (0.252) (0.247)
None of these/DK -0.413* 0.248 0.451 0.387
(0.216) (0.362) (0.358) (0.350)
Welsh Newspaper 0.638*** 0.417 -0.071 0.239
(0.235) (0.330) (0.322) (0.296)
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Respondent MP Bercow Hunt Farron
UKNewspaper 0.018 0.521*** 0.065 0.139
(0.097) (0.158) (0.159) (0.144)
Welsh TV 0.042 -0.14 -0.057 -0.276*
(0.104) (0.172) (0.168) (0.154)
UK TV 0.069 0.469*** 0.311* 0.566***
(0.108) (0.177) (0.181) (0.168)
Constant 1.294*** 0.192 0.608 0.292
(0.226) (0.372) (0.372) (0.350)
Observations 3143 1292 1274 1265
Nagelkerke R2 0.169 0.376 0.285 0.351
LL -1463.074 -552.751 -563.64 -655.647
AIC 0.948 0.896 0.926 1.078
Table A.6: Logisধc regression predicধng WES 2016 respondents’ knowledge of UK poliধcal actors. Standard errors in
parentheses. Levels of significance: *** 99% ** 95% * 90%
JC Juncker D Tusk M Schulz
Age (Centred) 0.010* 0.004 -0.009
(0.005) (0.006) (0.008)
Female -0.954*** -0.634*** -1.285***
(0.161) (0.178) (0.289)
Education (Ref = No formal qualifications)
GCSE/National 5 0.242 0.614* 0.844
(0.321) (0.350) (0.797)
A-level/Higher 0.499* 0.340 1.404**
(0.276) (0.319) (0.672)
University Degree 0.629** 0.574** 1.807***
(0.248) (0.288) (0.632)
Social Class (Ref = DE)
AB 0.159 0.019 0.300
(0.238) (0.257) (0.428)
C1C2 -0.136 -0.173 0.546
(0.233) (0.252) (0.422)
Ethnic Minority -0.120 -0.210 -0.173
(0.391) (0.413) (0.587)
Income 0.228 0.019 -0.433
(0.172) (0.189) (0.271)
Party ID (Ref = Other/None)
Conservative 0.012 -0.114 0.171
(0.213) (0.244) (0.348)
Labour -0.011 -0.018 -0.236
(0.201) (0.220) (0.335)
Liberal Democrat -0.009 0.265 0.199
(0.321) (0.357) (0.512)
Plaid Cymru 0.117 0.327 -0.177
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JC Juncker D Tusk M Schulz
(0.303) (0.328) (0.533)
Political Interest (Ref = Very interested)
Somewhat interested -0.281* -0.702*** -0.886***
(0.163) (0.183) (0.278)
Not very interested -1.803*** -1.502*** -1.426**
(0.395) (0.380) (0.565)
Not at all interested -1.940*** -1.388** -1.848*
(0.623) (0.557) (1.062)
Moreno Nat ID (Ref = Welsh not British)
MoreWelsh than British -0.710** -0.236 0.362
(0.295) (0.318) (0.529)
Equally Welsh and British -0.002 0.040 0.298
(0.261) (0.290) (0.520)
More British thanWelsh -0.230 -0.224 0.600
(0.316) (0.356) (0.561)
British not Welsh -0.071 -0.180 0.137
(0.273) (0.309) (0.537)
None of these/DK -0.258 0.515 0.739
(0.370) (0.385) (0.618)
Welsh Newspaper 0.120 -0.023 -1.254
(0.322) (0.391) (1.051)
UKNewspaper 0.344** 0.250 0.458*
(0.164) (0.182) (0.277)
Welsh TV -0.154 -0.017 -0.372
(0.171) (0.189) (0.286)
UK TV -0.267 0.140 -0.272
(0.193) (0.218) (0.302)
Constant -0.825** -1.314*** -3.185***
(0.394) (0.445) (0.855)
Observations 1124 1085 1085
Nagelkerke R2 0.192 0.137 0.197
LL -544.581 -463.736 -240.042
AIC 1.015 0.903 0.49
Table A.7: Logisধc regression predicধng WES 2016 respondents’ knowledge of EUpoliধcal actors. Standard errors in
parentheses. Levels of significance: *** 99% ** 95% * 90%
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Law&Order NHS Schools Defence Economy Tax
Age (Centred) 0.015*** 0.030*** 0.029*** 0.035*** 0.031*** 0.038***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Female -0.420*** -0.115 -0.137* -0.176** -0.143* -0.212**
(0.079) (0.080) (0.079) (0.082) (0.080) (0.083)
Education (Ref = No formal quals)
GCSE 0.151 0.461*** 0.379*** 0.492*** 0.479*** 0.441***
(0.141) (0.142) (0.140) (0.148) (0.143) (0.148)
A-level -0.071 0.219* 0.204* 0.18 0.258** 0.248*
(0.125) (0.124) (0.124) (0.126) (0.123) (0.127)
Degree 0.222* 0.512*** 0.474*** 0.398*** 0.409*** 0.403***
(0.114) (0.115) (0.114) (0.118) (0.114) (0.119)
Social Class (Ref = DE)
AB 0.140 0.296*** 0.220** 0.276** 0.215* 0.223*
(0.111) (0.111) (0.110) (0.115) (0.111) (0.116)
C1C2 0.041 0.190* 0.200** 0.143 0.162 0.146
(0.102) (0.101) (0.101) (0.102) (0.100) (0.103)
Ethnic Minority -0.230 -0.032 0.137 -0.156 -0.088 -0.317*
(0.187) (0.183) (0.181) (0.183) (0.179) (0.183)
Income 0.045 0.085 0.051 0.102 0.195** 0.085
(0.085) (0.085) (0.084) (0.087) (0.085) (0.088)
Party ID (Ref = Other/None)
Conservative -0.021 0.319*** 0.161 0.13 0.151 0.122
(0.111) (0.112) (0.109) (0.116) (0.111) (0.117)
Labour 0.045 0.141 0.129 0.177* 0.336*** 0.123
(0.098) (0.098) (0.097) (0.101) (0.098) (0.101)
Liberal Democrat 0.253 0.135 0.077 0.147 0.154 0.035
(0.163) (0.164) (0.163) (0.170) (0.164) (0.169)
Plaid Cymru -0.093 0.238 0.079 -0.014 -0.038 -0.016
(0.154) (0.156) (0.154) (0.159) (0.154) (0.160)
Political interest (Ref = Very interested)
Somewhat interested -0.328*** -0.135 -0.049 -0.085 0.012 -0.07
(0.090) (0.093) (0.091) (0.097) (0.093) (0.098)
Not very interested -0.640*** -0.610*** -0.467*** -0.450*** -0.291** -0.513***
(0.126) (0.124) (0.123) (0.127) (0.123) (0.127)
Not at all interested -0.874*** -1.141*** -1.048*** -0.821*** -0.689*** -0.945***
(0.185) (0.182) (0.186) (0.172) (0.170) (0.173)
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Law&Order NHS Schools Defence Economy Tax
Moreno Nat ID (Ref = Welsh not British)
MoreWelsh than British -0.096 0.038 0.070 0.177 0.124 0.16
(0.137) (0.139) (0.138) (0.142) (0.138) (0.142)
Equally Welsh and British -0.108 -0.021 -0.004 -0.017 0.056 0
(0.130) (0.132) (0.131) (0.134) (0.131) (0.135)
More British thanWelsh -0.322** 0.175 0.145 0.131 0.028 0.114
(0.163) (0.166) (0.163) (0.170) (0.164) (0.171)
British not Welsh -0.517*** -0.032 -0.025 -0.005 -0.059 -0.019
(0.140) (0.140) (0.139) (0.142) (0.138) (0.143)
None of these/DK -0.304 -0.068 -0.150 0.073 0.024 -0.044
(0.186) (0.187) (0.186) (0.190) (0.185) (0.191)
Welsh Newspaper 0.193 0.158 0.322** 0.111 0.047 0.113
(0.159) (0.166) (0.163) (0.174) (0.166) (0.175)
UKNewspaper -0.135* -0.065 -0.034 -0.148* -0.140* -0.089
(0.082) (0.082) (0.081) (0.084) (0.082) (0.085)
Welsh TV 0.120 0.101 0.138 0.013 -0.040 0.041
(0.085) (0.086) (0.085) (0.089) (0.086) (0.089)
UK TV 0.087 0.223** 0.121 0.216** 0.183** 0.12
(0.093) (0.091) (0.091) (0.093) (0.091) (0.094)
Constant -0.001 -0.484*** -0.626*** 0.066 -0.279 0.197
(0.186) (0.188) (0.187) (0.191) (0.186) (0.192)
Observations 3143 3143 3143 3143 3143 3143
Nagelkerke R2 0.096 0.168 0.14 0.165 0.133 0.175
LL -1989.49 -1960.705 -2002.664 -1880.562 -1971.902 -1861.371
AIC 1.283 1.264 1.291 1.213 1.271 1.201
Table A.8: Logisধc regression predicধng WES 2016 respondents’ knowledge of aħribuধon of responsibility. Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of signifi-
cance: *** 99% ** 95% * 90%
208
B
Supplementary Information for Chapter 4
B.1 National Identity Distributions
Figures B.1 and B.2 illustrate the distributions of British, English and Scottish/Welsh national iden-
tity in Scotland andWales.
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Figure B.1: Kernel density esধmates of BES naধonal idenধধes in Scotland Source: BESIP
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Figure B.2: Kernel density esধmates of BES naধonal idenধধes in Wales Source: BESIP
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B.1.1 HoldingMultiple Identities
Many citizens do not hold a single national identity, but an often complicated mix of several na-
tional identities. Figures B.3 and B.4 illustrate the combined distributions of Scottishness and
Welshness with Britishness and with Englishness. Focusing first on Scottishness/Welshness and
Britishness, the negative skew of the distribution suggests that considerable number of voters feel
at least partially British and Scottish/ Welsh. Conversely – and unsurprisingly – very few respon-
dents appear to identify with Englishness in Scotland andWales, although the distribution inWales
suggests more English identifiers than Scotland.
Figure B.3: Kernel density esধmates of mulধple idenধধes in Scotland. 0 - 14 scale derived from adding two 7-point
naধonal idenধty scales together Source: BESIP
Figure B.5 looks at Scottish andWelshness combined with Englishness. The normal distributions
provided in both suggests result from two possibilities. First, is that respondents felt very strongly
attached to one identity and not attached at all to the other. The second is that respondents felt a
medium degree of attachment to both identities. Subsequent analysis of the data tells us that the
first explanation is the case for the vast majority of respondents.
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Figure B.4: Kernel density esধmates of mulধple idenধধes in Wales. 0 - 14 scale derived from adding two 7-point
naধonal idenধty scales together Source: BESIP
Figure B.5: Do Scoষshness and Welshness overlap with Englishness? 0 - 14 scale derived from adding two 7-point
naধonal idenধty scales together Source: BESIP
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B.1.2 Alternative measures of national identity
In addition to this modified Moreno scale, I use the BES national identity questions to create a set
of discrete identity categories. In these categories respondents who gave a score of ‘6’ or ‘7’ for each
category are considered to identify strongly with that national identity (Figures B.1 and B.2 provides
distribution of these scores). Respondents were then grouped according to which categories they
identified strongly with. The proportion of the sample in each category is given in Table B.1.
Wales Scotland
ID Group Weighted % IDGroup Weighted %
British only 14.68 British only 9.83
English only 1.98 English only 0.93
Welsh only 23.05 Scottish only 43.21
British & English 14.83 British & English 5.45
British &Welsh 29.66 British & Scottish 25.68
English &Welsh 0.24 English & Scottish 0.47
British & English &Welsh 3.61 British & English & Scottish 2.69
Other Identity 11.95 Other Identity 11.75
Weighted N 3,612 6,047
Table B.1: Naধonal idenধty categories in Scotland and Wales. BESIP
Confirming the pattern illustrated in Figure 4.2, there are clear differences in the relative size of
national identity groups in Scotland andWales. In Scotland the largest group by a considerable
amount are those who fall into the ’Scottish only’ category, followed by the British and Scottish
category. Over two-thirds of all BES respondents in Scotland can be sorted into these two categories.
In contrast, Wales presents a far more heterogeneous picture regarding national identity. No single
category contains more than one third of the Welsh sample, with noticeably larger groups of those
identifying as ‘British Only’ and ‘British and English’. The greater presence of ‘British’ and ‘En-
glish’ sentiment inWales compared to Scotland can, in part, be explained by greater in-migration to
Wales from England. According to the 2011 UK Census, 21% of the Welsh population were born in
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England, compared to 9% in Scotland and greater reliance on combined England andWales or even
England only institutions (e.g. see Chapter 3).
B.1.3 Subjective Left-Right Placement with ‘Don’t know’
England Scotland Wales Total
0 - Left 2.33 3.88 3.61 2.53
1 2.25 3.78 2.39 2.39
2 6.89 9.66 8.04 7.19
3 8.93 12.44 8.93 9.24
4 6.78 8.51 7.15 6.95
5 18.07 18.22 20.51 18.2
6 8.47 6.46 6.87 8.21
7 10.4 7.54 8.55 10.06
8 8.97 5.34 6.08 8.51
9 2.59 1.71 2.05 2.49
10 - Right 2.67 2.03 2.27 2.6
Don’t Know 21.65 20.43 23.56 21.64
Weighted N 26,037 2,631 1,517 30,186
B.2 Full Regression Tables for Table 4.3
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Figure B.6: Marginal effect of naধonal idenধty interacted with Independence Referendum vote on probability of
voধng for Scoষsh Bloc 2015-2017. Source: TableB.2
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C
Supplementary Information for Chapter 5
C.1 Impact of EU Referendum on Devolved Elections
The 2016 devolved elections – the first since the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum – took
place in the shadow of another significant referendum. Despite requests from the First Ministers
of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland then PrimeMinister David Cameron set the date for the
EU Referendum to 23rd June 2016, within six weeks of the devolved elections (Mason, 2016). The
proximity of such a major UK-wide political event inevitably affected the behaviours of voters and
elites. Much of the political information people were receiving was heavily influenced by discussion
of the EU and UK (and, by proxy, English) politics, raising the salience of extra-territorial issues.
This was particularly prevalent inWales, which lacks a strong domestic media, and hence heavily
relies on English-based media (see Chapter 3). As part of WES 2016 ‘rolling thunder’ campaign wave,
roughly 100 respondents were chosen from the larger sample and interviewed in the 30 days leading
up to the National Assembly for Wales elections. Respondents were asked whether they agreed with
the statement ‘The Assembly election has been completely over-shadowed by the EU referendum’.
Figure C.1 displays their responses.
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Figure C.1: WES 2016 respondents who agreed that “the Naধonal Assembly for Wales elecধon had been completely
overshadowed by the EU referendum.”
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C.2 Sample robustness checks
Variable Odds Ratio Odds Change (%) Std. Err.
Age (Centred) 1.037939 0.037939 0.0026686
Female 0.8407901 -0.1592099 0.0688698
Social Class (Ref=DE)
AB 1.008261 0.1095913
C1C2 1.39666 0.39666 0.142234
Education (Ref = No Qualifications)
GCSE/National 5 1.152127 0.1671961
A-level/Higher 0.9068793 0.1139944
University Degree 1.119061 0.1301853
Partisan 0.6394036 -0.3605964 0.0702282
Political Interest (Ref=Very interested)
Somewhat interested 1.074811 0.1085609
Not very interested 0.9567837 0.150704
Not at all interested 1.053363 0.2402824
Political Knowledge 1.008173 0.0269771
Table C.1: Logit regressions predicধng whether respondent took part in both the BES and WES. Significant effects
presented with % odds change for ease of interpretaধon. Source: WES 2016
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C.3 Distribution of national identity variables
Figure C.2: Distribuধons of BES naধonal idenধty scales in sample
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C.3.1 Partisanship and Gender
Figure C.3 illustrates the gender gap among respondents reporting ‘Very strong’ support for a partic-
ular political party. Higher proportions of male respondents consistently identify as supporters of
a single political party across all waves of the BESIP, although the gap appears to close somewhat in
waves 12 and 13.
Figure C.3: % of ‘Very Strong’ party supporters in BESIP, waves 1-13, by respondent gender.
C.4 Multilevel Model
It is possible that voters may switch party between election to different levels of government due
to factors that are not necessarily held at the individual-level, but rather at a higher level. In Wales,
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Welshness 0.074* 0.068 0.042 0.077 0.073 0.105*
(0.044) (0.043) (0.048) (0.054) (0.057) (0.057)
Britishness -0.025 -0.05 -0.035 -0.038 -0.004 -0.006
(0.053) (0.056) (0.061) (0.066) (0.070) (0.072)
Age (Centred) -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Female 0.633*** 0.500** 0.568** 0.660*** 0.698***
(0.184) (0.200) (0.230) (0.242) (0.248)
Social Class (Ref = DE)
AB 0.121 0.122 -0.048 0.02 0.107
(0.246) (0.272) (0.291) (0.315) (0.316)
C1C2 0.244 0.450* 0.392 0.424 0.429
(0.228) (0.255) (0.272) (0.294) (0.295)
Education (Ref = No formal quals)
GCSE 0.106 0.164 0.148 0.061 0.024
(0.316) (0.341) (0.357) (0.383) (0.386)
A-level -0.347 -0.446 -0.524* -0.598* -0.634*
(0.277) (0.296) (0.317) (0.331) (0.331)
Degree -0.304 -0.463* -0.571* -0.653** -0.700**
(0.253) (0.280) (0.309) (0.329) (0.332)
Strong Partisan -0.418** -0.322 -0.307 -0.269
(0.207) (0.228) (0.244) (0.248)
Personal Importance -0.054 -0.04 -0.031
(0.040) (0.043) (0.044)
Gov. Performance 0.557** 0.507** 0.409*
(0.232) (0.246) (0.247)
Brexit at odds -0.088 0.008
(0.265) (0.269)
Margin 0.019***
(0.006)
Constant -1.033** -1.197** -1.017* -0.946 -1.270* -1.955**
(0.433) (0.508) (0.581) (0.694) (0.752) (0.812)
Observations 1109 1088 987 837 783 783
Nagelkerke R2 0.007 0.035 0.046 0.07 0.069 0.099
LL -310.609 -297.342 -244.287 -204.076 -187.29 -182.443
AIC 0.566 0.565 0.517 0.519 0.514 0.504
Table C.2: Full logit regression output used to calculate figures for Table 5.2. Results presented as log-odds with
standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: *** 99% ** 95% * 90%
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Labour Conservative Plaid Cymru UKIP
Welshness 0.452*** 0.033 -0.336 0.545**
(0.125) (0.108) (0.228) (0.225)
Britishness 0.199 -0.351** 0.308 0.428*
(0.154) (0.170) (0.218) (0.233)
Age (Centred) 0.027 0.022 -0.031 -0.047*
(0.017) (0.020) (0.022) (0.025)
Female 0.396 0.787 -0.195 1.201*
(0.521) (0.497) (0.627) (0.669)
Social Class (Ref = DE)
AB -0.003 0.647 -0.837 0.857
(0.735) (0.684) (0.879) (1.112)
C1C2 0.724 1.479** -1.831 1.371
(0.531) (0.600) (1.114) (1.020)
Education (Ref = no formal quals)
GCSE -0.865 -0.688 1.606 0.401
(0.820) (0.804) (2.134) (0.749)
A-level -1.038* -1.164** 0.414 -0.24
(0.630) (0.556) (1.415) (0.933)
Degree -0.017 -1.634*** 1.192 -0.593
(0.716) (0.625) (1.195) (0.946)
Strong Partisan -0.039 -0.551 -0.989 0.031
(0.514) (0.564) (0.808) (1.078)
Personal Importance -0.042 -0.126 0.075 -0.059
(0.079) (0.086) (0.329) (0.121)
Gov. Performance 1.285*** 0.198 -0.807 0.041
(0.491) (0.525) (0.770) (0.705)
Brexit at odds 0.545 -0.958* -1.482* 1.879
(0.598) (0.523) (0.777) (2.000)
Margin 0.058*** 0.036*** -0.022 -0.031
(0.013) (0.011) (0.022) (0.027)
Constant -6.206*** 0.897 -0.019 -6.539***
(1.227) (1.559) (4.752) (2.452)
Observations 273 210 96 114
Nagelkerke R2 0.357 0.234 0.253 0.357
LL -52.814 -37.191 -11.281 -18.968
AIC 0.497 0.497 0.548 0.596
Table C.3: Full logit regression output used to calculate figures for Table 5.3. Results presented as log-odds with
standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: *** 99% ** 95% * 90%
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voters are divided into constituencies, within which separate electoral contests occur. It could be
the case that constituency-specific issues encourage voters to switch party between levels, factors
that individual-level models would not pick up. Initial analysis shows considerable variation in the
proportion of voters in each constituency switching their vote between levels. Figure C.4 shows the
amount of variation between constituencies in the levels of multilevel voting when no individual-
level factors are accounted for.
Figure C.4: Variaধon in amount of switching between consধtuencies without individual-level controls.
To test for possible constituency effects I re-ranModel 6 from Table C.2 as a random intercepts
model, with respondent constituency as a level-2 unit. The results are presented in Table C.4. For
ease of interpretation I have included a caterpillar plot (Figure C.5 of constituency level residuals
once individual-level factors have been accounted for. As all the confidence intervals cross over the
median estimated constituency effect – no effect in this case – we can say that once individual-level
factors are controlled for, the variation between constituencies is no longer significant: i.e. there is
no significant constituency effect.
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Figure C.5: Caterpillar plot of consধtuency residuals with individual-level controls
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Welshness 0.043
(0.038)
Britshness 0.077
(0.056)
Age (Centred) -0.004
(0.007)
Female 0.328*
(0.171)
Social Class (Ref = DE)
AB -0.088
(0.236)
C1C2 0.140
(0.219)
Education (Ref = No formal quals)
GCSE 0.189
(0.250)
A-level 0.054
(0.249)
Degree 0.046
(0.219)
Strong Partisan -0.529***
(0.177)
Personal Importance -0.035
(0.031)
Brexit at odds -0.088
(0.198)
Gov. performance 0.001
(0.172)
Margin 0.016***
(0.004)
Constant -1.662***
(0.561)
var(_cons[constituency] 0.079
(0.089)
Observations 843
Log pseudoliklihood -456.683
Δ in Log pseudoliklihood 281.906
Table C.4: Random intercept model predicধng whether a respondent switches the party they vote for between elec-
ধons to different levels with respondent consধtuency as level 2 variable. Change in Log pseudoliklihood calculated as
difference from null model. Results presented as log-odds with standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance:
*** 99% ** 95% * 90%
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D
Supplementary Information for Chapter 6
D.1 Incumbency Effects: Aggregate-level Analysis
In the main body of this chapter, I suggest that an incumbency effect might lead people to cast a
split-ticket. One method for uncovering the existence of an ‘incumbency’ effect is to analyze avail-
able sources of aggregate-level data for voting at SP and NAW elections. Since the 2011 devolved elec-
tion, The Electoral Commission has published constituency level data for both ballots in Scotland
andWales. This means that for each constituency, the number of votes is recorded for each con-
stituency candidate, but also the number of votes cast for each party on the list in that constituency.
While aggregate data is not an ideal source for studying split-ticket voting it can provide an insight
into the existence of a incumbency effect during these elections (see King, 2013a, on the problem of
ecological inference). Specifically, it can identify which candidates outperform their parties in their
constituency.
By calculating the ‘candidate gap’ (candidates’ vote share in constituency - party list share of can-
didate’s party in constituency) we can develop a relatively clear idea of which candidate’s outperform
their parties. Figures D.1 and D.2 plot this candidate vote gap as a function of that candidate’s party
229
vote share in the regional list vote at the 2011 and 2016 SP and NAW elections.
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Figure D.1: Incumbency scaħer plot, Scotland. IN = Incumbent, CH = Challenger, and PIN = Party Incumbent Source: The Electoral Commission
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Figure D.2: Incumbency scaħer plot, Wales. IN = Incumbent, CH = Challenger, and PIN = Party Incumbent Source: The Electoral Commission
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Incumbents do perform better in their constituencies than their parties do in almost every case
by between five and fifteen points. This is similar for party incumbents (candidates who are from
the same party as previous incumbent), although they seem to do slightly less well. This is largely to
be expected; there is more competition for list seats with more parties standing. In both cases there
are extreme outliers where candidates outperform their parties by such large margins that there is a
strong likelihood a personal vote was at play.
The same graphs are replicated in Figures D.3 and D.4. Rather than identifying candidates by
their incumbency statues, these figures identify them by their political party. In both Scotland and
Wales, the most extreme outliers are Liberal Democrat candidates who remain elected whilst their
party share collapsed 55.
If there was evidence of an incumbency effect during these elections, we would expect incum-
bents to have a positive candidate gap, indicating that they are more popular than - and therefore
outperform - their parties in that constituency. Where strategic voting takes place we would expect
to see the opposite: party’s receiving more votes than their candidates in constituencies as voters
deviate from their preferences at the constituency level to vote for a viable candidate.
233
Figure D.3: Incumbency scaħer plot by party, Scotland. Source: The Electoral Commission
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Figure D.4: Incumbency scaħer plot by party, Wales Source: The Electoral Commission
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1999 2003 2007 2011 2016
Scotland 51.3 50.9 59.6 26.7 41.0
N 1,361 1,359 1,532 1,709 2,934
Wales 49.1 47.9 52.2 19.9 28.5
N 424 789 785 1,847 2,569
Table D.1: % of respondents who prefer coaliধon government. Source: SES & WES 1999-2016. All data are weighted
D.2 Coalition attitudes
Table D.1 shows the proportion of respondents in Scotland andWales whose preference is coalition
government. In both the Scotland andWales data, approximately half of all respondents express a
preference for a coalition government between 1999 and 2007. A considerable drop is seen in 2011,
perhaps explained by the unpopularity of the UK Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition at the
time.
It therefore seems that the experience of coalition government in Scotland andWales was a pos-
itive one for many voters. As a result, voters might adjust their voting behaviour appropriately in
order to maximize the perceived chance of a coalition occurring between their two preferred parties.
D.3 Full Regression Tables
Scotland SMD Scotland List
Gap 0.022*** 0.029***
(0.003) (0.003)
Incumbent 0.203* 0.044
(0.107) (0.102)
Age (Centred) -0.014*** -0.016***
(0.003) (0.003)
Female -0.462*** -0.356***
(0.103) (0.100)
Education (Ref = no formal quals)
National 5s -0.025 -0.238
Continued on next page
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Table D.2 – continued from previous page
Scotland SMD Scotland List
(0.239) (0.232)
Highers 0.469*** 0.358**
(0.178) (0.172)
Degree 0.641*** 0.516***
(0.164) (0.160)
Party Support Strength (Ref = none at all)
Very strong 0.173 -0.075
(0.222) (0.212)
Fairly strong 0.389** 0.198
(0.170) (0.163)
Not strong 0.274* 0.114
(0.166) (0.159)
Why did you vote the way you did? (Ref = Always vote thॾ way)
Best policies 0.838*** 0.968***
(0.167) (0.149)
Best leader 0.513** 0.162
(0.210) (0.201)
Specific candidate 2.497*** 1.894***
(0.214) (0.276)
Tactical vote 1.899*** 1.214***
(0.189) (0.181)
Preferred no chance of winning 2.343*** 1.620***
(0.280) (0.345)
Preferred not standing 3.901*** 2.699***
(0.360) (0.882)
Other 2.590*** 2.843***
(0.281) (0.240)
Constant -3.447*** -3.038***
(0.276) (0.261)
Observations 2,854 2,854
Nagelkerke R2 0.339 0.278
AIC 0.883 0.935
LL -1242.437 -1316.052
Table D.2: How did Scoষsh respondents explain their votes? Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance:
*** 99% ** 95% * 90%
Wales SMD Wales List
Gap 0.012*** 0.018***
(0.004) (0.004)
Incumbent 0.447*** 0.436***
(0.126) (0.130)
Age (Centred) 0.001 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004)
Female -0.339*** -0.384***
Continued on next page
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Table D.3 – continued from previous page
Wales SMD Wales List
(0.120) (0.126)
Education (Ref = no formal quals)
GCSE -0.027 0.116
(0.242) (0.247)
A-level 0.360* 0.333
(0.196) (0.203)
Degree 0.355** 0.273
(0.171) (0.178)
Prefer Coalition 0.678*** 0.710***
(0.125) (0.129)
Party support strength (Ref = None at all)
Very strong 0.133 0.066
(0.306) (0.316)
Fairly strong 0.496* 0.508*
(0.277) (0.285)
Not strong 0.277 0.363
(0.277) (0.283)
Why did you vote the way you did? (Ref = Always vote thॾ way)
Best policies 0.452*** 0.521***
(0.164) (0.174)
Best leader 0.468* 0.447*
(0.240) (0.260)
Specific candidate 1.772*** 0.905***
(0.226) (0.330)
Preferred no chance of winning 1.934*** 1.826***
(0.297) (0.367)
Tactical 1.434*** 1.795***
(0.241) (0.230)
Preferred not standing 3.025***
(0.830)
Second pref: first in constit 4.493***
(0.539)
Other 1.391*** 1.845***
(0.298) (0.289)
Constant -2.590*** -2.749***
(0.354) (0.370)
Observations 1,707 1,707
Nagelkerke R2 0.199 0.278
AIC 1.074 1.008
LL -898.022 -841.605
Table D.3: How did Welsh respondents explain their votes? Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance: ***
99% ** 95% * 90%
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Scotland ’07 Scotland ’16 Wales ’07 Wales ’11 Wales ’16
Gap 0.018* 0.029*** 0.017 0.022*** 0.021***
(0.009) (0.003) (0.016) (0.005) (0.005)
Voted for incumbent -0.249 0.058 -0.956*** 0.019 0.383***
(0.241) (0.117) (0.360) (0.230) (0.145)
Age (Centred) -0.006 -0.010*** 0.012 -0.006 0.007
(0.009) (0.004) (0.010) (0.007) (0.005)
Female 0.092 -0.518*** -0.205 -0.004 -0.280**
(0.247) (0.115) (0.307) (0.209) (0.142)
Education (Ref = no formal quals)
GCSE/National 5 -0.028 0.201 0.233 0.514 0.103
(0.450) (0.276) (0.427) (0.347) (0.279)
A-level/Higher 0.977** 0.651*** 0.241 0.550* 0.420*
(0.415) (0.189) (0.459) (0.331) (0.231)
Degree 0.838* 0.941*** 0.814* 0.146 0.296
(0.454) (0.174) (0.457) (0.297) (0.203)
Prefers coalition 0.666** 0.359 0.219 0.690***
(0.262) (0.329) (0.260) (0.147)
Party support strength
Very strong 0.416 -0.093 0.259 0.746 0.241
(0.481) (0.186) (0.883) (0.581) (0.298)
Fairly strong 0.128 0.002 0.154 -0.017 0.516*
(0.506) (0.186) (0.895) (0.266) (0.299)
Not very strong -0.662 -0.477* -0.295 0.252 0.115
(0.454) (0.245) (0.964) (0.247) (0.339)
Constant -2.213*** -2.320*** -1.516 -1.830*** -2.168***
(0.730) (0.272) (0.922) (0.312) (0.349)
Observations 1,202 2,854 348 973 1,707
Nagelkerke R2 0.166 0.167 0.113 0.081 0.071
LL -669.095 -1269.415 -169.178 -524.803 -756.798
AIC 1.133 0.897 1.041 1.103 0.901
Table D.4: Logit Regression predicধng split-ধcket voধng (1). Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance:
*** 99% ** 95% * 90%
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Wales ’11 Wales ’16
Age (Centred) -0.001 0.015**
(0.010) (0.007)
female 0.189 -0.334
(0.282) (0.207)
Education (Ref = no formal quals)
GCSE 0.158 -0.13
(0.434) (0.382)
A-level 0.244 0.248
(0.439) (0.321)
Degree 0.245 0.227
(0.410) (0.285)
Constituency vote (Ref = Other)
Conservative 0.211 -4.403***
(0.476) (0.677)
Labour 0.207 -4.572***
(0.429) (0.860)
Liberal Democrat 0.426 -3.975***
(0.568) (0.761)
Plaid Cymru -0.406 -4.392***
(0.475) (0.681)
UKIP -4.845***
(0.705)
Incumbent -0.003 0.691
(0.317) (0.568)
Prefers Coalition 0.646* 1.045***
(0.344) (0.213)
Party support strength (Ref = none at all)
Very strong 0.309 -0.649
(0.324) (0.421)
Fairly strong -0.027 -0.097
(0.352) (0.369)
Not very strong 0.928 -0.398
(0.643) (0.388)
Constant -1.769*** 2.789***
(0.447) (0.737)
Observations 570 980
Nagelkerke R2 0.043 0.221
LL -315.699 -388.497
AIC 1.16 0.826
Table D.5: Logit Regression predicধng split-ধcket voধng (2). Standard errors in parentheses. Levels of significance:
*** 99% ** 95% * 90%
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Figure D.5: List ballot results for Mid Scotland and Fife region, 2011 Source: Fife Council
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